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Introduction: Towards a Political-Cultural Explanation of the “Christian 
Right” 
 
Between the 1960s and the 1980s the decline of mainline Protestant churches and the 
simultaneous growth of conservative denominations enabled evangelicalism to become the 
largest religious group in the whole of the United States.1 The dominance of evangelicals in 
the post-war American religious landscape naturally made the movement a particularly 
potent political resource. Evangelicals’ shift from being a bipartisan group to a predominantly 
Republican movement with strong right-wing affiliations is therefore justifiably considered 
to be one of the most significant political reorientations in twentieth century American history. 
Ever since this realignment was forged in the late-1970s, the so-called “Christian Right” has 
received a large amount of attention from historians and political scientists. But most of the 
scholarly attention devoted to the growth of contemporary white evangelicalism and the 
emergence of its politicised offspring the Christian Right has focussed on the movement from 
broad, generalised perspectives. This thesis arises from the need for a study which examines 
the post-war history of white evangelicalism at a local, congregational level. By viewing the 
movement though the lens of congregational culture, this methodology is receptive to how 
the post-war history of white evangelicalism was influenced by the urban, political and 
socioeconomic forces that existed in American localities at the end of the twentieth century. 
The most important effect of this novel approach towards contemporary evangelicalism is, as 
this thesis demonstrates, a reinterpretation of the nature and origins of the movement’s post-
1970s political shifts.  
 The case study chosen to carry out this congregational analysis is Bellevue Baptist 
Church in Memphis, Tennessee, one of the largest and most well-known evangelical 
congregations in the United States. As Richard Kyle somewhat understatedly remarks, 
evangelicalism is a ‘broad movement’ that in the American context encompasses a large 
number of different denominations and includes ‘many diverse elements, some [of which are] 
in conflict with each other’. 2  Bellevue could therefore never be said to represent 
evangelicalism as a whole. However, Bellevue’s historical, theological and geographical 
characteristics make the church a particularly appropriate site for examining ‘the conservative 
political alignment’ of evangelicalism that took place within the movement from the 1980s 
onwards. 3  Bellevue’s strict theological conservatism and opposition to cultural 
accommodation means the church is positioned firmly on the “fundamentalist” side of the 
evangelical ideological continuum, an orientation which many—if not the majority—of the 
Christian Right’s constituents have shared in common. 4  Moreover, Bellevue’s physical 
                                                          
1 Axel R. Schafer, “Religion, the Cold War State, and the Resurgence of Evangelism in the US, 1942 – 
1990”, ZENAF Arbeits und Forschungsberichte (ZAF) (2006), p. 5. 
2  Richard G. Kyle, Evangelicalism: An Americanized Christianity, (New Brunswick, NJ and London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2006), p. 11, 13. 
3 Schafer, “Religion, the Cold War State”, p. 10. 
4 Over four decades ago expert of evangelicalism Richard Quebedeaux conceived of five different 
categories of evangelicals which are still relevant today. The two most extreme categories in 
Quebedeaux’s system are the “Separatist Fundamentalists” and the “Open Fundamentalists”. The 
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presence in a large southern city has meant that the church’s history has inevitably been 
entwined with post-war urban history, and in particular the forces that transformed the 
socioeconomic, political, demographic and racial terrain of the American South. This most 
obviously includes the phenomenon known as “white flight”, which was one of the key 
narratives of the post-civil rights era South and which Bellevue itself participated in in 1989 
by withdrawing from its original inner-city location to a suburban neighbourhood. Lastly, 
Bellevue is a suitable case study because the church had actual, tangible connections with the 
conservative political tendencies that rose from within the evangelical movement. Dr Adrian 
Rogers—who was Bellevue’s pastor between 1972 and 2005 and who oversaw a prolonged 
period of exceptional growth for the church—was one of the main “architects” of the Southern 
Baptist Convention’s “Conservative Resurgence”, an attempt by conservatives to drive out all 
traces of liberalism from the denomination and which had close links with the Christian Right 
itself. 5  The case study of Bellevue Baptist Church therefore provides an opportunity to 
investigate how the congregational culture of an important church related to the post-war 
history of evangelicalism and the regional locales of Memphis and the US South.  
 The most important contribution of this thesis is its reinterpretation of conservative 
evangelicalism’s political and electoral alliance with the Republican Party. By shifting the 
historiography’s attention away from the movement’s elite-level mobilisation, it offers an 
alternative reading of the causes of the movement’s post-war political realignments. The issue 
of white evangelicals’ enduring electoral and political loyalties towards the GOP have 
occupied political scientists and historians for decades, but the causes of such an alliance have 
still not been fully understood. Up until the 1980 presidential election, evangelicals were 
roughly as likely to vote Democrat as they were to side with Republican candidates. In the 
1976 presidential race, for instance, almost half of white evangelicals (and fifty-six percent of 
white Baptists) voted for the Georgian Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter. But by the next 
election white evangelicals had become solidly Republican, and in 1980 sixty-seven percent 
of white evangelicals voted for the GOP candidate Ronald Reagan.6 This electoral devotion 
has remained persistent ever since, with around eighty percent of conservative evangelicals 
backing the GOP in the 2000 and 2004 elections, and the movement supporting 2008 
                                                          
former group has the most militant, uncompromising approach towards theology and cultural 
accommodation, and could be said to include organisations such as Bob Jones University, which was a 
key player in the build-up of the Christian Right. The latter group is slightly less militant theologically, 
‘is less vocal and extreme about its separatist posture,’ and is ‘willing to engage in dialogue with other 
Orthodox schools of thought’. Since it adheres to the most conservative form of evangelical theology, 
Bellevue’s position is perhaps closer to the Separatist strand of fundamentalism than the Open one. 
Richard Quebedeaux, Young Evangelicals: The Story of the Emergence of a New Generation of Evangelicals, 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 19, quoted in Kyle, Evangelicalism, p. 15. 
5 See Barry Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon: Southern Baptist Conservatives and American Culture, (Tuscaloosa, 
AL and London: The University of Alabama Press), p. 6. 
6 Daniel K. Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right, (Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p. 193. Meanwhile, Jimmy Carter’s share of the southern evangelical vote 
dropped from 56 percent in 1976 to 34 percent in 1980—an astonishingly sharp and rapid decline in 
popularity, especially considering Carter was himself a born-again Christian. Evangelicals’ preference 
for Republican candidates has strengthened ever since, with the GOP becoming ‘increasingly 
dependent on its evangelical constituency’. Ibid, p. 8. 
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Republican nominee John McCain ‘over Barack Obama by a 3-1 margin’.7 Most of the existing 
literature on the Christian Right has focussed on how the movement’s most powerful leaders 
mobilised evangelical support for conservative “moral” issues and forged strong, politically-
lucrative connections with the Republican Party. The historiography’s preoccupation with 
Christian Right’s elite is in many ways understandable. Indeed, it was figures like the 
Lynchburg, Virginia pastor and televangelist Jerry Falwell who ‘could claim at least partial 
responsibility for turning conservative evangelicals into a Republican voting bloc that party 
strategists could not afford to ignore’.8 Not long before the 1980 presidential election, Falwell 
and others had persuaded Reagan and the right-wing of the Republican Party to adopt an 
evangelical platform which included proposals to ban abortion, shelve the Equal Rights 
Amendment and reintroduce state-sponsored school prayer. Thus, in 1980 the United States 
witnessed an ideological convergence between an insurgent conservative evangelical 
movement and the GOP, a relationship which leaders such as Falwell were no doubt partially 
responsible for engineering.  
However, despite the obvious necessity of examining the courtship that took place 
between the Republican and evangelical elites, such a process is a well-trodden topic of 
research, and more importantly it overlooks how this significant moment in the post-war 
history of evangelicalism played out at a local level. Individual churches have seldom featured 
in scholarly attempts to understand contemporary conservative evangelicalism, least of all in 
the context of the movement’s most politically prominent iteration of the twentieth century, 
the Christian Right. This has resulted in a gap in the field’s understanding of an important 
mechanism through which—as this thesis shows—the movement was involved with politics: 
congregational culture. It is indeed striking that, despite widespread acknowledgement that 
the Christian Right was predominantly a “grassroots” phenomenon, there has not been more 
of an effort to understand how evangelical politics actually operated in America’s pews. After 
all, the success of Falwell and others in building alliances with the Republican Party would 
have counted for little without the millions of white evangelicals who committed their 
political allegiances to the GOP between the 1976 and 1980 presidential elections, and who 
have stayed faithful to the Party ever since. These voters formed the backbone of conservative 
evangelicalism’s late-twentieth century political realignment, but relatively little is known 
about the local, congregational forces which related to evangelicals’ Republicanisation. 9 
Instead, top-down perspectives have dominated the historiography of the movement.  
                                                          
7 Daniel K. Williams, “Jerry Falwell’s Sunbelt Politics: The Regional Origins of the Moral Majority,” The 
Journal of Policy History, Vol. 22, No., 2 (2010), accessed, April 10, 2013, DOI: 10.1017/S0898030610000011, 
p. 125. 
8 Williams, God’s Own Party, p. 193. Much of the Christian Right’s success was about ‘capitalizing on 
conservative evangelicals’ unease with the social changes taking place in America’ ever since the civil 
rights movement era. In turn, ‘Falwell and his allies succeeded in channelling this anxiety about the 
nation’s moral condition into a partisan movement.’ Ibid. 
9 As well as poaching a disproportionate share of voters from the Democratic Party in the late 1970s, 
the Republican Party’s success with evangelicals also consisted of rousing what has been described a 
“sleeping giant” of American politics: the significant number of born-again Protestants who had never 
voted before. Prior to the emergence of the Christian Right, evangelicals tended to vote a rate of around 
60 percent; but in the 1980 election that figure had risen to over 70 percent, compared to the national 
average of 52 percent. See Jeffrey W. Robbins & Neal Magee (eds.), The Sleeping Giant Has Awoken: The 
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Evangelicals’ post-Carter affinities with the Republican Party necessarily included 
millions of people either switching their political allegiance, engaging politically for the first 
time, or maintaining their affinity with the GOP. But how was this long-lasting political and 
electoral loyalty actually formed? Building on studies which have chronicled the political 
activity of the movement’s most powerful leaders, this thesis argues that as well as being a 
story of elite-level mobilisation the so-called Christian Right was also about the formation of 
a new political culture at evangelical churches like Bellevue. This entailed a new willingness 
to apply conservative evangelical principles to what were currently considered to be the 
pertinent “moral” issues of the period, and it also consisted of an alignment with the broader 
features of mainstream Republicanism during the 1980s, including a “colour-blind” attitude 
towards race and segregation and a strong patriotic impulse. This mimicking of key aspects 
of Christian Right and Republican Party politics helps explain how conservative 
evangelicalism’s longstanding, post-1970s electoral loyalty to the Republican Party was 
orchestrated at a congregational level. 
How was this new form of political culture at key churches like Bellevue formed? 
Contrary to the conventional narrative of partisan mobilisation that has been applied to 
evangelical elites, this thesis argues that Bellevue’s mirroring of the Christian Right was 
instead a result of the church’s responses to desegregation and its links with a racially-
uniform, conservative culture in Memphis’s suburbs. As at other large, conservative 
evangelical churches, Bellevue’s leaders avoided making explicit political endorsements from 
the pulpit. Adrian Rogers, Bellevue’s pastor between 1972 and 2005, was heavily involved 
with Christian Right campaigns outside of his church, but he saw his denominational and 
political activities as separate from his ministerial duties. Meanwhile, although Rogers’ church 
did become more engaged with key Christian Right issues during the 1980s, the Bellevue 
pastor resisted making direct partisan political pronouncements in sermons or elsewhere. In 
the absence of any clear partisan mobilisation, Bellevue’s new political culture was in large 
part a result of more indirect factors. These include Bellevue’s theology, which determined 
how it reacted to demographic change and, most importantly, the church’s connections with 
Memphis’s politically and culturally distinct suburbs. In other words, this thesis argues that 
the interrelationships between congregational culture, race and urban history played a far 
more important role in shaping post-civil rights era conservative evangelical political culture 
than previously assumed. This congregational methodology is related to the recent “spatial 
turn” of American political history, which has been concerned with ‘connect[ing] the 
structural insights of urban studies to the…ideologies of white voters during the modern 
era’. 10  As this thesis demonstrates, Bellevue’s particular brand of theology, the church’s 
growth strategies, and the broader demographic and cultural trends of the Sunbelt South all 
had indirect but crucially important effects on the political manifestations of conservative 
evangelicalism during the Reagan era and beyond.  By viewing the process through the lens 
of a shift in the congregational culture of important churches like Bellevue, this thesis helps 
reconcile the apparent contradiction between conservative evangelicals’ allegiances with the 
                                                          
New Politics of Religion in the United States, (New York and London: Continuum International 
Publishing, 2008). 
10  Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 7. 
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Republican Party and the simultaneous avoidance of overt forms of political mobilisation in 
church pulpits.  
 
Scholarship on the Christian Right Since the 1980s 
 
Historian of evangelicalism Darren Dochuk has argued that the lack of studies which examine 
the congregational culture of white evangelicalism is the result of a historiography which 
remains ‘general and top-down in its orientation’.11 This criticism is most applicable to the 
first wave of scholarship on the Christian Right. During the height of the Christian Right’s 
political influence, scholars were understandably keen to explain the sudden emergence of 
political advocacy groups such as the Moral Majority and the Religious Roundtable. One 
symptom of this focus was a preoccupation with exploring the features of the evangelicalism 
at its most elite level.12 As implied by Dochuk, this broad methodological framework was also 
susceptible to generalisations which tended to obscure some of the finer historical intricacies 
of the movement. A key example of these overlooked facets has been an understanding of 
how the congregational cultures of individual churches were connected to the politicisation 
of conservative evangelicalism. The tendency to generalise has also resulted in oversimplified 
and short-sighted descriptions of what were, in reality, the extremely complex and deeply-
rooted origins of the Christian Right. Conventional wisdom stated that the Christian Right 
emerged spontaneously in the late 1970s as a reaction to the perceived moral depravities of 
post-civil rights American society, and a succession of liberal Supreme Court rulings which 
appeared to violate conservative evangelical attitudes towards “social issues”. Meanwhile, it 
has been assumed that the movement’s success was down to its unambiguous and 
uncompromising approaches towards these issues, which appealed to working class whites 
who had started to feel disillusioned by the Democratic Party’s commitment to African 
American equality and other progressive initiatives.13  
Although this narrative is no-doubt part of the story, it fails to capture the complexity 
of the movement’s features and the depth of its historical roots. A new generation of scholars, 
led by historian of evangelicalism Axel Schafer, has begun to reveal the inadequacy of the first 
                                                          
11 Darren Dochuk, ‘“Praying for a Wicked City”: Congregation, Community, and the Suburbanisation 
of Fundamentalism’, Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2003), 
accessed April 8, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/rac.2003.13.2.167?origin=JSTOR-pdf, p. 186. 
12  For example, Nancy T. Ammerman, Bible Believers: Fundamentalists and the Modern World (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987); for the links between major financial donors and 
religious advocacy groups, see James L. Guth and John C. Green, “Politics in a New Key: Religiosity 
and Participation among Political Activists,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1 (March 1990). 
13 For examples of works stressing this interpretation of the NCR’s political mobilisation, see Steve 
Bruce, The Rise and Fall of the New Christian Right: Conservative Protestant Politics in America, 1978 – 1988, 
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1990); Kenneth J. Heineman, God is a Conservative: Religion, Politics, and 
Morality in Contemporary America, (New York and London: New York University Press, 1998). Bruce J. 
Schulman (ed.), Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s, (USA: Harvard University 
Press, 2008), in particular the essay by Paul Boyer, “The Evangelical Resurgence in 1970s American 
Protestantism”, pp. 29 – 51; Dan T. Carter sees right-wing politics in the 1970s as a reaction to the racial 
liberalism of the 1960s: From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race and the Conservative Counterrevolution, 
(Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1996). 
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wave’s assumptions. Schafer and others have rejected the conventional “backlash” 
explanation for the Christian Right’s mobilisation, challenging it on the grounds that it 
presents an overly simplistic characterisation of the movement’s politics and origins. Shafer 
argues that to suggest evangelicals simply reacted ‘against the cultural changes in the 
aftermath of the 1960s’ is to ‘ignore the organisational, personal and even cognitive links 
between evangelicalism, the Civil Rights movement, the counterculture, and even the New 
Left’.14 David R. Swartz has demonstrated, for instance, that the Christian Right’s rhetorical 
style and mobilisation techniques were actually borrowed from the progressive wing of 
evangelicalism, which had used such strategies over a decade earlier as part of its resistance 
to several of the sixties’ most controversial issues.15 Thus, rather than being outside of or 
diametrically opposed to the politics and culture of the sixties—as the somewhat misleading 
notion of a “culture war” suggests—the ‘cross-over between left’ and right wings of the 
movement was more significant than originally thought. 16  These interventions have 
problematized many of the assumptions made about the Christian Right by complicating the 
simplistic left/right dichotomy which existed in much of the first wave of scholarship. The 
historiographical inaccuracies are in some ways a symptom of the broad and top-down 
methodologies used to analyse the Christian Right, which this thesis intends to avoid via its 
examination of a case study’s congregational culture.  
 At around the same time as Schafer et al’s re-evaluation of the backlash theory, the 
historiography of political evangelicalism began to broaden its horizons. Amidst the 
realisation that progressive and conservative facets of the movement were more entwined 
than previously imagined, David Swartz has published works which reveal the existence an 
Evangelical Left, which was active in the 1970s despite swimming against the formidable tide 
of conservative Protestant discourse. 17  Another area of recent interest has been the 
relationship between the Christian Right and capitalism and consumerism. Darren Dochuk 
has investigated the connections evangelicals in the Southwest had with the oil industry, 
demonstrating that that black gold facilitated conservative Protestants’ embrace of the 
emerging political, cultural and economic paradigm of the Sunbelt.18 Meanwhile, Kevin Kruse 
has examined the connections between powerful business leaders and evangelicalism in the 
                                                          
14Schafer, “Religion, the Cold War State” p. 12, emphasis original. For the links between conservative 
evangelicalism and the sixties counterculture, see Axel R. Schafer, Countercultural Conservatives: 
American Evangelicalism from the Postwar Revival to the New Christian Right, (Madison, Wisconsin, and 
London, UK: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011). 
15 David R. Swartz, Moral Minority: The Evangelical Left in an Age of Conservatism, (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). 
16 Schafer, “Religion, the Cold War State”, p. 13. For essays which depict the diversity of evangelical 
politics and culture in the 1960s, see Axel R. Schafer (ed.), American Evangelicals and the 1960s, (USA: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 2013). 
17  Swartz, Moral Minority. See also “The Evangelical Left and the Move from Personal to Social 
Responsibility,” in Schafer (ed), American Evangelicals and the 1960s, pp. 211 – 230. 
18  Darren Dochuk, “Blessed by Oil, Cursed with Crude: God and Black Gold in the American 
Southwest”, The Journal of American History, Vol 99, No. 1 (2012), pp. 51 – 61. See also Bethany Moreton, 
To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2009). 
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1930s, arguing that an alliance was forged between the two groups as a response to the New 
Deal state.19  
Since the new century a handful of fresh interpretations of the origins of the Christian 
Right have also emerged. Daniel K. Williams has argued convincingly that rather than 
emerging suddenly as a reaction to the political and cultural liberalism of the 1960s, the 
Christian Right was in fact a direct descendent of the fundamentalist movement of the 1920s.20 
Fundamentalism began as a reaction to the threat posed by theological liberalism, which had 
been gaining momentum since the late nineteenth century. However, the movement was 
never concerned solely with purely religious issues. Faced with the growing threat of rival 
discourses such as evolutionism, Catholicism, and secularism—not to mention changing 
gender and sexual mores—fundamentalists were determined to use politics to restore the 
cultural influence of conservative Protestantism. The movement had mixed success during 
the first few decades of their crusade, ‘but they never lost sight of the political vision that they 
had formed in the 1920s—the vision of reclaiming America’s Christian identity through 
politics’.21 By the end of the 1940s the movement had matured: fundamentalists now had a 
political advocacy group based in Washington and were able to act with greater unity behind 
certain social, economic and foreign policy agendas. More importantly, fundamentalists had 
begun to create enduring alliances with the Republican Party. At first the movement focussed 
on developing connections with powerful party leaders such as Richard Nixon, but in the 
early 1970s conservative evangelicals—who by this point had dropped the “fundamentalist” 
label because of its pejorative connotations—started exercising a degree of control over the 
party itself. The Christian Right—with its organisational unity that transcended 
denominational boundaries, and its power to change ‘the agenda of the [Republican] party,’—
was therefore the culmination of over five decades of coordination between different strands 
of the movement, as well as persistent attempts to infiltrate the halls of power in Washington.22 
‘What was new in 1980 was not evangelicals’ interest in politics but, rather, their level of 
partisan commitment,’ concludes Williams.23  
In his recent history of modern American evangelicalism, Matthew Avery Sutton 
reaches similar conclusions to those of Williams.24 Sutton’s aim is to address some of the 
historiographical oversights made by the first attempts to chronicle the history of American 
                                                          
19 Kevin M. Kruse, One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America, (New York: 
Basic Books, 2015). 
20 Williams, God’s Own Party. 
21 Ibid, p. 3. 
22 Ibid. Though the movement was indeed dominated by Protestants, one of the major achievements of 
the Christian Right was that it managed to recruit conservative Catholics and even Mormons to its 
cause. According to the conventional narrative, different denominations put aside their theological 
differences to unite behind certain political issues. This explanation has, however, been rejected by Neil 
J. Young, who has argued that coalition-building had been occurring amongst conservative Christians 
for far longer than previously assumed. Instead being a reaction to the political and cultural liberalism 
of the 1960s, conservative Christians, he argues, formed a coalition to rival that of the mainline 
Protestant compromise. Neil J. Young, We Gather Together: The Religious Right and the Problem of Interfaith 
Politics, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
23 Ibid, p. 2. 
24 Matthew Avery Sutton, American Apocalypse: A History of Modern Evangelicalism, (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014). 
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evangelicalism from its late-nineteenth century origins to the present day.25 This includes 
investigating female and African American evangelicals, whose voices existed despite the 
sexist and often racist culture of twentieth century fundamentalism and evangelicalism. 
Williams’ and Sutton’s studies differ slightly in terms of their explanations of evangelicalism’s 
engagement with politics. Sutton places a greater emphasis on conservative evangelicals’ 
premillennial eschatology than Williams, who argues the movement’s political mobilisation 
was more to do with its resistance towards secular culture. Nonetheless, Sutton shares 
Williams’ dissatisfaction with the ‘rise-fall-rebirth narrative’ that dominated discussions of 
American evangelicalism at the end of the twentieth century.26 He emphasises ‘continuity 
rather than discontinuity,’ and argues that ‘cultural engagement rather than sectarian 
isolation remained both a priority and a reality [for conservative evangelicalism] between the 
nineteenth century and the present’.27 Williams’ and Sutton’s works both demonstrate that the 
Christian Right was a direct descendent of an early twentieth century movement which was 
constantly concerned with penetrating the political domain, but which had simply yet to 
acquire enough organisational resources to exert a tangible influence on the Republican Party. 
In this sense both studies are historical accounts of conservative evangelicals’ struggle to align 
their movement with the Republican party and control it from within. A further 
methodological overlap between Williams’ and Sutton’s works is their focus on conservative 
evangelicalism’s most influential players, such as Jerry Falwell, who figures particularly 
heavily in the former’s monograph. Another recent example of this approach is Steven P. 
Miller’s study of Billy Graham’s career, which examines, amongst other things, the eulogised 
evangelist’s role as mediator between his native region and Richard Nixon’s so-called 
“southern strategy”.28  
Overall, the latest wave of scholarship has contributed significantly towards the field’s 
understanding of the Christian Right, dispelling numerous myths about the origins and 
features of the movement. But the historiography’s preoccupation with the evangelical elite’s 
connections with the GOP has meant that little attention has been paid to the culture of 
evangelicalism at a lower organisational level. Darren Dochuk’s monograph about 
“transplanted” southern evangelicals in Southern California is a notable exception to this 
trend.29  Dochuk’s study examines the large number of evangelicals who migrated to the 
Golden State as part of a mass exodus which saw six million people abandon the economically 
impoverished South between the 1930s and the 1960s. His findings complement Williams’ and 
Sutton’s suggestion that conservative evangelicals were engaged with politics several decades 
prior to the Christian Right. ‘Southern evangelicalism was, from the very beginning, aligned 
with the forces that created the Sunbelt and embedded in the political processes that upset the 
                                                          
25 This includes the seminal but nevertheless outdated study by George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism 
and American Culture, (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1980); see also Joel A. Carpenter, 
Revive Us Again: The Reawakening of American Fundamentalism, (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). 
26 Sutton, American Apocalypse, p. xiii. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Steven P. Miller, Billy Graham and the Rise of the Republican South, (Philadelphia, PA: The University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 
29  Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of 
Evangelical Conservatism, (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011). 
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region’s Democratic alliances and constructed its Republican Right,’ he argues.30 However, 
rather than focussing solely on the ability of well-known evangelists like Graham to rub 
shoulders with California’s political elite, Dochuk’s study also seeks to understand why the 
culture of Southern California ‘proved so welcoming to Graham [and his contemporaries] and 
nurturing of his worldview’. 31  He demonstrates that the region, with its culture of 
competitiveness and its ‘decentralised and deregulated suburban layout’ turned out to be the 
‘ideal proving ground’ for evangelicals, who favoured congregational independence and who 
had an unflappable commitment to their religious doctrine. 32  Via a network of schools, 
associations, and organisations that involved evangelicals at every level, the movement 
developed a strong presence in Southern California and became involved in an eclectic range 
of issues that related to suburban life, such as tax, housing and work legislation. In sum, by 
observing ‘the southern people who ensured that the religious system took root’ in Southern 
California, Dochuk’s study offers an insight into how evangelicalism’s involvement in the 
construction of a New Right played out amongst normal believers, showing that the 
movement’s culture was at least as politically significant as its elite level political alignment.33  
 
Race, “White Flight” and the Origins of the Christian Right 
 
One important advantage of this thesis’s congregational framework is that it pays attention to 
the voices of those who had considerably less formal power than the evangelical elites, but 
who nonetheless made up by far the largest numerical constituency of the movement—a 
group whose political behaviours ultimately facilitated the Christian Right’s success. An 
appreciation of the features of this group’s discourses and the dynamics behind their actions 
will therefore enable a more comprehensive understanding of the broader movement. 
Additionally, the congregational perspective is also receptive to how the demographic, 
socioeconomic and political developments of post-war metropolitan environments influenced 
evangelicalism at a local level. This is particularly important when we consider the context of 
southern cities like Memphis, which were effected most acutely by the civil rights movement, 
and which for most of the second half of the twentieth century had larger and politically 
stronger black populations than their nearest equivalents in the urban Northwest.34 This thesis 
demonstrates that these historical developments were in fact intimately linked with the build-
up of politically active conservative evangelicalism. The most obvious effects of civil rights 
era desegregation and the subsequent busing rulings were dramatic shifts in the demographic 
composition of urban environments. As part of a phenomenon known as “white flight”, the 
response of white communities across the nation to the outlawing of racially segregated public 
spaces—including, most significantly, schools—was an abandonment of inner-city 
neighbourhoods in favour of suburban locales. In Memphis, the situation was particularly 
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34 This is one of the exceptions to the phenomenon of regional convergence that took place after the 
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severe. Throughout the initial stages of busing and beyond, the city had some of the most 
extreme levels of residential and educational segregation in the whole country. Midtown, 
where Bellevue had resided ever since its formation in 1903, was one of several areas of the 
city which experienced considerable levels of post-civil rights demographic change. A 
historically white neighbourhood, by the end of the 1970s Midtown was majority-black. In 
1989, mirroring what countless other white churches in the country had done already, 
Bellevue completed its own relocation from the inner-city to the suburbs.  
Despite the prevalence of white flight in the Protestant context, scholarly 
investigations of the phenomenon in the Protestant context remain few and far between. The 
two exceptions to this trend are Dochuk’s study of an evangelical congregation in Detroit, and 
a monograph by Mark Mulder which examines a handful of Chicago churches.35 Dochuk’s 
analysis of Highland Park Baptist Church (HPBC) reveals how the congregation’s strong 
social conscience and willingness to serve a struggling community clashed with the realisation 
that the church was becoming increasingly incapable of ‘offering any substantive response to 
the changing racial dynamics’ of its neighbourhood.36 HPBC’s failure to adapt to the rapidly 
changing socioeconomic, racial and political situation made relocation necessary. But as 
Dochuk shows, rather than being an inevitable outcome thrust upon the church by outside 
forces, HPBC’s decision to move was also the product of a ‘deep ideological transformation’ 
involving theology and community loyalties, in which ‘the very spiritual legitimacy of the 
church’ was at stake. 37  The example of HPBC therefore ‘provides…insight into the 
multifarious issues, motives and forces that helped sever…ties with community and 
ultimately facilitate[d] movement to the suburbs’.38 Meanwhile, Mulder’s study explores the 
responses to urban change of inner-city evangelical churches which were affiliated with 
different denominations. He shows that churches that belonged to certain denominations 
were more likely to withdraw from their neighbourhoods than churches which had other 
denominational affiliations. Congregations which had a greater propensity for withdrawal 
tended to be members of denominations which placed less of an emphasis on community 
attachments, were more organisationally insular, and which had less institutional authority 
over individual churches. Overall, these religious facets of white flight complicate the 
conventional narrative which, at best, assumes that congregations were blindly complicit to 
urban trends. Both Dochuk’s and Mulder’s works therefore reveal the wealth of insights that 
can be gained by paying attention to the religious manifestations, experiences and 
implications of urban withdrawal. Scholars who ‘ignore religious affiliations’ in studies of 
white suburbanisation therefore ‘fail to sufficiently assess the social phenomenon’ as a 
whole.39 
Studies of urban withdrawal in the evangelical context have added to the considerable 
amount of work done on white flight in more secular settings. The most valuable contribution 
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Congregations and Urban Departure, (New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London: Rutgers University 
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36 Dochuk, ‘“Praying for a Wicked City”’, p. 178. 
37 Ibid, p. 178-9. 
38 Ibid, p. 168. 
39 Ibid. 
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these studies have made in terms of this thesis’s aims is to enhance the field’s understanding 
of the political effects of post-civil rights white suburbanisation. Kevin Kruse’s landmark 
study of Atlanta traces the development of the strategy of protecting white privilege by 
maintaining residential segregation.40 Rather than being solely an impulsive, physical reaction 
to desegregation, Kruse argues white flight should also understood as a political ideology that 
evolved from its blatantly racist form during the genesis of the civil rights movement into a 
subtler framework which defended residential segregation in the name “freedom of 
association”, commercial enterprise and “private rights”. He shows that this ideology had 
tangible links with the formation of the New Right, as budding Republican conservatives such 
as Richard Nixon, Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan began to recognise the political 
potential of using the same language to exploit the resentments of white working- and middle 
class voters. 
 By examining southern cities during the busing era, Matthew Lassiter’s study of the 
“Silent Majority” resumes this story from where Kruse’s narrative finishes.41 In most cities the 
response of white communities to federally-sponsored school integration during the 1970s 
was to flee the inner-city in even greater numbers. This was particularly the case in Memphis, 
which remained one of the most residentially segregated cities in the country throughout the 
twentieth century. But Lassiter takes issue with the conventional ‘white flight thesis’ which, 
he argues, implies that suburbanisation was solely the symptom of individual racism, when 
in reality it involved deliberate strategies by local politicians and even the federal government 
to protect white privilege in the suburbs.42 The politics of residential segregation during the 
busing era took the form of a “colour-blind” discourse which saw white privilege in the 
suburbs as the product of individual meritocracy ‘rather than the unconstitutional product of 
structural racism’.43 As part of the recent scholarly trend of eschewing top-down perspectives 
in favour of examining conservative ideologies and behaviours at a more subaltern level, both 
Kruse’s and Lassiter’s works deal with the politics of suburban white privilege from the 
perspective of local communities. This dissertation applies these insights about the formation 
of a conservative suburban discourse to the context of white evangelicalism, demonstrating 
that it helped create a new political culture in churches like Bellevue.  
 By virtue of its detailed analysis of how the urban history of a racially divided city 
related to the congregational culture of an important megachurch, race and segregation are 
inevitably central themes of this dissertation. Undoubtedly the most important and influential 
scholarly work of the last twenty years to tackle the issue of white evangelicalism’s thorny 
post-war relationship with desegregation and racial equality has been Michael Emerson and 
Christian Smith’s Divided by Faith.44 Their study has inspired recent work on the Evangelical 
Racial Change movement and its attempts to achieve racial reconciliation in evangelical 
                                                          
40 Kruse, White Flight. See also the seminal work by Thomas J. Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race 
and Inequality in Postwar Detroit, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996, 2005). 
41 Lassiter, The Silent Majority. See also Matthew D. Lassiter, “The Suburban Origins of ‘Color-Blind’ 
Conservatism: Middle Class Consciousness in the Charlotte Busing Crisis,” Journal of Urban History, 
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42 Ibid, p. 9. 
43 Ibid, p. 1. 
44 Michael O. Emerson and Christian Smith, Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race 
in America, (Oxford, England: Oxford University press, 2000). 
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churches.45  Emerson and Smith argue that the greatest challenge confronting attempts to 
integrate evangelical churches has been the seemingly irreconcilable gulf between black and 
white theological worldviews. Whereas African American churches tend to be sensitive to the 
structural roots of racial inequality, white congregations like Bellevue are far more likely to 
perceive injustice solely in individual terms. This has resulted in a widespread trend in white 
evangelical culture to ignore or deny the existence of racial inequality.46 This thesis will show 
that these theological explanations for white evangelical churches’ racial conservatism are 
applicable to the case study of Bellevue. Unsurprisingly for a theologically conservative 
church, Bellevue has always prioritised evangelism over other initiatives such as social gospel. 
This had clear implications for the church’s prospects for racial integration and its willingness 
to engage with racial inequality in Memphis.  
Beyond this theological explanation for the lack of racial reconciliation within the 
evangelical movement, there have also been a handful of attempts to understand the Christian 
Right’s relationship with race. It is true to say that the subject of race has, alas, been somewhat 
neglected in a historiography which has too-often focussed narrowly on the Christian Right’s 
ostensible preoccupations with abortion, the family and church-state separation. Studies 
which have highlighted the centrality of race in the mobilisation conservative evangelicals 
include Carolyn Dupont’s excellent study of white evangelicals in Mississippi between 1945 
and 1975.47 Dupont shows that during the civil rights movement conservative evangelicals 
often used theological disagreements as a smokescreen behind which to advance more 
sinister, segregationist agendas. More provocatively, she argues that the lingering 
resentments of Southern Baptist conservatives towards their liberal coreligionists over the 
issue of segregation were the root cause of the late-1970s Conservative Resurgence, a 
successful attempt to banish theological liberalism from the denomination. ‘It was only in 
response to progressive attempts to engineer a far-reaching and meaningful response to 
America’s racial crisis… [that the] disparities’ between liberals and conservatives of the SBC 
begin to ‘appear insufferable,’ she argues. 48  Dartmouth College scholar Randall Balmer 
applies a similar interpretation to the Christian Right. Balmer argues that the origins of 
politicised evangelicalism are rooted in the movement’s resistance to the newly-authorised 
powers of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to withdraw tax exemption status from 
                                                          
45  See Nancy D. Wadsworth, Ambivalent Miracles: Evangelicals and the Politics of Racial Healing, 
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segregated Christian schools and Colleges.49 Balmer seeks to debunk what he sees as the myth 
that it was the 1973 Roe V. Wade Supreme Court ruling that motivated conservative 
evangelicals to form a political movement. He concedes that by the time president Jimmy 
Carter had begun his campaign for re-election, resisting abortion had indeed become the 
cornerstone of the Christian Right’s campaign against liberalism; but this was not because of 
a deep-seated moral objection to abortion, he writes, but rather because ‘the anti-abortion 
crusade was more palatable than the religious right’s real motive: protecting segregated 
schools’.50  
Two years prior to Roe, another Supreme Court decision—Green V. Connally—had 
ruled that independent schools which practiced racial segregation were unconstitutional and 
therefore ineligible for tax exemption status. The ruling incensed conservative evangelicals 
such as Jerry Falwell, who argued it infringed religious freedom. “In some states,” Falwell 
fumed, “It’s easier to open a massage parlor than a Christian school”.51 Meanwhile, Balmer 
cites numerous evangelical sources from the 1970s which display an initial indifference 
towards or even approval of Roe; his most surprising quotation comes from the notorious 
Southern Baptist conservative and one-time segregationist W. A. Criswell, who said shortly 
after the Roe ruling that “I have always felt that it was only after the child was born and had 
a life separate from its mother that it became an individual person, and it has always, 
therefore, seemed to me that what is best for the mother and for the future should be 
allowed”. 52  A few years later, in 1976, after numerous warnings from the IRS, the 
fundamentalist Bob Jones University had its tax exemption status rescinded after it 
continuously refused to racially integrate its campus.53 This, according to Balmer, was ‘the 
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50 Ibid. 
51 Jerry Falwell, quoted in ibid. 
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final straw’ for Falwell et al.54 The resentments created among evangelical leaders by the IRS 
debacle were seen as a good opportunity to mobilise participants behind a crusade against 
liberalism.55 In particular, political activist Paul Weyrich, who had been trying unsuccessfully 
for years to unite evangelicals across the country to ‘form a formidable voting block’, saw this 
as the right time.56 But Weyrich, Falwell and other politically savvy leaders knew that to wage 
such a war on racial or segregation terms would be political suicide: these concerns ‘had 
worked to rally the leaders, but they needed a different issue if they wanted to mobilize 
evangelical voters on a large scale’.57 Accordingly, and spurred on by the realisation that many 
conservative Americans had started to feel anxious about the increase in the number of 
recorded pregnancy terminations since Roe, they decided that abortion would be the key issue 
around which to mobilise conservative evangelicals.  
This thesis is primarily concerned with the dynamics of conservative evangelicalism 
at a congregational level. It therefore does not directly engage with Balmer’s findings, which 
are related to the movement’s elite-level mobilisation. Nonetheless, like Balmer this thesis 
does argue that race played an important role in the build-up of a politicised form of 
conservative evangelicalism that by 1980 displayed disproportionally high electoral loyalty 
towards the Republican Party. However, this thesis contends that race played a more indirect 
role than is suggested in Balmer’s analysis. Rather than being a hostile reaction to racially 
progressive legislation, this thesis argues the build-up of politicised evangelicalism was about 
the creation of a conservative political culture at churches like Bellevue which was in part a 
symptom of how evangelical congregational culture interacted with racial and demographic 
processes in urban environments during the civil rights era and beyond. This congregational 
analysis supports Emerson and Smith’s finding that conservative evangelical theology acted 
as a barrier in the way of racial reconciliation at white churches during the desegregation era. 
In the case of Bellevue, the existence of this theological barrier during the local 
neighbourhood’s rapid demographic transformation helped establish the racial fault lines for 
a new form of congregational culture. While theology helped establish the divisions necessary 
for its formation, the major creative force behind this new culture was not partisan political 
mobilisation in the church’s pulpit, but rather Bellevue’s connections with the formation of 
Memphis’s politically and culturally distinct—and racially uniform—“island suburbs”.58 As 
part of the region-wide economic development trends of the Sunbelt South, which were aided 
by federal policy and accentuated by white flight, Memphis’s burgeoning neighbourhoods on 
the eastern fringes of the city soon became havens for young, conservative and middle class 
whites—the exact demographic which Adrian Rogers sought to attract during his long tenure 
as Bellevue’s senior pastor. Therefore, although Bellevue remained at its Midtown location up 
until 1989, the church’s congregational culture was being transformed long before then. As 
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outlined in greater detail below, thanks in part to Bellevue’s connections with the suburbs by 
the early 1980s aspects of the church’s congregational culture had started to mirror the 
political features of the Christian Right and the Republican party.  
 
Thesis methodologies and structure 
This thesis presents a new reading of post-war southern evangelicalism by examining the 
understudied dimension of congregational culture. Via the case study of Bellevue, it tells the 
story of how white evangelicalism at a local level interacted with social and structural 
phenomena in Memphis. By doing so, it reinterprets some of the movement’s key late-
twentieth century moments. The project has relied on a variety of different primary and 
secondary sources. Bellevue’s on-campus archive houses an extensive array of church 
documents, ranging from day-to-day correspondences to a complete collection of its weekly 
Bulletin, the Bellevue Baptist Messenger. This thesis’s understanding of Bellevue’s history 
would not have been possible without access to this archive. Another crucial resource has 
been Southern Baptist Historical Library and Archive, in Nashville, Tennessee, which houses 
numerous documents about Bellevue and has been particularly useful for understanding Dr 
Rogers’ SBC presidency. Meanwhile, the experiences of worshipping at Bellevue have been 
illuminated considerably by the many people interviewed for this project. Lastly, the 
completion of this dissertation has involved synthesising the wide array of secondary sources 
required for understanding the post-1960 social and racial history of Memphis, southern 
evangelicalism and the SBC. Chapter 1 begins with a contextual background of our case 
study’s history from its establishment in 1903 to the 1950s. Bellevue’s early twentieth century 
origins attest to how modest it initially was in comparison to the more established Protestant 
institutions in Memphis. The church was founded over eighty years after the establishment of 
the River City, and throughout the nineteenth century and for some time afterwards the First 
Baptist and Central Baptist congregations had the lion’s share of Memphis’s evangelical 
resources. But from its humble beginnings as a one-room chapel to the east of Downtown, 
Bellevue grew steadily during the 1910s and 1920s. In 1927 the arrival of Dr Robert G. Lee, 
whose fiery preaching style and uncompromising inerrantist theology resonated with white 
Memphis’s deeply conservative religious culture, accelerated Bellevue’s growth and by end 
of the 1950s the church had effectively overtaken its rivals to become the city’s largest 
evangelical congregation.  
The main focus of Chapter 1 is Bellevue during the height of the civil rights movement, 
and the question of how the church responded to the federal and grassroots desegregation 
initiatives that affected Memphis from the 1950s. Shortly after the turn of the 1960s, Bellevue 
inaugurated its first new pastor in over thirty years, Dr Ramsey Pollard, whose tenure 
represented something of an interim period between the church’s two most successful 
pastorates. But while Pollard was not notable for his popularity, his tenure corresponded to 
an important period in evangelical history, when large southern churches like Bellevue were, 
after decades of obliviousness, finally forced to engage with the issues of race and segregation. 
Chapter 1 demonstrates that while conservative and liberal factions of the church’s mother 
denomination, the Southern Baptist Convention, were embroiled in a bitter conflict over the 
biblical implications of racial segregation, Bellevue made a conscious effort to position itself 
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in the ideological centre of discourses on race. This meant, on one hand, that the church tried 
to distance itself from the blatant racism that plagued much of the SBC. For example, during 
his tenure pastor Pollard publically declared that there was no biblical rationale for segregated 
worship. Meanwhile, when confronted early on in Pollard’s tenure by “kneel-in” protestors, 
who were the first campaigners to attempt to force integrated worship in southern churches, 
the congregation did its best to ensure that Bellevue was a space where blacks were tolerated. 
On the other hand, at the same time as this willingness to be racially moderate, Bellevue never 
made any active attempts to attract African Americans to its pews and thereby fully practice 
racial integration; it had what Chapter 1 refers to as a laissez-faire approach towards racial 
integration, in that it tolerated blacks if they were present but it did not actively seek them, as 
their more liberal coreligionists sometimes had a tendency to do. This type of racial centrism 
was relatively widespread in white evangelical churches during the civil rights movement, 
and Chapter 1 outlines the historical, theological and attitudinal causes of this phenomenon. 
But these origins are, in the context of this thesis, less important than the legacies of this 
approach in the post-civil rights world, which are the next chapter’s main concern. 
Chapter 2 covers the first ten years of Dr Adrian Rogers’ pastorate at Bellevue, which 
would become the most successful tenure in the church’s history. Rogers arrived in 1972 to a 
church that was in state of decline, after twelve years of stagnation under Pollard. Pledging to 
bring Bellevue back to its glory days under Lee, Rogers duly ushered in a prolonged era of 
stunning growth at the church which began almost as soon as he arrived and lasted 
throughout his tenure. Indeed, by the time of Rogers’ death in 2005, Bellevue had become one 
of the largest and most famous churches in the whole country. Chapter 2 attempts to 
understand the reasons for Bellevue’s success under Rogers, but the main purpose of the 
chapter is to explore how this growth related to a handful of important religious, racial and 
urban developments that were taking place in the 1970s. It demonstrates that Bellevue’s links 
with the phenomenon of “white flight” in Memphis created a “suburbanised” congregational 
environment at Bellevue which facilitated both the church’s political culture during the 1980s 
and its relocation to the city’s suburbs in 1989. In the 1970s, desegregation and busing effected 
Bellevue’s Midtown neighbourhood dramatically, with the district receiving a large number 
of new African American residents. But despite the changing racial composition of Midtown, 
Bellevue maintained its laissez-faire approach towards attracting ethnic minorities. In other 
words, its method of attracting new members did not entail “reaching out” to the local 
neighbourhood’s burgeoning African American population; instead, Bellevue’s renaissance 
under Dr Rogers involved attracting whites with a younger and more affluent socioeconomic 
profile than those who had attended the church during the Pollard era.59 As in other cities in 
the Sunbelt South, these whites had begun to flock to Memphis’s suburbs from 
neighbourhoods like Midtown and further afield as a symptom of white flight and of an 
economic boom in the South which disproportionately benefitted whites. As important 
studies on the “Silent Majority” have demonstrated, the concentration of conservative whites 
in the suburbs of southern cities like Memphis created a new conservative political paradigm 
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which the Republican Party actively embraced. 60  Chapter 2 shows that by attracting this 
demographic Bellevue allowed itself to become more aligned with the political and cultural 
paradigm of the suburbs, a process which begun almost ten years prior to the conservative 
evangelical movement’s actual embracement of the Republican party, and which is further 
evidenced in Chapter 4’s direct analysis of the church’s congregational culture during the 
1980s.  
The late 1970s and early 1980s were decisive years for the formation of a unified, trans-
denominational group of politically mobilised conservatives that became known as the 
Christian Right. One of the most important achievements of the Christian Right was to gain 
the support of the Southern Baptist Convention, the largest Protestant denomination in the 
country. Chapter 3 examines the role played by Rogers and Bellevue’s most politically active 
layman, former business executive Ed McAteer, in forging an alliance between the Christian 
Right, the SBC and the Republican Party. It focusses on Rogers’ and McAteer’s joint campaign 
to reverse the 1962 Engel Vs. Vitale Supreme Court case which ruled that government 
sponsorship of school prayer was unconstitutional. It is argued that Rogers and McAteer 
focussed their efforts on the school prayer initiative as a way of resisting what they saw as the 
increasing hostility of the federal government towards religion, and as a way of furthering the 
SBC’s “Conservative Resurgence”. In 1982, thanks largely to the efforts of Rogers and 
McAteer, SBC conservatives managed to achieve a crucial reversal of its separationist church-
state position. This in turn enabled the denomination to officially endorse the Republican 
Party’s proposals to ban abortion and reintroduce school prayer, thereby confirming the SBC’s 
involvement with the Christian Right. This analysis is, of course, carried out with a view to 
understanding how this activity related to Bellevue. Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of 
how Rogers and other leading conservative evangelical pastors hesitated about bringing these 
ostensibly partisan political matters directly into the pulpits of their churches. This was in part 
because they viewed political activity as potentially corrupting the purity of the evangelical 
message. In the case of Rogers, it was also because he attempted to construct a separation 
between his denominational duties as president of the SBC and his ministerial responsibilities 
as a pastor. This paradox problematizes the notion that the Christian Right was the product 
of direct political mobilisation; however, it is consistent with this thesis’s suggestion that 
conservative evangelical engagement with Republican politics occurred through a shift in 
congregational culture which was itself a symptom of indirect forces.   
The penultimate chapter discusses Bellevue during the 1980s, carrying out a direct 
analysis of the church’s congregational culture during the peak of the Christian Right’s 
influence. It demonstrates that the combined effect of the church’s last three decades of 
history—as described in previous chapters—was the creation of a political culture which 
mirrored several defining features of Christian Right and Republican Party conservatism 
during the 1980s. As well as acknowledging that Bellevue has always harboured a deeply 
conservative theology which is perhaps inherently compatible with political conservatism, 
Chapter 4 contends that from around the late 1970s the church had nonetheless started to 
channel its brand of conservatism in novel ways. One important component of this newly-
formed political culture was a propensity for applying its conservative evangelical principles 
to what had become the key Christian Right political issues of the period. For example, 
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although Rogers continued to refrain from making explicit partisan endorsements from the 
pulpit, in the 1980s he had begun to preach to his congregation about the evangelical duty of 
voting according to moral principle (one sermon addressing evangelical politics even took 
place just three days before the 1980 presidential election). Some Bellevue laypeople even took 
this a step further by explicitly suggesting that Bellevue’s brand of conservatism was tied 
closely to voting Republican. Bellevue’s congregational culture during the 1980s also 
consisted of a patriotic zeal which was reminiscent of the cold war-era jingoism of the 
Republican Party under Reagan. Chapter 4 is careful not to exaggerate the extent of this shift 
in the congregational culture of Bellevue; it underlines the existence of a large proportion of 
the eleven thousand-strong membership at the church which was disengaged from 
denominational issues and saw their faith as being separate from the political world. But the 
chapter nonetheless contends that portions of the congregation were more receptive to the 
ideologies and agendas of the Christian Right and the Republican Party during this period 
than they had been before. Contrary to popular assumptions about the origins of the Christian 
Right, this was not the result of a spontaneous decision by Rogers to suddenly involve his 
church more with conservative politics; rather, it was primarily a symptom of a subtler shift 
in the congregational culture of Bellevue and the experiences of attending the church—a shift 
which took over two decades to be completed and which was the result of the church’s 
relationship with the events and forces of the 1960s and 1970s.  
In 1989 Bellevue completed its relocation from Midtown—an ethnically diverse 
neighbourhood where the church had resided for eighty-six years—to a suburban site almost 
fifteen miles east of Memphis’s downtown centre, where around ninety percent of the 
neighbourhood’s residents were white. By abandoning a racially mixed inner-city area and 
moving to a more demographically “appropriate” area in the suburbs, Bellevue mirrored a 
process that had been taking place for several decades at evangelical congregations in dozens 
of cities across the United States. But despite the prevalence of evangelical “white flight”, little 
academic attention has been devoted towards understanding the phenomenon, and even less 
has been directed to the situation in the South, where some of the most extreme cases of post-
busing residential segregation have occurred.  
As one of the first academic studies of white flight in a southern evangelical context, 
the complex causes of Bellevue’s suburbanisation are the main subject of this thesis’s final 
chapter. By the time the issue was put to a vote at the church in 1983, the vast majority of 
Bellevue’s leaders and members were overwhelmingly in favour of the relocation. Chapter 5 
argues that the principle reason for this massive congregational mandate was the church’s 
lack of connections with its surrounding community. This enabled the church to easily adapt 
to, and indeed openly embrace, the prospect of urban withdrawal. Bellevue’s lack of 
neighbourhood connections was due to a combination of factors. Firstly, the church’s 
inerrantist theology, which was radically oriented towards individual responsibility and 
which overlooked the existence of systematic, structural forms of inequality, meant that close 
neighbourhood connections or social ministry were never considered to be a vital part of the 
church’s ministerial or congregational identity. Secondly, as outlined in Chapter 2, the 
increasing number of Bellevue laypeople who were based in the suburbs gave Bellevue a 
strong pragmatic rationale for the relocation. And thirdly, Bellevue’s lack of willingness to 
actively attract the African American population that had arrived in Midtown over the last 
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two decades further increased the likelihood of the relocation. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, 
Bellevue’s model of megachurch growth centred on targeting the most “reachable” racial 
group; moreover, the culture of political conservatism that was created during the post-civil 
rights era also had the side-effect of deterring African Americans from joining the church. 
This thesis’s historical and cultural analysis of Bellevue Baptist Church between 1960 
and 1990 examines how congregational culture was influenced by broader political, 
socioeconomic and demographic forces that existed in racially divided southern cities like 
Memphis. The findings detailed in the following chapters are important because they offer an 
alternative reading of conservative evangelicals’ post-1970s engagement with politics. This 
thesis argues that as well as being about direct, partisan political mobilisation, the so called 
“Christian Right” was also about the creation of a conservative political culture at churches 
like Bellevue which facilitated the movement’s recent political and electoral allegiances with 
the Republican Party. From the 1980s onwards Bellevue displayed a new willingness to apply 
conservative evangelical principles to what had been identified as they most important 
“moral” issues of the period. At the same time, the congregation began to mirror key features 
of Republican Party conservatism, including a “colour-blind” approach towards race and a 
strong patriotism. But Bellevue’s political-cultural alignment with the Christian Right and the 
GOP had little or nothing to do with political mobilisation. Rogers avoided making partisan 
political endorsements from the pulpit of his church. Instead, the creation of Bellevue’s new 
form of political culture was in large part a symptom of the church’s relationship with 
demographic and socioeconomic change in Memphis. Bellevue’s de-facto racially uniform 
model of church growth, its conservative theology, and its complicity with the socioeconomic 
and political implications of “white flight” and suburbanisation had indirect but profoundly 
important effects on the congregational culture of the church. Although partisan political 
mobilisation undoubtedly played an important role in the courtship between Christian Right 
and Republican Party elites, this thesis demonstrates that at a congregational level—the arena 
where the numerical majority of conservative evangelicals resided—Republicanisation was 
also rooted in the local dynamics of urban history.  
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Chapter 1: Bellevue Baptist Church and the Civil Rights Movement, 1954 
– 1970 
 
White evangelicalism’s relationship with the civil rights movement has been the subject of a 
large amount of historiographical attention in recent decades. Interest has mainly centred on 
the degree of evangelical churches’ complicity with racial inequality and segregation. Some 
have argued that a key reason why southern churches remained stubbornly segregated 
throughout the civil rights era and beyond was that white Protestant congregations were 
essentially indifferent towards the struggle for racial equality. 61  According to this 
interpretation, congregations neither actively defended nor resisted segregation and racism, 
but instead turned a blind eye to the rapidly transforming political situation in the South. 
Meanwhile, the cultural captivity thesis initiated by John Eighmy four and half decades ago 
contended that white churches were often anti-racist but were nonetheless being “held 
hostage” by the dominant surrounding culture of southern racism.62 Conversely, scholars 
such as Carolyn Dupont have shown that white evangelicals—particularly those of the 
Southern Baptist persuasion—systematically resisted the civil rights movement in order to 
protect the racial status quo.63 The three interpretations are not mutually exclusive, since in 
reality white evangelicalism in the South was a relatively broad spectrum of approaches 
towards desegregation and racial equality 
 This chapter examines Bellevue’s own policies towards racial equality and integration 
as a means to understanding the long-term effects of these approaches. It chronicles the 
history of the church during the federal and civil desegregation initiatives of the 1950s and 
1960s, during what was a pivotal decade for southern religion and the Southern Baptist 
Convention in particular. Chapter 1 begins by introducing the history of Bellevue during the 
first half of the twentieth century, as it evolved from being a small, one-room chapel in East 
Memphis to one of the largest congregations in the region—an early example of a 
megachurch. The main aim of this chapter is to understand Bellevue’s own approach towards 
the prospect of integrated worshipping in a period when white churches across the region 
were being forced, one way or another, to engage with the issue of America’s “race problem”. 
This, it is hoped, will lay the foundations for an understanding of the legacies of Bellevue’s 
integration policy, which subsequent chapters are concerned with discussing. In 1960, 
Bellevue inaugurated its first new pastor in over thirty years, Dr Ramsey Pollard. the 
beginning of the 1960s was also when Bellevue would come into direct contact with civil 
desegregation initiatives that were spreading across the South. On a handful of occasions, the 
church became a venue for the “kneel-in” movement, which involved African American 
protestors attempting to worship at “de-facto” white churches during Sunday services. By 
forcing Bellevue to construct a tangible policy towards racial integration, such events offer a 
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meaningful insight into how the church’s approach towards race compared with the broader 
denominational and regional situation.  
 This chapter argues that while the SBC was in the midst of a civil war over the biblical 
implications of segregation and racial inequality, in the 1960s Bellevue positioned itself on the 
ideological centre of discourses on race. The church’s reactions to the protestors—as well as 
comments made by pastor Pollard at the time and the recollections of living Bellevue 
laypeople who were members of the church during the 1960s—indicate that Bellevue was 
neither committed to upholding segregation, nor invested in actively promoting racial 
equality. African Americans were allowed to enter the church and, unlike at other large white 
congregations in the city, their presence did not cause any major disputes within the 
congregation. Meanwhile, in the wake of the kneel-ins Pollard publically clarified his 
moderate position on segregation, declaring that he believed there was no biblical or ethical 
reason why whites and blacks should worship separately. However, unlike his more 
progressive coreligionists, Pollard never spoke out against racial inequality, nor did he make 
any attempt to meaningfully desegregate the church or “reach out” to the neighbourhood’s 
African American population. Instead, the congregation had what this chapter suggests was 
a “laissez-faire” approach towards desegregation: that is, its practices resembled that of the 
city of Memphis itself, which adopted an ideologically moderate stance towards race but 
which was extremely slow to implement the Brown Supreme Court ruling and spent most of 
the 1960s deferring integration or offering “token desegregation”. 64  This laissez-faire 
approach towards race, it is argued, was the result of the church’s particular brand of 
theology, as well as its assumptions about racially segregated worshiping in the post-Brown, 
post-civil rights South. As subsequent chapters will show, the legacy of this moderate, laissez-
faire approach towards integration was that it laid the racial fault lines for relocation and even 
the creation of a new conservative political culture at the church.  
 
Robert G. Lee and the Making of a Megachurch 
 
On the evening of November 5, 1949, a thousand people assembled on North Bellevue Avenue 
in Midtown Memphis to witness the ceremonial ground-breaking of Bellevue Baptist 
Church’s forthcoming and highly anticipated new sanctuary, located a hundred yards north 
of the old building. As laypeople chanted “we will break this ground,” leaders of the church 
took turns to dig earth on the site of the new $1.2m facility. Bellevue’s charismatic pastor, Dr 
Robert G. Lee, who was about to begin his second of three terms as president of the Southern 
Baptist Convention, declined the spading honours, insisting Robert R. Meadows, who was 
chairman of the church’s building committee, take his place. As Meadows began digging the 
first furrows of earth on the site, Pastor Lee, who was dressed in his trademark white suit, 
stood upon a ‘paper-covered platform’ and thanked God for the “Bible—the inspired, 
infallible, inerrant Word of God”.65 The utterance that Lee made from upon his podium not 
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only affirmed the theological orientation that he and his church were faithful towards; the act 
also embodied two of the major reasons for Bellevue’s recent success. Firstly, taking place 
during the ground-breaking of what would become one of the movement’s largest 
sanctuaries, Lee’s gesture symbolised the dramatic post-war growth of the conservative 
evangelicalism. In the context of his audience Lee’s staunch inerrantism was uncontroversial, 
but Bellevue’s theological conservatism was a central explanation for why so many 
Memphians had been flocking to the church in recent decades. Secondly, the presence of Dr 
Lee was in itself significant. Through a combination of preaching charisma, pastoral skill and 
raw ambition, Lee played an important role in transforming Bellevue from a medium sized, 
Depression-era congregation into one of the largest and most famous churches in the whole 
region, and indeed the nation.  
Two and a half years after the round-breaking, on April 27, 1952, the new sanctuary, 
‘of simple Georgian colonial design’, was ready for its first Sunday service. Few churches in 
the city, or even the state, compared in size to the new home of Bellevue Baptist.66 It was the 
‘largest church building in Tennessee’, and ‘seated 3000 in the sanctuary in opera seats’—
comfortably more than any other church in Memphis. But even these undeniably impressive 
facilities could not cope with the demand to witness the first services of the building’s opening 
weekend. Over five thousand people were squeezed into the auditorium that Sunday, 
requiring the use of an additional two thousand folding chairs to accompany the church’s 
permanent seating. Some reports even suggested that a further two and a half thousand 
people were ‘turned away at the morning service’, because there was simply not enough space 
to safely accommodate them in the sanctuary.67  
Bellevue’s new facilities—as well as the sheer demand to worship there—were above 
all a testament to the exceptional growth that the church had enjoyed throughout Dr Lee’s 
pastorate. But prior to Lee’s arrival there was little to suggest that within the space of a few 
decades Bellevue would eventually become one of the South’s leading evangelical churches. 
Bellevue was originally founded at the turn of the twentieth century as a splinter congregation 
from the successful Central Baptist Church. At the end of the nineteenth century Memphis 
was still recovering from a tumultuous period of war and Reconstruction. But even more 
devastating for the city was a succession of deadly yellow fever outbreaks during the 1870s, 
which resulted in over twenty thousand fatalities. Aside from the number of deaths caused as 
a result of the epidemic, the most significant symptom of yellow fever in Memphis was the 
mass withdrawal of the city’s middle and upper classes. This transformed the social makeup 
of the city, so that there was a higher proportion of poor blacks and whites than there were in 
other large southern cities such as Atlanta and New Orleans. Meanwhile, as higher-paying 
jobs began to disappear, Memphis’s proximity to the Mississippi Delta favoured the city’s 
lower-skilled cotton industries. Once yellow fever had been eradicated thousands of 
economically impoverished citizens and new immigrants flocked to Memphis in search of 
work, and by the beginning of the twentieth century the population of the city had reached 
100,000 (although the city’s annexation of surrounding areas also contributed towards the 
population increase). As the city’s inhabitants crept eastwards the demand for evangelical 
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churches outside of Downtown increased. ‘The Pastor and people of Central Baptist Church’ 
had taken ‘note of the city’s eastwards expansion’ and duly ‘began a mission on the outskirts 
of Memphis to reach more people for the glory of God’.68  
Central Baptist’s mission in the east of the city officially became Bellevue Baptist 
Church in the summer of 1903. Although the location of the church on the corner of Bellevue 
and Erskine Avenues eventually evolved into an urban, de facto “inner-city” environment, in 
the early twentieth century the neighbourhood of what would become Midtown was 
effectively on the outskirts of the city’s ever-expanding eastern frontier. According to a 
Bellevue charter member at the time, Bellevue Avenue was little more than a “pig path”, and 
all that surrounded the small, one-room chapel that was Bellevue’s first sanctuary were 
strawberry fields. Despite the church’s humble origins Bellevue’s early leaders had the 
ambition to expand the church’s ministry, and by 1909 there were already plans to build a 
new Sunday school. The tenures of the first two pastors at Bellevue lasted a combined total of 
just eighteen years, a relatively short period in comparison with the church’s most successful 
preachers. And although the pastorate of Dr William M. Bostick, Dr Lee’s predecessor, was 
just as brief, it was under his leadership that the rate of Belleview’s growth started to increase 
considerably. A few years after the arrival of Bostick Bellevue’s membership stood at 1,400, 
and the church knocked down its old chapel and replaced it with a large, 1,000 seat sanctuary. 
According to an official history of Bellevue published to celebrate the church’s centenary, Dr 
Bostick was an ‘evangelist at heart’ who ‘led revivals that sparked the Bellevue spirit’.69 In 
other words, Bostick was the first Bellevue preacher to place a strong emphasis on evangelism 
and membership growth—two hallmarks which would become cornerstones of the church’s 
congregational identity in the future.  
While Bostick may have initiated Bellevue’s strong emphasis on evangelism and 
congregational growth, it was the church’s fourth pastor, Dr Lee, who succeeded in 
completing its transformation from a modest church on the fringes of Memphis to regionally 
recognised megachurch. Lee, who was already something of a celebrity in southern 
evangelical circles, brought to Bellevue the kind of glamour and charisma that the church had 
been lacking up until his arrival. He is often considered Bellevue’s first “great preacher”, in 
that his ambition, preaching prowess, pastoral skill, and loyalty helped elevate the 
congregation’s status and growth. 70  But perhaps most importantly, Lee was deeply and 
unashamedly conservative, both in theological terms and in a broader sense. He identified 
liberalism as one of his enemies, hating it for “go[ing] nowhere so fast it arrives out of breath, 
talking more and more of less and less”. 71  Meanwhile, as an indication of the pastor’s 
inerrantist credentials, ‘from the beginning, Dr Lee made it clear that the Bible was the Word 
of God without equivocation’.72  Lee’s outspoken anti-liberalism, combined with his strict 
theological conservatism, meant that the charismatic preacher was an ideologically suitable—
if not ideal—candidate to preach to the white, working class demographic that Bellevue 
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would rely upon to achieve its growth throughout his pastorate.73 Before moving to Memphis 
in 1927, Lee had already achieved his lifelong ambition of becoming a ‘big-city preacher’.74 He 
was ‘quite content’ preaching at Citadel Square Baptist Church, a large congregation in 
Charleston, South Carolina, where he was ‘building a reputation as one of the South’s leading 
preachers’.75 Thus, when Bellevue’s Pulpit Committee offered Lee the vacant senior pastor 
position, his initial response was to decline. But Lee soon changed his mind: for a man of Lee’s 
ambitions the appeal of preaching at Bellevue, which was located in an even bigger city and 
which had vast potential for growth, proved impossible to resist.   
Much like the movement of conservative evangelicalism as a whole, growth and 
expansion would be the dominant themes of Lee’s thirty-three-year pastorate. He attracted 
thousands of new members, expanded the church’s facilities, and widened its range of 
activities. Perhaps the most telling indicator of Bellevue’s growth during Lee’s tenure is the 
church’s membership figures. In 1927, Lee’s first year at the church, Bellevue had a 
membership of 1,430. By 1960, the year of his retirement, that figure had risen to over nine 
thousand—a six-fold growth in the size of the congregation.76 By that point Bellevue was ‘the 
second-largest church of the Southern Baptist Convention’.77 In order to keep up with the 
swelling numbers of people involved with the church, Bellevue also underwent an extensive 
building program. Prior to the all-new sanctuary being completed in 1952, Lee oversaw the 
enlargement of the church’s original facility, which was completed in 1930 despite the ensuing 
economic devastation of the Great Depression. This was followed shortly afterwards by a new 
educational building. Later, once the original building had been replaced by the all-new 
sanctuary, Bellevue held onto the old facility and renamed it the Lee Building. The building 
program was so extensive that by the time Lee retired the church’s facilities effectively 
‘span[ned] a [whole] city block’.78  
To what extent was Lee responsible for the Bellevue’s exceptional growth? The degree 
of Lee’s success at Bellevue was, of course, linked to the broader growth trends of conservative 
evangelicalism in the first half of the twentieth century. The Southern Baptist Convention’s 
growth was particularly strong during this period, with the denomination accruing four 
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million new members and over doubling in size between 1920 and 1950. In this respect, Lee 
was fortunate to have been a preacher at a SBC church in a large city during a period of very 
high growth for the denomination he was a part of. However, the rate at which Bellevue grew 
between 1930 and 1960 was roughly three times greater than that of the denomination as a 
whole. The above-average growth rate during that period suggests that Lee’s success was also 
related to his credentials and skills as a pastor. This point is further supported by the 
membership figures of Bellevue during the pastorate of Lee’s successor, Dr Ramsey Pollard, 
which actually dropped, even while the SBC continued to grow at a national level. As one 
commentator argued when asked by a Christian journal what the secret to Bellevue’s success 
was: “It isn’t a strategic location that makes a great church; it is a strategic pastor”.79 As the 
church’s first high-profile pastor, Lee’s arrival therefore represented something of coup for 
Bellevue. One especially enthusiastic worshipper declared shortly after his arrival that Dr Lee 
was “the greatest preacher on earth”.80  
Lee had acquired his decorated reputation largely thanks to success of his famous 
“Payday Someday” sermon, which he had been preaching ever since 1919. “Payday 
Someday” was based on the two Old Testament chapters I Kings 21 and II Kings 9, and its 
central theme was the notion that all of mankind’s sins would eventually be judged. But like 
all significant sermons, the source of its popularity lay in its combination of content and 
execution. Lee’s prose in “Payday Someday” was eloquent and articulate, and although his 
style was less intense than some of this firebrand colleagues, the sermon was nonetheless 
absorbing in Lee’s idiosyncratic manner. In terms of influence and popularity “Payday 
Someday” has been compared to British colonial theologian Jonathan Edwards’ “Sinners in 
the Hands of an Angry God”. Meanwhile, historian of the SBC Barry Hankins has suggested 
that it was the ‘southern equivalent’ of Russell Conwell’s “Acres of Diamonds”. 81  Lee 
preached “Payday Someday” ‘more than 1,200 times’ throughout his career, and his ‘vivid 
characterisations’ and charismatic delivery—‘Lee needed no script’ to carry out the one-hour 
sermon—had made the preacher a household name by the time he arrived at Bellevue.82 While 
he was at the church Lee set aside the first Sunday of every May for an annual delivery of the 
sermon, ‘until the crowds grew so large the event had to be moved to Ellis Auditorium where 
9,000 could be seated’.83 Bellevue’s growth is also attributable to Lee’s talent for fundraising. 
In 1934 Lee launched the church’s “Love Offering” initiative which, despite the continued 
effects of the Great Depression in Memphis, raised $36,000 in its first year—the equivalent to 
over $600,000 today. The Love Offering fundraiser has been an annual occasion at the church 
ever since, and has been used to pay off church debts and fund missions and building 
programmes.  
Although the amount of charitable donations the church received might suggest 
otherwise, the average Bellevue member during Lee’s tenure was not wealthy. In fact, the 
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socioeconomic makeup of the congregation in many ways resembled that of a typical mid-
century urban Southern Baptist church: that is, Bellevue members were predominantly from 
working class backgrounds, were unlikely to be educated beyond high school, and often had 
low-wage service sector or blue-collar jobs. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that 
Bellevue’s members experienced the poverty that their coreligionists from more rural areas of 
the Cotton Belt did during the Great Depression, but neither would it be accurate to describe 
the congregation as prosperous or even middle class. As one Christian Century church profile 
put it in 1950, ‘Among the many citizens of Memphis, not many great and not many mighty 
are members of the Bellevue Baptist Church…Other churches enrol most of the prominent 
figures of this midsouth city of 350,000, but Bellevue Baptist carries on its rolls…the common 
people’.84 Although thousands of other SBC congregations in the South would comfortably fit 
this description, Bellevue’s socioeconomic profile during the Lee pastorate was also a 
symptom the church’s unique local context. In the late 1920s and 1930s Memphis had yet to 
fully recover from the mass withdrawal of middle class whites who had left the city in the 
wake of the yellow fever epidemics of the late nineteenth century—a situation which was 
accentuated by the Great Depression. The fact that Bellevue was not a wealthy congregation 
during the Lee pastorate highlights the famous pastor’s exceptional skill for convincing his 
congregation of the importance of investing in their church. More importantly, it also 
emphasises the transformation in the socioeconomic profile of the church that had begun to 
take place during the 1970s, as discussed in the next chapter. 
In terms of membership growth and building expansion the last fifteen years of Lee’s 
tenure were his most successful, and they corresponded to a period of dramatic growth for 
evangelicalism as a whole. The first fifteen years after World War II were indeed boom years 
for white evangelical congregations in southern states such as Mississippi and Tennessee. 
Millions of ‘returning service personnel’ and new believers flocked to churches as ‘scores of 
congregations…set new attendance records’.85 But America’s post-war religious resurgence 
did not extend to all Protestant denominations. In fact, while the membership rates of 
mainline denominations such as the United Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church 
(U.S.A) actually declined, it was the membership of evangelical institutions such as the 
Southern Baptist Convention that benefitted the most from the nation’s renewed religious 
vigour. Between 1946 and 1956, membership of the SBC alone grew from six million to 8.7 
million. Significantly, the post-war growth of the SBC even transcended the denomination’s 
traditional regional boundaries. For the first time in its history, the SBC began to have a 
presence in Midwestern states such as Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, and in the Pacific States 
of California, Washington and Oregon.86 In 1940, SBC-affiliated congregations could be found 
in nineteen states, most of which were in the South. But by 1957, the SBC had attained a truly 
nationwide presence, with congregations in all but seven states. As denominations like the 
SBC testify, evangelicalism started the post-war era stronger than ever, converting record 
numbers of believers and spreading the Gospel to the farthest corners of the nation. Indeed, 
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by the middle of the 1950s, evangelicalism had become one of the largest religious groups in 
the Unites States.87 
Bellevue, like many other Baptist congregations in Memphis, benefitted from this 
nationwide surge in evangelical religiosity. But just as it had done during the Great 
Depression, the church also managed to grow at a quicker rate than its rival congregations. A 
comparison between the membership figures of Bellevue and its main city rival, First Baptist, 
between 1940 and 1950, reveals both the scale of evangelical growth in Memphis and the 
extent to which Bellevue had begun to consolidate its position as the city’s largest and most 
prominent white Baptist congregation. Between 1940 and 1950, the membership of First 
Baptist, which was also a member of the Sothern Baptist Convention, grew from 2,448 to 3,553, 
an average yearly increase of one hundred people.88 Meanwhile, Bellevue began the 1940s 
with a membership of 5,362 and ended it with 8,272 members—meaning the church grew by 
an average of three hundred members per year.89 Bellevue’s rate of membership growth was 
thus three times higher than that of First Baptist’s. but the figures for the years between 1940 
and 1950 also demonstrate that Bellevue’s growth was proportionally higher than First’s: 
whereas First Baptist’s congregation grew by an impressive forty percent in the space of ten 
years, Bellevue’s congregation grew by an even more impressive fifty-four percent.  These 
figures demonstrate that even during the post-war evangelical revival—when one would 
expect nearby churches to begin to catch up—the rate of Bellevue’s enlargement comfortably 
exceeded that of its rival congregations.  
As the above figures hint at, the first fifteen years after the War were when Bellevue 
consolidated its position as the city and even the region’s most prominent white Southern 
Baptist congregation. In the South, this kind of status was usually reserved for a city’s “first” 
Baptist congregation, such as First Baptist, Atlanta, and First Baptist, Dallas, the largest 
evangelical churches in their respective cities. Bellevue’s exceptional growth during the 
1940s—caused by its post-war building programme, its staunch theological conservatism, and 
the status and charisma of its pastor—enabled the church to subvert this tradition. As an 
indication of Bellevue’s presence in the city, few things could have matched the church’s new 
sanctuary. One year before the building was completed, First Baptist had finished a new 
sanctuary of its own. But First’s facility was dwarfed by Bellevue’s, which was one of the 
largest of its kind in the whole of the South. The completion in 1952 of Bellevue’s new 
sanctuary thus literally cemented the church’s position as Memphis’ leading Baptist 
congregation. The prestige of eclipsing First Baptist as the city’s statistically and physically 
largest evangelical congregation was further compounded by the success Lee was having, not 
just as pastor of Bellevue, but also at a denominational level. In 1949, Lee began his first of 
three consecutive terms as President of the Southern Baptist Convention, the most prestigious 
Baptist post in the country. As a result of the growth and prestige Bellevue had achieved after 
the War, the church was beginning to attain nationwide recognition. In a poll conducted in 
1950 of 100,000 ministers, Bellevue was chosen as ‘the church most worthy of study in a large 
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city in the southeast quarter of the country’, and even as ‘one of the great churches of 
America’. 90  The survey pointed to Bellevue’s outstanding congregational growth, the 
popularity and denominational success of Pastor Lee, and the success of the church’s charity 
endeavours as the key reasons for its success. 
 
“Setting the City on Fire”: The Arrival of Ramsey Pollard  
 
On December 3, 1959, Robert Lee announced his retirement from the pastorate he had held 
for thirty-two years. The decision would take effect the following February, when Lee’s 
successor, Dr Ramsey Pollard, would take over as senior pastor. Lee’s last major contribution 
to the church was to help launch the United States’ first evangelical television ministry, set up 
in 1958 using cameras and a ‘television broadcast station’ which the church had purchased 
itself.91 The ministry aired Sunday sermons from Bellevue’s pulpit directly to thousands of 
homes in several states across the South. Bellevue would expand its television ministry 
continuously over the ensuing decades, and the innovation inspired countless other large 
churches to establish television ministries of their own. Lee’s pioneering new ministry 
cemented his legacy as one of Bellevue’s “great preachers”, and bookended the pastor’s long 
succession of impressive pastoral achievements. Other notable accomplishments of Lee’s 
thirty-two year pastorate included gaining a grand total of 23,000 new members, increasing 
the total value of the church’s property to ‘over three million dollars,’ and receiving a total of 
$8.4m worth of charitable gift receipts.92  In other words, Lee was largely responsible for 
transforming Bellevue from a mid-sized, Depression-era congregation into an early example 
of a “megachurch”, with one of the largest and fastest growing audiences in the South, and 
an entrepreneurial ethos which sought innovative new ways of spreading the Gospel.  
Pollard’s pastorate, which lasted from 1960 to 1972, did not run nearly as smoothly as 
his predecessor’s. To begin with, whereas Bellevue had spent the 1950s riding on the wave of 
extraordinary post-war evangelical growth and prosperity—apparently oblivious to the 
burgeoning racial unrest that was taking place in the SBC and in southern cities like 
Memphis—the sixties would be the decade in which the church would finally come into direct 
contact with the surrounding turbulence of America’s social upheavals (as discussed in the 
next section of this chapter). But what shook the congregational culture of Bellevue to its 
foundations was not its contact with the civil rights movement, but rather a controversy 
related to the suitability of Pollard for being Lee’s successor. Early on in Pollard’s tenure the 
church struggled to adjust to the shock of welcoming in its first new pastor in over three 
decades. The disorientation caused by Pollard’s noticeably different pastoral style was the 
source of an internal rift which resulted in numerous members leaving the church. The impact 
that these issues had on the health of the church is disputable, and it is of course important 
not to overemphasise their significance. Barry Hankins has appeared to downplay the 
negative impact that the Pollard years on had on the church, referring to Pollard’s pastorate 
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as ‘[f]or the most part… a twelve year holding pattern’. 93  However, there are few better 
indicators of a church’s health than the rate at which it is growing, and in contrast to many of 
its regional rivals Bellevue’s membership actually decreased between 1960 and 1972. 
Based on Pollard’s credentials, however, few could have anticipated the difficulties 
the church would encounter during the 1960s. To begin with, Pollard was a self-described 
fundamentalist and biblical inerrantist, which meant he shared an identical theological 
outlook to Dr Lee and the church’s laypeople. Pollard’s résumé also seemed to suggest that 
he was the ideal man to succeed Lee. In his first year at Bellevue Pollard served his term as 
president of the SBC, the most prestigious honour in Southern Baptist denominational life, 
and a clear indication that he was up to the task of preaching at a megachurch. His pastoral 
background was similarly impressive. Pollard was born in Cleburne, Texas, in 1903, (the same 
year Bellevue was founded), and preached at two Baptist churches in his home state before 
becoming senior pastor at Broadway Baptist Church in Knoxville, Tennessee, where he stayed 
for twenty-one years. It was at Broadway Baptist that Pollard built his reputation as a talented 
pastor, and it was also where he ‘had planned to retire’.94 But ‘the lure’ of preaching at one of 
the country’s largest Southern Baptist congregations—and also, perhaps, the notion of 
succeeding pastor Lee—‘was simply too much…so Pollard made his late career move’ in 
1960.95  
 Unsurprisingly for a skilled orator and regular public speaker, Pollard was not 
inclined to shy away from the attention brought about by becoming the new pastor of Bellevue 
Baptist Church. Indeed, in some respects he appeared to actually revel in it. He liked to ‘say 
that when he came to Memphis as pastor of Bellevue Baptist Church, he set the city on fire’.96 
Here Pollard was referring to the weekend of his very first Sunday service at Bellevue, when 
a huge fire ‘burnt to the ground’ the adjacent Russwood Baseball Stadium, and ‘threatened 
Baptist Memorial Hospital a few blocks from the church’.97 Controversy seemed to plague 
Pollard’s pastorate from the very beginning, and soon he began to attract attention for the 
wrong reasons. The first problem was to do with the house Bellevue was considering to 
provide for Pollard and his family upon their arrival in Memphis, which ‘some felt’ cost far 
too much.98 But this relatively minor issue paled in comparison to the discord experienced just 
a year and a half into Pollard’s tenure, when the Bellevue preacher caused a church split over 
the issue of his pastoring style. A sizable group of dissenters within the congregation had 
grown increasingly dissatisfied with Pollard, and quickly ‘put before the deacons a resolution 
to have Pollard removed’.99 Quite remarkably, the resolution culminated in an open vote to 
determine whether or not Pollard would remain as Bellevue’s pastor. The sources of 
dissatisfaction were, according to a Bellevue member who wrote a dissertation about the 
pastoral history of the church, that Pollard ‘had failed in his pastoral duties; he had failed to 
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lead the church spiritually; and his sermons were inadequate’.100 Other charges included that 
Pollard was not ‘able to communicate with small children’ and that his cigar smoking was 
inappropriate.101 On December 17, 1961, at a meeting of ‘roughly 2,500 in attendance,’ the 
congregation voted 1,180 to 808 in favour of keeping Pollard, with the remaining voters 
abstaining. 
Although the outcome of the vote gave Pollard a mandate to continue his duties at 
Bellevue, ‘he was now the pastor of a church where almost 40 percent of the people did not 
approve of him’.102 A sizable proportion of those who favoured firing Pollard broke away 
from the church, many of whom went on to establish Second Baptist Church, Memphis, a 
congregation which still exists today. According to Pollard, the “core of the opposition [then] 
left that church and started an independent fundamentalist church” called Emmanuel. 103 
Despite these drastic measures, in an interview conducted in 1975 Pollard played down the 
significance of the church split, referring to it as “one little unpleasant experience”.104 He 
claimed the church had predominantly stayed loyal to him, and that many of those that left 
had eventually come back to Bellevue. In the same interview Pollard implied that the split 
was in some part caused by the dissenters’ belief that he was “not evangelistic” enough—even 
though, he argued, he had “been known as an evangelist [in] all of [his] ministry”.105 Pollard 
also admitted that the split could have been related to the shadow cast by pastor Lee: “I think 
that every preacher who follows a great preacher…like Robert Greene Lee, is going to have 
difficulties and problems…Usually there has to be one man to go in there and serve between 
that outstanding personality, and the next man has to be a man to come in there and solidify 
the situation and let it calm down and settle down a bit”.106  
 This is a view shared by Bill and Emily Cochran, two long term members of Bellevue. 
In an interview with the author, Mr and Mrs Cochran defended Pollard’s role in the church 
split. They maintained that Pollard was a “great pastor”, and believed “succeeding Dr Lee 
was always going to be difficult”. Having been at the church since 1957, Mrs Cochran has 
memories of both the Lee and Pollard pastorates (whereas her husband joined later, in the 
1960s).107 She saw the split occurring because of the considerable differences between Lee and 
Pollard in terms of their preaching styles. Lee’s “command of the English language was 
incredible”, and his charisma and unique talent for delivering sermons was one of the reasons 
why “people from all over” came to see him preach.108 Though Pollard was also a highly 
competent orator, the delivery of his sermons was noticeably less formal than Lee’s. The 
official pastoral history of Bellevue, funded and published by the church itself in 2003 to 
commemorate its centenary, acknowledged that ‘following the legendary Robert G. Lee was 
a formidable prospect’, and that Pollard was noticeably more ‘straightforward and humble 
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[than Lee, and he]…didn’t pretend to be otherwise’.109 Pollard’s less formal style, the Cochrans 
conceded, “probably took some getting used to for some”, and is likely to have been one of 
the reasons why some members got offended, especially given how long Lee had been at the 
church. Nonetheless, the Cochrans maintained that Pollard was devoted pastor who was good 
at his job.110  
 Despite Pollard’s efforts to play down its significance, as well as some sympathetic 
views from Bellevue members, there is no doubt that the church split left a profound mark on 
the church for a long period of time. Bellevue member Dan Lester Greer described the split as 
a ‘traumatic experience’ which ‘for many years’ left ‘the spirit of the church…broken’. 111 
Perhaps the most reliable way to evaluate Bellevue’s health during the period in question is 
to rely, once again, on membership figures.112 In this case they offer an insight into the extent 
of Bellevue’s post-Lee decline. In 1960 Bellevue’s membership stood at 9,480, but in 1970 that 
figure had dropped to 8,679, representing a net loss of around nine percent of the 
congregation.113 This is a particularly eye-opening statistic given the rate at which southern 
white evangelicalism was growing during that decade, and the extent to which Bellevue itself 
had been growing up until 1960. Pollard’s pastorate is anomalous to the contemporary history 
of the church in that it remains the only post-war tenure for which the membership figure was 
higher at the beginning than it was at the end; the other two of Bellevue’s post-war pastors 
(excluding the church’s incumbent pastor, Dr Steve Gains) achieved dramatic net growth in 
membership over the course of their terms. Other reasons exist for Bellevue’s net loss of 
members over the course of the Pollard pastorate, such the church’s failure to attract younger 
worshippers. However, the church split, combined with Pollard’s general lack of popularity, 
are undoubtedly main reasons for Bellevue’s deterioration during the 1960s. As asserted by 
Greer in his pastoral history of the church, it is clear that Bellevue did not fully recover from 
the split until the arrival of Pollard’s hugely popular successor, Dr Adrian Rogers.114 
 
A “Laissez-Faire” Approach Towards Racial Integration: Pollard’s SBC Presidency, 
Bellevue and the Civil Rights Movement in Memphis 
 
Further compounding the hapless beginning to Pollard’s tenure, the church split 
corresponded to a period when Bellevue would become directly, albeit unintentionally, 
involved with the issues of racial segregation. In 1960, the year Pollard arrived at Bellevue, 
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the civil rights movement in Memphis and beyond was gaining momentum. Recent federal 
desegregation rulings had given activists further confidence to resist racial discrimination in 
a broad range of segregated public spaces. Shortly after the lunch counter sit-ins started 
spreading across the region, churches soon became arenas of civil rights protest in the South. 
In August of that year, the “kneel-in” movement, with its racially mixed participants 
attempting to peacefully enter and worship at all-white congregations, arrived in Memphis. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to understanding the nature, implications, and 
effects of Bellevue’s relationship with desegregation initiatives such as kneel-in campaigns 
and the broader civil rights movement. After an overview of the denominational context—
i.e., the ways in which the Southern Baptist Convention reacted to the apparent collapse of 
the Jim Crow caste system—the following paragraphs will evaluate Bellevue’s own position 
towards racial integration. It is demonstrated that at a time when large white churches were 
subjected to an unprecedented degree of public scrutiny with regards to their segregation 
policies, Bellevue positioned itself on the ideological centre of existing discourses on race. In 
practice, this meant the church did its best to tolerate the presence of American Americans in 
its pews, but unlike some of its more liberal coreligionists it did not go any further than that. 
Meanwhile, although Pollard publically declared that there was no Biblical or ethical 
justification for segregation, there was at the same time an obvious, albeit rarely mentioned, 
assumption at the church that blacks and whites “belonged” in different churches. In other 
words, Bellevue practiced a “laissez-faire” approach towards racial integration in that it did 
not progressively intervene in Memphis’s “race problem”, but neither did it actively resist 
desegregation. As the forces of the civil rights movement drove blatant racism further away 
from the cultural mainstream, this approach towards integration would become increasingly 
common in white evangelical churches. And as subsequent chapter demonstrate, it helped 
facilitate Bellevue’s links with white flight and in also the creation of a new conservative 
political culture at the church.  
 By the time the kneel-in movement had reached Memphis, the denomination that 
Bellevue belonged to was in the midst of an internal rift over the biblical justifications for 
segregation and racial inequality. The recent Supreme Court ruling declaring the 
unconstitutionality of segregation in public schools had triggered intense debates about the 
moral and theological justifications for racial segregation in America’s churches. By the 
beginning of the 1960s, as anti-segregation activists were stepping up their campaign and civil 
unrest in the South intensified, it was no longer possible for religious institutions to avoid the 
issue of integration. Moreover, recent developments had also inspired a vocal minority of 
southern evangelicals on the left of their movement to begin to apply the principle of 
desegregation to their religious organisations. The presence of racially liberal Protestants 
infuriated the majority of southern white evangelicals, who were still heavily invested in the 
institution of segregation. The new discussions about race and the uncertainties over the 
future of segregation were particularly controversial for the Southern Baptist Convention, and 
for the thousands of churches under its denominational umbrella. This was in large part a 
legacy of the important role that white supremacy had played in the Convention’s formation. 
Throughout much of the nineteenth century Baptists in the South rigorously defended their 
biblical defence of slavery, while their northern coreligionists grew increasingly abolitionist. 
The SBC was formed in 1845 when a group of southern Baptists split from the Triennial 
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Convention—the United States’ first Baptist denomination—after it refused to consider 
ordaining a slaveholder as a missionary. In turn, the SBC held onto its ‘white religious 
traditions,’ which ‘continued to foster its strong sense of distinctiveness well into the 
twentieth century’.115 Two of these racial traditions which continued into the Jim Crow era 
were the ideal of white supremacy and the practice of segregation. The SBC, ‘like most 
southern institutions, reflected, manifested, and in many instances led the racism of the region 
as a whole’.116 The assumption that ‘segregation was [a] natural’ and God-intended principle 
dominated southern white evangelical discourse up to and including the civil rights 
movement.117 
 Although the SBC had always been dominated by theological conservatives—the 
majority of whom were, up until the end of the 1960s, openly racially conservative—there had 
also always existed a small group of liberals within the denomination who used the 
opportunity of the civil rights movement to speak out against black oppression and to argue 
that segregation was unchristian. Many of the Baptist liberals had elite positions in the SBC’s 
institutional hierarchy or belonged to the denomination’s seminaries. This enabled liberals to 
act with a degree of influence that was disproportional to their numerical size. It was thanks 
in part to their disproportional power that SBC liberals had managed to persuade the SBC, 
during its annual convention meeting in 1954, to officially endorse the Brown v. Board of 
Education Supreme Court ruling. But the 1954 convention meeting was far from being an 
accurate indication of the general attitudes of Southern Baptists towards desegregation’.118 In 
fact, up until the end of the civil rights movement, once the cultural mainstream of southern 
society no longer accepted racism as a norm, the majority of Southern Baptists vigorously 
defended their segregation practices. The battle against integration took place on numerous 
different fronts, including theology. Many Baptists in the South insisted that the current social 
order was in line with God’s intentions, and that proof of this could be found in the Bible. 
Indeed, the ‘biblical case for segregation enjoyed a renaissance after the Brown decision,’ 
because segregationists were sensitive to the threat posed to segregation from within their 
own religion.119  
Thus, although they had existed in the denomination for decades, it was only during 
the civil rights movement that the presence of SBC progressives and liberals had become 
unbearable for conservatives. For decades prior to the civil rights movement, moderates, 
liberals and conservatives of the SBC had coexisted relatively peacefully. But as soon as they 
began to step up their attempts to redeem America’s racial immoralities, progressives became 
an intolerable presence for Southern Baptist conservatives. The outrage felt by conservatives 
over their coreligionists’ racial progressivism was even the genesis of an ensuing battle—
known as the Conservative Resurgence or the Southern Baptist Holy War—to rid the SBC of 
its moderate and progressive impulses entirely. 120  During the 1960s, the battle intricately 
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linked theological differences between the two camps with their respective attitudes towards 
race and segregation. That is, their policies toward segregation were intimately tied to, and in 
many ways symptomatic, of their theological outlooks. On one side, progressives were 
heavily influenced by social gospel, which saw inequality as the product of societal failure, 
and in turn promoted Christian intervention to social problems. The liberalism of Baptist 
progressives was also reflected in how they “read” the Bible: progressives argued that much 
of the Bible should be interpreted in an allegorical, non-literal manner. Conversely, 
conservatives leant on a theological framework ‘that construed morality in entirely 
individualistic terms and rendered the structures of inequality invisible’. 121  This enabled 
prominent conservative pastors like Douglas Hudgins of First Baptist, Jackson, Mississippi, to 
‘argue that the Christian faith had nothing to do with a corporate, societal problem like 
segregation’.122 Meanwhile, in contrast to the progressives, conservative Baptists were biblical 
inerrantists in that they believed in the literal truth of Scripture. Although many Baptists 
conservatives were, throughout the civil rights movement, at least as outraged by 
progressives’ racial stances as they were their liberal interpretations of the Bible, the 
Conservative Resurgence ‘placed theology at the centre of the struggle’. 123  This enabled 
conservatives to battle against both racial progressivism and biblical liberalism—and in turn 
maintain their dedication to white supremacy—by rarely, if ever, mentioning segregation or 
race.  
One of the most challenging tasks for a SBC president during the 1960s was to act as 
mediator between the increasingly polarised sides of the segregationist divide. The issue of 
integration—never far away from the minds of conservative Baptists—meant the stakes were 
raised for SBC presidents during the numerous civil rights controversies of the fifties and 
sixties. Thus, post-Brown, each president’s pastoral background, theological credentials, and 
stances on segregation were scrutinised to an unprecedented degree. Dr Pollard’s own SBC 
presidency, which took place from 1960 to 1961, went some way towards appeasing the angry 
conservatives of his denomination. The decision to nominate Pollard as president was, in 
terms of maintaining a degree of order amidst the storm of controversy that had enveloped 
the SBC ever since the dawning of the civil rights movement, in many ways a savvy choice. 
To begin with, Pollard’s refusal to get involved with racial matters or politics during his 
presidency gave him an air of neutrality which his predecessor, Brooks Hays, lacked. Hays, 
who was the Democrat Congressman for Arkansas during his two consecutive presidential 
terms between 1958 and 1960, infuriated conservatives because of the way he had dealt with 
a sensitive integration issue during his time as a Congressman. In 1957 Hays, who had no 
experience as a pastor, found himself caught in the crossfire of the infamous Little Rock Crisis, 
which took place when nine black students attempted to attend a white high school in 
Arkansas. The decision by the segregationist Governor Orval Faubus to call up the National 
Guard to prevent the students attending required a federal intervention headed by president 
Eisenhower. Hays angered a vocal minority of Baptist conservatives after he refused to 
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support Faubus’s drastic measures in the state capital. To SBC segregationists, Hays’ 
‘mediating role’ in the crisis represented ‘a symbol of a dangerous trend in religious life’.124 
Baptist conservatives pointed to Hays’ status as a former chairman of the liberal-leaning 
Christian Life Commission, as well as his handling of the Little Rock Crisis, as evidence that 
the denomination was being infiltrated by a leftist insurgency determined to undermine 
segregation.125  
 It is unlikely to have been accidental that a pastor like Dr Pollard was chosen to 
succeed Hays as president of the SBC. Rather than risk causing further conflict and instability 
by nominating another inexperienced, relatively liberal candidate, the denomination instead 
opted for a conservative, experienced pastor who knew Southern Baptist mores well. Indeed, 
Pollard himself claimed he made a good SBC president because he “knew Baptist people; I 
knew what they wanted to do, and I helped them do it”.126 Although Pollard never sided with 
conservatives on the integration issue, his unapologetic biblical inerratism left no question 
mark over which side of the theological divide he belonged to. In his own words, he 
considered himself “one of those fundamentalist fellows”, which would have pleased the 
majority of the Convention’s churches and members.127 Pollard’s background and theological 
credentials went some way towards appeasing Baptist conservatives in the wake of Hays’ 
controversial terms. Aside from one occasion when “something came up” (which he never 
elaborated on), Pollard recalled his two terms as SBC president as running smoothly. 128 
Possibly alluding to the controversy that plagued his predecessor’s reign, he claimed he could 
not “recall any question that came up that was anywhere near causing a division in the 
Convention” during his presidency.129 Pollard claimed to have had the support from the 
“overwhelming majority of preachers, laymen, and women” of the Convention. Moreover, 
aside from opposing the election of President John F. Kennedy on “religious grounds”, Pollard 
rarely spoke publically about politically sensitive issues.130 Having been raised by an alcoholic 
father, he was more concerned with his personal crusade against the liquor industry than he 
was with addressing the “race problem” in America.131  
 Another way in which Pollard sided himself with conservatives during this critical 
period of SBC history was his outspoken criticisms of the denomination’s liberal voices. He 
unleashed his harshest criticisms at the seminaries, where many of the SBC’s most liberal 
figures resided. In a direct and unambiguous attack, Pollard argued in one of his presidential 
messages that “The seminary professor who didn’t believe in the great fundamental truths of 
God’s Word should be terminated before the setting of the sun”. He continued, “We ought 
not to pay a man a salary to destroy the faith of our young preachers”.132 Pollard expressed an 
equal amount of resentment towards the Convention’s notoriously liberal Christian Life 
Commission, the now-defunct body responsible for the SBC’s public policy, and the 
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organisation which helped push through SBC’s official endorsement of Brown in 1954. He 
believed that the Commission was “bringing it on itself” in the wake of the widespread 
criticism it routinely received, and that it “ought to be more cautious in irritating the great 
mass of our people”.133 In 1970, Pollard was involved in a dispute over the future of the CLC 
after it received complaints about its “exceedingly unwise” programming.134 The executive 
chairman of the CLC assured Pollard that the mistake would not happen again and, fearing a 
deepening rift within the Convention over the issue, the Bellevue pastor voted in favour of 
maintaining the Commission’s funding. Pollard would later look upon his decisive role in 
saving the CLC as the “biggest mistake I have ever made in my denominational life”.135  
Overall, Pollard’s SBC presidency helped mollify some of the unrest that had taken 
place at the SBC in the wake of Hays’ controversial terms. His inerrantist credentials and 
outspoken criticism of the SBC’s liberal impulses placed the Bellevue pastor firmly on the 
conservative side of the denomination’s increasingly polarised theological rift, even though 
he never sided with conservatives on the segregation issue. Any individual Southern Baptist’s 
attitude towards the CLC was, particularly during the civil right era, an accurate indication of 
their theological orientation and their approach towards social ministry. Progressive Baptists 
approved of the Commission because they believed that addressing social inequalities was at 
least as important as “winning souls” though evangelising individuals. Meanwhile, 
conservatives saw the CLC’s more liberal ethos as a threat to what they believed to be the 
SBC’s crucial emphasis on biblical inerrancy and individual soul winning. For Pollard, the key 
to a successful church like Bellevue was a pastor who put a strong emphasis on evangelism, 
as opposed to social ministry. Although, Pollard argued, there was an “element of 
interdependence” between evangelism and a social focus, the main reason for Bellevue’s 
success was its strong “spirit of evangelism”.136 Pollard believed the chief “thing we should 
be magnifying above everything else is the spirit of evangelicalism, winning people to 
Christ”.137  Meanwhile, as a denominational politician Pollard shrewdly avoided doing or 
saying anything that would make him appear to endorse either side of debate over race and 
segregation. This made sense in terms of fulfilling his duty of sustaining relative calm within 
the denomination. But it would not be long before Pollard would be forced—as a pastor rather 
than a denominational politician—to construct a stance towards segregation of his own.  
 
Shortly after the Freedom Riders attempted integrated public travel and campaigners 
organised sit-ins at whites-only diners, civil rights protest in the South soon spread to 
segregated churches. These “kneel-ins” would become ‘an integral part of the larger 
campaign…of direct action that was sweeping the South’ from the beginning of the 1960s.138 
Although more limited in scope, ‘number of participants, and degree of social disruption’ than 
their secular counterparts, kneel-ins had the advantage of possessing a unique moral 
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dimension. 139  By using churches as sites of protest, campaigners fore-fronted the ethical 
implications of racial discrimination: kneel-ins—unlike other forms of protest, which tackled 
the issues such as property rights and freedom of association—were thus ‘moral spectacles 
par excellence’.140 A kneel-in typically involved black or racially mixed groups attempting to 
peacefully enter a segregated church to worship. The visit was then categorised as either a 
“spectacle of embrace” or a “spectacle of exclusion”, depending on the church’s response to 
the campaigners.141  The first documented kneel-in took place in August 1960 in Atlanta, 
Georgia, and within months the movement had spread to cities all over the South. By April 
1961, as many as two hundred churches across the nation had been targeted.142  
 Memphis was one of the first cities after Atlanta to be subjected to kneel-ins. On 
Sunday, August 21, 1960, a small group of black students attempted, in this case successfully, 
to worship ‘at two Catholic churches’ in the city.143 One week later, it was already Bellevue’s 
turn. As one of the largest white churches in Memphis, it was almost inevitable Bellevue was 
targeted. As noted by Stephen Haynes in his study of the kneel-in movement, ‘the more 
prominent and centrally located the congregation, the more powerful the spectacle. This is 
undoubtedly why churches in the town square or city center, or churches that were “first” in 
their respective denominations, were the most common targets’. 144  Dr Pollard appeared 
acutely aware that Bellevue’s prominence—as well as his own status as president of the SBC—
made his church particularly susceptible to attention from the kneel-in movement: “I knew 
that since I was coming here [to Bellevue] and, since I was president of the Southern Baptist 
Convention, that in all likelihood they [the protestors] would bring in outside forces and try 
to force the issue here,” Pollard later recalled.145 Bearing in mind the context of racial tension 
in 1960s Memphis, as well as the intensity of the debates surrounding segregation in the SBC, 
the way in which Bellevue Baptist Church—in Pollard’s words, “one of the great churches of 
our Convention”—responded to the kneel-ins was highly significant.146 Once the kneelers 
came knocking would the church create a spectacle of embrace or a spectacle of exclusion? 
Pollard claimed that while he was pastor Bellevue had always welcomed African Americans, 
and that he saw no biblical reason to resist church integration. He recalled bringing his 
deacons together at the beginning of his pastorate and telling them, “we are going to be put 
to the test”, and that “the thing for you to do, the biblical thing for you to do, is that if these 
Negroes want to come to this church, let them come. Make no issue of it, let them be seen 
where they want to be seen…Don’t say anything that would hurt their feelings. Just treat them 
like you treat everybody else”.147 He claimed to have told the church that “there is no ground 
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for excluding black people from your church…You can do it on prejudice, you can do it on 
earthly reasoning; but so far as the Bible is concerned, you can’t”.148 
 For a large congregation with such strong denominational ties, it is in some ways 
unsurprising that Bellevue adopted a moderate stance towards race and integration. Once 
desegregation initiatives and the nationwide expansion of evangelicalism had begun to 
provoke debates about the theological legitimacy of the racial caste system, it was the smaller 
congregations in less urban settings and with relatively weak denominational connections 
which were the most likely to defend segregation most rigorously.149 Larger congregations in 
more urbanised settings were, on the other hand, more likely to be racially moderate. 
Accordingly, there is little evidence to suggest that there was any kind of active resistance to 
African Americans entering the church from the Bellevue’s membership. Exceptions to this 
usually took the shape of isolated incidents of individual confrontation, such as when a man 
that Pollard knew “got mad and left the church because we had them [African Americans] in” 
the congregation.150 But despite acknowledging the lack of a biblical mandate for segregation, 
Bellevue never went as far as the Christian Life Commission in publically speaking out against 
America’s “race problem”, nor did it attempt to address Memphis’s racial inequalities in any 
meaningful or direct way. Instead, the church’s approach towards desegregation is best 
described as laissez-faire. Indeed, its practices resembled that of the city of Memphis itself, 
which was extremely slow to implement Brown and spent most of the 1960s deferring 
integration or offering “token desegregation”.151 The manner in which Bellevue dealt with 
being targeted by the civil rights initiatives during the height of the kneel-in campaign 
demonstrates the church’s overall willingness to actually be, as well as be seen as, racially 
moderate. Unlike other large, white churches in Memphis—such as Second Presbyterian 
Church, which was thrust into a deep crisis as a result of the kneel-ins—the congregation was 
not split over the issue.152 At the same time, Bellevue’s responses to the kneel-ins also hint at 
the limitations of the church’s racial consciousness, its lack of any willingness to actively 
address racial inequality, and its laissez-faire approach towards integration. 
 Evidence suggests that there were at least two separate instances of kneel-in protests 
at Bellevue during the sixties. During the first, which took place the Sunday after the 
movement arrived in Memphis, on August 28, an unsavoury incident occurred which 
featured in a local newspaper a few days later. In accordance with Pollard’s wish, the activists, 
who were young African American students, were allowed entry into the church. However, 
the church did not quite manage to treat the students in the same way as everyone else, as 
requested by Pollard, nor did it “let them be seen where they want[ed] to be seen”. Once the 
protesters entered the church they were offered seating in a separate, i.e. segregated, section 
of the sanctuary, ‘on the third floor balcony’.153 This was likely to have been because there was 
simply not enough space to seat them with the main audience, although it could also have 
been because the ushers deemed it more suitable for them to sit away from the white members 
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of the congregation. Either way, the students declined the offer and “left peacefully”, but not 
before ‘arguing with ushers in the church vestibule’.154 The confrontation caused around fifty 
members to leave the sanctuary, although according to a report most of the congregation 
‘seemed not to notice the students’.155 Three of the students were subsequently arrested when 
a ‘policeman directing traffic nearby responded to “the disturbance”’.156 Several of Bellevue’s 
members were summoned to court as witnesses, where the ‘assistant attorney described a 
“calculated scheme” to disrupt services at Bellevue’.157 After a failed attempt by the students’ 
lawyer to have the allegations overthrown, they were charged with ‘disorderly conduct’.158 
 In reference to a separate, apparently more successful, kneel-in, Pollard recalled a time 
“when one of the international leaders…[Ralph] Abernathy [the minister and civil rights 
campaigner]…came here and brought about forty or fifty [black activists]. It happened that 
there wasn’t a vacant seat downstairs, everything was full so they had to go upstairs to be 
seated. Nobody said a word about it”.159 This event does not appear in Haynes’ study of the 
kneel-in movement, nor in any other secondary source dealing with the church. Meanwhile, 
Bill and Emily Cochran, who attended Bellevue throughout the sixties and were interviewed 
by the author of this thesis, were not able to recall either of these kneel-ins at Bellevue. Thus, 
Pollard’s reference to a successful, more peaceful kneel-in cannot be independently verified. 
Nonetheless, the anecdote demonstrates the church’s willingness to distinguish itself from the 
racism and segregationism of some of its fellow Southern Baptist congregations. To further 
emphasise Bellevue’s apparent openness towards African Americans, Pollard even claimed 
that “some of the black people started coming here” as early as Lee’s pastorate: “They have 
always been welcome to attend here; Dr Lee used to have some black people who heard him 
regularly, particularly one old white-haired Negro who came here. So there was no objection 
on the part of Bellevue.”160 This is corroborated with the views of Mr and Mrs Cochran who, 
despite not remembering the kneel-ins, claimed there was “very little or no hostility” towards 
African Americans at the church during the sixties.161 
 Although Bellevue’s experiences of the kneel-ins did not always run quite as smoothly 
as Pollard would have wanted, the church’s responses to the protestors nonetheless 
demonstrate that the vast majority of those involved with the church wanted to worship in a 
racially moderate environment. There was little active hostility towards the principle of 
integrated worshipping at Bellevue, either from the pastor or from individual members of the 
congregation itself. However, despite this racial tolerance the church never actively sought to 
minister to the city’s African American population. The church did its best to tolerate African 
Americans when they entered, but it did not attempt to bring them to the church on a 
permanent basis. Similarly, Bellevue’s leaders had no intention of making the church a site for 
publically discussing America’s “race problem”, like more liberal evangelical churches had 
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been doing since the genesis of the civil rights movement. Meanwhile, throughout the civil 
rights movement and beyond, Bellevue essentially stayed faithful to the view that black and 
white audiences were always likely to worship separately. As Pollard himself articulated 
when discussing the possibility of black worshippers regularly attending Bellevue in the wake 
of the kneel-ins: “They [African Americans] are not going to come to your church [often], they 
don’t want to come. They’ve got better preachers than we have in the first place, and they 
want to be with their own people”.162  
   
Conclusion  
 
The main aim of this chapter has been to illustrate Bellevue’s approaches towards race and 
segregation during the civil rights movement. After chronicling Bellevue’s progression from 
a small church on the east side of a growing city to a thriving megachurch, this chapter 
discussed how it was forced to develop tangible stances towards integration and racial 
equality. Bellevue adopted a moderate stance towards race which, as the discussion of the 
concurrent rift in the SBC demonstrated, placed the church at the ideological centre of 
discourses on race. Meanwhile, this chapter has showed that Bellevue had a laissez-faire 
approach towards its surrounding environment in the 1960s, which was a symptom of its 
particular brand of theology, as well as its assumptions about racially segregated worshiping 
in the post-Brown world. Individual responsibility had long been at the heart of the moral 
worldview of this strand of theologically conservative evangelicalism. The church’s dominant 
concern was with evangelising rather than with redeeming social problems such as racial 
inequality. Pollard insisted that it was simply not the duty of the church to intervene on 
community matters: “This idea that the main business of the church is to build apartment 
houses and a new sewer system for the city, or to lead out in other social activities, is not the 
main objective of the church,” he argued.163 Meanwhile, sensing the importance of Bellevue’s 
reaction to the kneel-in movement, Pollard made an effort to ensure that the protesters’ 
presence was tolerated in the church. Bellevue’s status as one of the largest congregations in 
the SBC—as opposed to marginal congregations, which were much more likely to harbour 
segregationist ideology—also helped safeguard its racially centrist position. However, Pollard 
was also responsible for helping perpetuate the assumption that blacks and whites were 
destined to always worship separately, irrespective of the impact of federal and civil 
desegregation initiatives. In the context of the changing ethnic and demographic dynamics of 
the Midtown neighbourhood, this attitude would have important long term implications for 
the church. As subsequent chapters will show, Bellevue’s lack of engagement with its 
neighbourhood’s increasingly diverse ethnic composition—combined with a corresponding 
strengthening of ties between the church and socioeconomic phenomenon of “white flight”—
would not only pave the way for its suburbanisation but also help create a distinct political 
culture which fostered the conservative evangelical alignment with the Republican Party.  
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Chapter 2: Becoming Suburban: The Post-Pollard Revival and Bellevue’s 
Connections with “White Flight” and the Suburbs, 1972 - 1980 
 
The events at Bellevue and in Memphis are a testament to the notion that the 1970s were at 
least as transformative in religious, socioeconomic and political terms as the decades that 
directly preceded and succeeded them.164 At the turn of the decade Memphis was still reeling 
from the trauma inflicted on the city by the assignation of Martin Luther King, Jr at a 
Downtown motel less than two years earlier. Residual tensions left behind by King’s death 
and the previous ten years of civil rights unrest did nothing to alleviate the atmosphere of 
racial polarisation and division that plagued the city. Rather than fading with the passage of 
time, these divisions were in many ways accentuated by the post-civil rights racial, economic 
and political landscape. The implementation of busing, the political economy of the Sunbelt 
and the politics of suburban planning resulted in a bipolar racial and class system in Memphis 
which was split physically between inner-city and suburbs. Meanwhile, in 1972, the same year 
that busing was first introduced in Memphis and across the nation, Bellevue welcomed its 
first new pastor in twelve years. Mirroring the trends of evangelical attendance at a national 
level, Dr Adrian Rogers’ first eight years at Bellevue’s helm would be characterised by 
extraordinary growth. The aim of this chapter is to explain how Bellevue’s post-Pollard 
revival was achieved, and more importantly, to explore how this growth related to post-civil 
rights era urban change in Memphis.  
It is demonstrated in this chapter that during the early years of the Rogers pastorate 
Bellevue maintained its laissez-faire approach towards attracting African Americans. In fact, 
the church appeared to have a deliberate strategy of targeting whites from different age and 
class groups to the predominantly older, working class groups that remained at the church in 
the wake of the Pollard pastorate. Rogers’ preaching charisma and inerrantist theology 
appealed to the conservative religious culture of white Memphis, which despite moving away 
from the inner-city was not uprooting from the city altogether. Indeed, the theological and 
cultural characteristics of the church made Bellevue an ideal environment for the religiously 
and politically conservative whites who were beginning to be concentrated in Memphis’s 
suburbs. Thus, unlike less popular white churches in inner-city areas, Bellevue was not forced 
to contemplate “reaching out” to the burgeoning ethnic minority presence of the local 
neighbourhood. In the context of Memphis’s extreme levels of “white flight”, the significance 
of Bellevue’s continued popularity with whites was that the church started to develop 
increasingly strong connections with the socioeconomic, political and cultural characteristics 
of the suburbs. As this chapter shows, these connections had an effect on the congregational 
culture of Bellevue itself. In other words, Bellevue was “becoming suburban” years before its 
actual relocation to the suburbs in 1989. As well as increasing the likelihood of Bellevue’s 
relocation, the suburbanisation of Bellevue during the 1970s encouraged the creation of the 
church’s new form of political culture, which would emerge clearly by the beginning of the 
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1980s. Thus, the intersection of Bellevue’s conservative theology, its growth model, and 
demographic change in Memphis had important effects on the church which would not be 
fully realised until around a decade later.  
 
Searching for “God’s Man”: The Arrival of Adrian Rogers 
 
In the afternoon of April 16, 1972, Dr Ramsey Pollard publically presented his resignation to 
the congregation and church leaders from Bellevue’s pulpit. Once Pollard had completed his 
resignation speech, the church’s deacons ‘left their seats’ and, in an unexpected ‘display of 
unified love and loyalty…stood by’ their veteran pastor’s side.165 The gesture signified the 
willingness of the church’s hierarchy to defend the legacy of Pollard’s tenure, which—as 
everyone present during the resignation speech would have known—included a particularly 
“testing” period in the early 1960s.166 Bellevue would not fully recuperate from its decline in 
membership until after Pollard’s retirement; but during the second half of his pastorate 
Pollard did manage to avoid any further significant congregational discord or instability, and 
from the mid-1960s onwards the congregation even started to show modest signs of recovery. 
For example, according to Bellevue’s official pastoral history, Pollard strengthened the 
church’s ministries, including a programme for the Jewish community and a “Medical 
Professions Day” hosting students working at the nearby hospital. 167  Pollard was also 
responsible for raising the funds for an “activities building”, which was designed for 
evangelistic outreach activities and recreational purposes. The building was completed in 
1966, and named the Pollard Activities Building in 1970 to honour the pastor’s tenth 
anniversary at the church.168  Between 1965 and 1970, Bellevue even managed to attain a 
modest increase in the size of its congregation, from 8,110 to 8,679 members. 169  Though 
Pollard’s tenure has been considered a mere ‘holding pattern’ in between the successful 
pastorates of Robert G. Lee and Adrian Rogers, after the resignation speech the church’s 
officials nonetheless waxed lyrical about the pastor’s achievements over the course of his 
twelve years at the church.170  
In his resignation speech Pollard argued that Bellevue’s next pastor needed to be 
“God’s man” for the “tremendous and challenging years ahead”.171 And after the controversy 
and stagnation that characterised the previous twelve years, Bellevue’s hierarchy were no-
doubt hoping that Dr Adrian Rogers, the man chosen to succeed Pollard, was nothing less 
than a pastor endorsed by God Himself. Born in West Palm Beach, Florida in 1931, Rogers 
was still only forty years old when three members of Bellevue’s Pulpit Committee came to see 
him speak at the Southern Baptist Convention Pastors Conference in Philadelphia in 1972. If 
the Committee’s interest in a relatively young pastor was intentional, then they were probably 
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in search of a preacher who would stay at Bellevue for decades, and potentially expand the 
church in similar vein to what Lee had achieved prior to Pollard. Other “non-negotiable” 
criteria for Bellevue’s next pastor were ‘an unshakable commitment to the inerrancy of God’s 
Word and a burning zeal to lead the lost to Christ’.172 Based on the sermon he had delivered 
at the Conference, the Committee were satisfied that Rogers possessed these qualities, as well 
as a ‘supreme desire of his heart’ to become a “man of God”. 173  Although prior to the 
Conference no one at Bellevue had even heard of Rogers, he soon became the leading 
candidate to succeed Pollard. 
Between 1964 and 1972 Rogers pastored at First Baptist Church, Merritt Island, Florida, 
overlooking the Kennedy Space Station. Prior to this Rogers studied at New Orleans Baptist 
Theological Seminary and completed successful pastorates at Baptist churches in Waveland, 
Mississippi, and Fort Pierce, Florida. Rogers settled down in Merritt Island to raise his 
children, and he turned First Baptist into a highly successful congregation with a young 
membership. He baptised an average of 350 people per year while at Merritt Island, bringing 
about an impressive five-fold increase in the church’s membership—from 300 to 1,500 
members—in just eight years.174 After hearing about First Baptist’s remarkable growth Gene 
Howard, one of Bellevue’s Pulpit Committee members, travelled to Merritt Island to see 
Rogers preach. Howard was impressed with how “people of all ages [were there] with their 
Bibles opened, following what he [Rogers] was saying”.175 Like the rest of the Committee, 
Howard was convinced that Rogers should be Bellevue’s first choice for its next pastor. 
However, with a wife a young children settled in Merritt Island, and a thriving congregation 
to preach at, Rogers was content as pastor at First Baptist. According to Rogers’ daughter, 
Janice Ediston, “my dad wasn’t interested [in the Bellevue job]. He said he was very happy 
being pastor at First Baptist, Merritt Island. And we truly expected that he would stay 
there”.176 But while holidaying north of Florida with some of his family, Rogers received a 
message from his son back home which said that Bellevue was trying to get in contact with 
him. Rogers “felt bad about the time that they had spent getting into contact with him” so 
they took a detour to Memphis while they were still on vacation.177 During that first meeting 
at Bellevue, the Pulpit Committee agreed to let Rogers preach at the church a single time, “just 
to get a feel for it”.178 This was scheduled for August 13, when Rogers preached a sermon 
entitled “How to Please God” from Bellevue’s pulpit. After the sermon, which was extremely 
well-received by the congregation, ‘Dr Rogers adjourned to the Pastor’s study’.179 While he 
was there, and without his knowledge, the Pulpit Committee conducted a poll and the 
congregation unanimously voted in favour of Rogers becoming the next pastor. With both the 
Pulpit Committee and the membership on board, all that was left to do was for Rogers to make 
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his decision. On the same day he called his family and told his daughter she “was going to be 
a Memphis girl”.180 
There were several things that took Rogers and his family by surprise once they 
arrived at Bellevue in September 1972 and began to settle down to living in Memphis. The 
first was just how different their new environment was compared with their old home in 
Florida. The high-tech industrial culture of Merritt Island that surrounded First Baptist 
created a “totally different” atmosphere to that of Midtown Memphis.181 Ediston grew up 
watching the rockets launched from the Kennedy Space Center, which could even be seen 
from their family home lifting off. She was around eight years old when NASA launched the 
Apollo 13 mission from the Merritt Island Centre in April 1970. Thanks to the changes 
wrought by the space travel industry and other high-tech trades, Florida became an early 
example of a Sunbelt state, so that environments like Merritt Island often shared more 
common economic and cultural characteristics with Californian towns than they did with the 
cities of fellow Southeastern states such as Mississippi and Alabama. Meanwhile, in the early 
seventies much of Memphis—including Midtown—was economically and socially deprived. 
Unemployment and poverty levels were high, and the city had barely begun its attempts to 
alleviate the racial tensions caused by the civil rights movement and the assassination of Dr 
Martin Luther King, Jr. in a downtown Memphis motel four years earlier. All of this felt like 
a world away from the middle class prosperity of Merritt Island. In an interview conducted 
decades later, Adrian Rogers described the culture of Merritt Island as “more eclectic” and 
“cosmopolitan” in comparison with Memphis. In Florida, “we have people who come from 
all over, especially there in the space centre”.182 Rogers argued that “You are more in the South 
in Memphis than you are in Florida. Memphis is the Deep South”.183 On this latter point the 
pastor was no-doubt referring to the typically ‘southern’ traits of racial tension, economic 
‘backwardness’ and poverty that plagued much of Memphis and was relatively absent from 
Merritt Island.  
The second observation Rogers and his family made upon arriving in Memphis was 
the graciousness of the congregation and the sense of welcome they received at their new 
church. Rogers’ daughter recalled how much effort the congregation had made to make the 
whole family feel comfortable and accepted.184  But equally noticeable was the difference 
between their current and former churches in terms of how busy they were during Sunday 
services. By the time Rogers had left First Baptist, Merritt Island, each Sunday the sanctuary 
was filled to its maximum capacity with worshippers. In contrast, during Rogers’ first 
sermons at Bellevue the ‘20-year-old sanctuary…was only about two thirds filled each 
Sunday’.185 Of course, in 1972 the membership at Bellevue was far greater than First Baptist’s 
(which was around 1,500 in comparison with Bellevue’s 8,739); but whereas just twelve years 
earlier Bellevue had comfortably attracted enough people to fill its 3,000 seat sanctuary, by 
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the end of Pollard’s tenure there was imply no longer the same demand to worship there. It 
was clear that Dr Pollard had left the church in a state of deterioration, as Janice Ediston had 
noticed: “Bellevue was in a kind of decline when we arrived. I think the attendance of Sunday 
school at the church we left was probably higher than at Bellevue at the time. Even though 
the church [Bellevue] was much bigger and well known, we still came from a church that was 
running bigger numbers”.186 This was a cause for deep concern for everyone involved in the 
church, and was likely to have been a key reason why the Pulpit Committee targeted Rogers 
as Pollard’s replacement. Ediston believed that one of the reasons why First Baptist was 
growing to such an extent was Rogers’ ability to attract younger worshippers. Bellevue, by 
contrast, was a congregation made up of much older members. Ediston remembered going, 
in 1972, from “from a church with all these young married couples to a predominantly older 
congregation”.187 Meanwhile, Rogers subsequently recalled how during his first sermon at the 
church “it felt like I was looking at a snowstorm”.188 Pollard’s failure to attract the young had 
thus undoubtedly contributed towards the church’s decline. And as Rogers would bluntly put 
it in an interview years later, “It is a fact that when a church ceases to grow it begins to die”.189 
Rogers’ most obvious challenges in the years ahead was therefore to restore Bellevue’s growth 
to the levels it had achieved during Lee’s pastorate. 
 
Bellevue’s Post-Pollard Revival and the Nationwide Growth of Conservative 
Evangelicalism in the 1970s  
 
The task of rejuvenating Bellevue after twelve years of stagnation was therefore a daunting 
one. But by ushering in a new wave of extraordinary growth that began almost immediately, 
the Floridian pastor soon put to rest any doubts that Bellevue members may have had about 
the arrival of their new preacher. Within a few years it became clear that Bellevue under the 
leadership of Dr Rogers had the potential to not only match the growth levels of the Lee era, 
but to actually surpass them. Indeed, as an indication of what was to come over the course of 
his thirty-three years at the church, thousands of new members flocked to the church during 
the first three years of Rogers’ pastorate. The new pastor’s success was thanks to a number of 
different factors. To begin with, Rogers displayed a willingness to expand Bellevue’s 
ministries and reach out to new members in ways that his predecessor’s somewhat low-risk 
leadership style lacked. Moreover, Rogers’ charismatic preaching style was so popular with 
southern evangelicals that during his first decade as Bellevue pastor he had gained the kind 
of celebrity following and reputation that resembled that of pastor Lee twenty years earlier. 
However, this chapter argues that the best way to understand Bellevue’s growth during the 
1970s is to place it within the within the context of the broader growth patterns of conservative 
evangelicalism during the same period. As other studies have already demonstrated, the 
central reason why churches like Bellevue grew from the 1970s onwards was that they offered 
a clear and unambiguous sense of meaning to social conservatives who, in the wake of the 
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resurgent liberalism of the civil rights movement, had started to feel disillusioned by the 
relatively moderate stances of “mainline” Protestant denominations. 190  As a pastor who 
articulated his theological conservatism in a particularly uncompromising and charismatic 
manner, Rogers appealed profoundly to this demographic, a disproportionate number of 
whom resided in the South. In other words, although Rogers was in theological terms no more 
conservative than his predecessors, his leadership and preaching style made him more suited 
to exploit the explosion of post-civil rights conservative religiosity that occured after the 1960s. 
 The instantaneous spike in membership that Bellevue benefitted from upon the arrival 
of Rogers can in part be explained by the excitement caused by the inauguration of the 
church’s first new pastor in twelve years. Word spread quickly whenever a new pastor was 
initiated at a church as large as Bellevue, and this interest inevitably translated into greater 
attendance figures. Janice Ediston recalled that everybody “knew there a new pastor in town 
so they all wanted to come and see him in person”.191 She also remembered how the church’s 
television ministry, which had been airing Sunday sermons to homes across the region since 
1958, further extended the reach of Rogers’ appeal. The rapid spread of Rogers’ profile thanks 
to word of mouth and the television ministry created a surge in demand to worship at 
Bellevue. As a result, the week-on-week membership of Bellevue rose dramatically. 
According to Ediston, “pretty much every service…around fifty people was the norm for 
joining”. Each Sunday, “people were scrambling to get to the front row of the church”.192 In 
the spring of 1973—half a year after his arrival—Rogers launched a ‘three-month campaign’ 
to attract new members.193 The initiative culminated in a “Miracle Day”, which saw the church 
host a ‘record high Sunday School service attendance of 4,567’.194 Meanwhile, between 1970 
and 1975 Bellevue’s membership grew by over two thousand, the largest increase over the 
course of a five-year period since 1940 to 1945. 195  Over the same period Sunday school 
enrolment increased by 1,300 and the total amount of charity receipts received almost doubled 
to $1.7m.196 
Judging by the similarities between the two popular preachers, it was no accident that 
Rogers achieved similar levels of growth to what Dr Lee had accomplished at the church 
decades earlier. There were several commonalities between the pastoring styles of Lee and 
Rogers which clearly resonated with Memphis’s white evangelicals. Firstly, just like his 
illustrious predecessor, Rogers possessed the potent blend of a charismatic preaching style 
and a strict inerrantist theology, the combination of which undoubtedly drew many new 
members to the church. Rogers referred to himself as an “inerrantist conservative”, and was 
comfortable being referred to as a ‘fundamentalist' so long as the term was understood as 
“somebody who believes in the fundamentals of the faith, fundamentals of the faith being to 
me the basis of all that is the Bible, word of God, the deity of Christ…and all these basic truths 
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that we—I believe, as Baptists—have held historically as being true”.197 According to Ediston, 
Rogers “spoke very boldly” about his commitment to theological conservatism.198 She claimed 
that a large part of his appeal was that “people heard somebody who told it like it is, and [did 
not] not apologise for [speaking] the word of God”. The scale of Rogers’ commitment towards 
biblical inerrancy, as well as his intolerance towards liberal strands of theology, is also 
demonstrated by the important role the pastor would play in the SBC’s Conservative 
Resurgence. Although Dr Pollard also used the platform of a SBC presidency to condemn 
theological liberalism, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that Rogers’ enthusiasm for 
decrying liberal theology and defending biblical inerrancy exceeded that of his predecessor. 
Rogers’ unequivocal conservatism lay at the heart of his popularity, but his preaching style 
also contributed.199 Rogers quickly gained the nickname “Old Golden Throat” because of the 
smooth sound and assertive delivery of his preaching voice. As Ediston recalled, “it was so 
magical when he was speaking…the spirit was guiding him”.200 Overall, as a preacher Rogers 
is often considered to be in the same “great preacher” category as that which Lee had belonged 
to during his time at Bellevue.201  
Another way in which Rogers was evocative of Lee was his willingness to expand 
Bellevue’s activities and ministries. Rogers fulfilled his duties as pastor with an 
entrepreneurial ethos that Pollard seemed to lack, but which was certainly reminiscent of Lee. 
Lee and Rogers were, after all, the only two post-war Bellevue pastors to have overseen the 
completion of brand new sanctuaries. Rogers’ programmes at the church centred around 
growth and expansion from the very beginning. Rogers “was always doing programmes, he 
always very conscious of growing. He would also have ‘high attendance days’. He would 
always have a goal, where he would aim for a higher number of attendees”.202 Part of his 
formula for increasing attendance was to expand the different platforms the church had for 
expressing and spreading the Gospel message. Aided by the television ministry, which 
transmitted Bellevue’s activities to an audience which would have been unimaginable a few 
decades earlier, Rogers sought to increase the appeal of the church by diversifying the range 
of events held in the church’s Worship Centre. Rather than merely hosting baptisms and 
sermons, Bellevue’s pews would also begin to serve as venues for numerous other Gospel-
related performances. As Janice Ediston put it, her father was “big on making shows”.203 One 
of the most ambitious of Rogers’ “shows” was the Singing Christmas Tree, an annual festive 
play performed in the Worship Centre featuring a giant Christmas Tree filled with a choir. 
Whatever the artistic merits of the Singing Christmas Tree, it was an undoubted success with 
the church’s congregants and the thousands of followers watching via Bellevue’s television 
portal; ever since the inaugural show in 1976, it has been performed during the festive period 
every year of the Rogers pastorate and beyond. The hardback book published by Bellevue to 
celebrate its centenary refers to Rogers’ idea of attracting members through “making shows” 
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as a ‘bold step forward’ for the church.204  The publication even claims that a substantial 
number of new members were attracted to the church as a direct result of the Singing Christmas 
Tree show.205 One piece of evidence supporting this claim is that on April 17, 1977—four 
months after the debut of the show—Bellevue introduced a second Sunday morning worship 
service, the first time the church deemed such a move necessary since the latest sanctuary was 
completed in 1952.206 
As part of his interest in integrating the Gospel message into new performing arts 
shows, Rogers was also quick to invest in the church’s music ministry. Perhaps the most astute 
facet of this was that it seems to have displayed an awareness of how, from the 1970s onwards, 
music was slowly becoming an integral part of “Christian Youth Culture”—a largely 
untapped audience of young evangelicals who adopted politically, socially and theologically 
conservative views but ‘saw no reason to give up their electric guitars’.207 Christian rock, 
which fused secular popular music influences together with devout, born-again content, 
would help keep a younger generation of evangelicals engaged with the religious and even 
political aims of the broader movement. Eventually, Christian rock, in its myriad different 
forms and variations, would become an accepted, relatively uncontroversial medium with 
which to spread the Gospel. Although Bellevue’s role in all of this was minor, the expansion 
of its music ministry suggests that the church was beginning to make concerted efforts to 
attract younger audiences. Although, as Pollard had proved, it was usually not difficult to 
hold on to older laypeople, appealing to younger audiences often involved using more 
imaginative ways of communicating the Gospel. Music was one of the forms that was used, 
particularly from the 1970s onwards, to make evangelical religious discourse more relevant 
to younger people. In another display of Rogers’ willingness to make Bellevue a younger 
congregation, the church’s new pastor even brought the youth minister of his old pastorate at 
First Baptist, Merritt Island with him to Bellevue. 208  Rogers and the youth minister had 
succeeded in making First Baptist a younger congregation, and now they were working on 
doing the same at Bellevue. In his study of the church’s pastoral history, Bellevue layman Dan 
Greer has argued that reducing the average age of the congregation was an integral part of 
the growth model implemented by Dr Rogers. Writing in the early 1990s, shortly after 
Bellevue’s relocation to the suburbs, Greer claimed that the proportion of senior adults at the 
church had been reduced from sixteen percent four years earlier to ten percent at the time of 
writing.209 This was the culmination of a project which was initiated twenty years earlier by a 
pastor who was acutely aware of the need to revitalise what his aging congregation. ‘We are 
now a church growing younger by the day, with significant numbers of young married adults 
joining our congregation,’ argued Greer.210   
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It is, of course, possible that Bellevue’s post-Pollard revival could have been achieved 
by targeting some of the many African Americans who had been moving to Midtown in the 
wake of desegregation and busing. In the early 1970s blacks were still a minority in Midtown 
but they were by far the fastest growing racial group in the neighbourhood. This trend would 
continue for decades, and by the end of the twentieth century blacks would make up a clear 
majority in Midtown, with two thirds of the population being African American.211  One 
solution to the decline of the church up until 1972 could therefore have been to embrace ‘the 
changes in the city’s population’ by “reaching out” to the local African American 
population.212  In practice, however, this did not happen. There is no doubt that the vast 
majority of Bellevue’s increase in membership under Rogers was realised by attracting a 
whites from different age and class groups, rather than by breaking the colour line. Unlike 
smaller white congregations in inner-city locations, Bellevue did not struggle to attract 
members from surrounding neighbourhoods; it had the resources, personnel (i.e., the allure 
of Rogers), and facilities to draw audiences from other districts of the city, and even 
neighbouring counties. In other words, Bellevue was a “regional” church (the definition of 
which overlaps significantly with “megachurch”), in the sense that “people from all over 
would come to attend”.213 One of the most important characteristics of large, regional churches 
is that once they ‘reach the critical mass of 2,000 members, sheer size alone enables [them] to 
lure more followers’.214  
The enduring whiteness of Bellevue inevitably created an increasingly broad racial 
gulf between the congregation and the neighbourhood that surrounded it. As Midtown 
continued along the road of its demographic transformation, the size of this discrepancy 
would grow until, in 1989, the church completed its relocation to a neighbourhood where over 
90% of the population was white. But in the absence of any conscious attempt to attract 
minorities to the church, the racial uniformity of Bellevue should not come as too much of a 
surprise. In many respects it was simpler and easier to attract new white members living 
several miles away than it was to appeal to the church’s much more local black populations. 
This was largely due to the cultural, theological, and political differences between black and 
white Protestant congregations in the United States—and particularly in the South—which 
have become deeply entrenched over the course of the last three centuries. These differences 
have created barriers to racial integration which could only be overcome with substantial 
effort from both the black and white religious communities. In their seminal study of racial 
divisions in the history of American evangelicalism, Michael Emerson and Christian Smith 
argue that the most irreconcilable division between white and black evangelical culture has 
been their respective interpretations of racial inequality.215 Whereas white evangelicals have 
tended to believe in individualistic ideas about ‘how social change happens’, their black 
                                                          
211  “Midtown, Memphis, TN Demographics”, Areavibes Inc., accessed May 6, 2015, 
http://www.areavibes.com/memphis-tn/midtown/demographics/. 
212 Trundle, “Doctrine, Demographics, and the Decline of the Southern Baptist Convention”, p. 90. 
213 Emily Cochran, interview with author. 
214 Richard N. Ostling, “Superchurches and How They Grow,” Time 138, August 1991, p. 63. Quoted 
from Greer, “Bellevue Baptist Church”, p. 53. 
215 Michael O. Emerson and Christian Smith, Divided By Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race 
in America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
54 
 
coreligionists have often been acutely aware of the structural causes of racial inequality.216 
These opposing approaches towards racial inequality closely correlate with stark theological 
differences, which have proven to be largely incompatible.217 Lastly, the continuation of de 
facto segregation in churches has ‘contribute[d] towards the divergent demographic and 
racial perspectives of blacks and whites’.218 Throughout its history, all three of these barriers 
have applied to Bellevue, whose conservative theology prioritised individual soul winning 
over collective responses to social problems like racism. Overcoming these obstacles to racial 
integration has been a formidable task for even the sincerest and devoted attempts to racially 
integrate America’s churches. The progress of “racial reconciliation” efforts has been slow; 
indeed, movements such as the Evangelical Racial Change advocates did not gather 
momentum until at least the 1990s.219 Therefore, without even the slightest attempt to attract 
African American worshippers, it is not surprising that the Bellevue’s racial makeup stayed 
white even as Midtown was in the midst of a demographic transformation which eventually 
shifted its overall racial composition into a majority-black neighbourhood. 
As well as Rogers’ skills as a pastor and his strategy of attracting younger worshippers, 
another significant factor related to Bellevue’s growth were the broader growth trends of 
white evangelicalism during the 1970s. The first few years of Rogers’ tenure corresponded to 
the beginning of a period of extraordinary change for Protestantism in the United States, as 
mainline denominations declined and evangelical congregations grew exponentially. After 
reaching their historical peak sometime in the 1950s, the membership figures of mainline 
denominations began shrink dramatically from the late 1960s. Each of the five major 
ecumenical denominations—namely, the Episcopal Church, the United Presbyterian Church, 
the United Methodist Church, the United Church of Christ and the Lutheran Church in 
America—each lost hundreds of thousands of members within the space of five years.220 And 
rather than representing a mere blip during a period of resurgent secularism, this decline 
would continue throughout the second half of the twentieth century and beyond, with 
mainline membership falling from 31 million in 1965 to 25 million in 1988.221 Meanwhile, 
membership of non-ecumenical, theologically conservative denominations—most of which 
are evangelical—exploded. Between 1965 and 1975 the Southern Baptist Convention alone 
amassed two million new members, the sharpest increase in followers over a ten-year period 
in the denomination’s history. By the middle of the 1970s the SBC was the largest Protestant 
denomination in the country. Sprouting from this phenomenon were so-called 
“megachurches”, congregations which like Bellevue had over 2,000 regular attendees and 
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which were disproportionately evangelical (and indeed Southern Baptist) in their 
denominational affiliations. Thus, although Bellevue’s growth during the 1970s was, even by 
evangelical standards, exceptional, its success was part of a far broader shift in the religious 
inclinations of American society in the second half of the twentieth century.  In order to have 
a complete understanding of Bellevue’s post-Pollard revival, it is therefore necessary to 
explicate how it related to the broader growth trends of the movement as a whole.  
Dean Kelley’s sociological survey was one of the first scholarly interventions on the 
topic of post-1960s denominational membership trends, but it remains highly relevant today. 
Kelley argued that the most important variable determining the strength of a church was the 
level of its religious “strictness” or “seriousness”.222 According to Kelley’s definition, strict 
churches are those which are highly demanding of their members: they expect all congregants 
be to fully invested in the church’s religious doctrine, and to participate in its activities; those 
that fail to meet these requirements are not allowed to continue worshipping in the 
congregation. Although this kind of approach deters and prevents less committed believers 
from joining strict churches, seriousness also produces a far higher degree of loyalty than 
more lenient approaches. This means that even if tolerant churches are able to attract a greater 
quantity of potential members, stricter congregations hold on to their adherents much more 
easily. Another component of Kelley’s “strictness” model is that in the current religious 
marketplace churches which ‘do not confuse’ their faith ‘with other beliefs, loyalties, or 
practices, or mingle them together indiscriminately,’ are more successful.223 Kelley cites a 
study which found that laypeople tended to believe the three most important activities of any 
church should be winning others to Christ, providing worship services and giving spiritual 
instruction.224 Although other activities such as ‘helping the needy’ and ‘supporting minority 
groups’ were deemed to be important, churches which more vigorously focussed on the 
higher priorities attracted more members and facilitated greater loyalty. 225  Conversely, 
churches which prioritise initiatives such as the eradication of poverty over inherently 
spiritual matters are more likely to lose members because they are seen as diluting religious 
meaning and as a digression from the actual purpose of the church. In sum, argues Kelley, it 
is not conservatism per se which made conservative churches in the United States so 
successful; rather, it was that conservative churches were far more likely to adopt strict, 
uncompromising approaches towards their religious beliefs than their more liberal 
counterparts. 226  In the United States, mainline denominations have historically played 
prominent role in the social gospel movement which, according to Kelley, is a key reason why 
more liberal churches were declining. ‘Those who confuse’ social action and religious 
meaning ‘run the risk of losing the comparatively reliable allegiance of the adherents of 
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religious bodies without obtaining loyalty of comparable reliability from a new constituency 
to take its place,’ he concludes.227 
Kelley’s claims are in many ways supported by Bellevue’s success as a megachurch. 
As Chapter 1 demonstrates, Bellevue has always prioritised evangelism above all other 
initiatives. Moreover, Bellevue’s strong and uncompromising inerrantism fulfils the criterion 
of spiritual “seriousness” laid out by Kelley.228 Indeed, once Rogers arrived at Bellevue the 
impetus behind these initiatives intensified. Rogers’ determination to attract as many new 
members as possible further strengthened the church’s commitment to evangelism. 
Meanwhile, although Rogers’ beliefs did not in any qualitative sense differ from Pollard and 
Lee before him, he arguably preached his theological convictions more forcefully than his 
predecessors. According to the Kelley framework, this could have resulted in a further 
increase in the perceived purity of Bellevue’s religious agenda. Lastly, Rogers’ unique 
preaching charisma could be said to have further entrenched the convincingness of Bellevue’s 
“system of meaning”.229 Although Kelley’s monograph was published almost forty-five years 
ago, more recent scholarship on the topic would appear vindicate at least one of the study’s 
most important findings. For example, Roger Finke and Rodney Stark’s much more recent 
study of church membership patterns complements Kelley’s suggestion that the success of a 
denomination is related to the degree of spiritual commitment that churches expect from their 
members.230 Finke and Stark’s claims work in a similar way to Kelley’s concept of “strictness”. 
Viewing religion as a marketplace of competing spiritual commodities, they argue that the 
larger the “cost” of belonging to a church, the greater the reward is for people who are willing 
to accept such a cost. Churches which have a stricter approach towards their doctrines foster 
a higher degree of loyalty from more serious worshippers. Meanwhile, stricter churches have 
mechanisms in place to deter less serious worshippers—who are seen as diluting the value of 
the spiritual commodity being practiced—from joining.  
Nonetheless, with the benefit of an extra forty years of historical perspective, 
researchers working in the twenty-first century have been able to expose some significant 
gaps in Kelley’s analysis. To begin with, Finke and Stark are highly sceptical of Kelley’s 
assumption that there was a sudden “eruption” of evangelical religiosity in the 1960s, arguing 
such reasoning is ‘based on a distorted historical perspective’.231 More importantly for the sake 
of this thesis, two areas of post-1960s denominational growth trends that Kelley’s study 
overlooks are the topics of race and demographics. The interrelationships between race and 
church growth have particularly important ramifications for Southern Baptist churches like 
Bellevue, whose patterns of post-1960s growth were so heavily dependent on whites. Andrew 
Trundle has discussed how the changing demographic and racial dynamics of Shelby County, 
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Tennessee—which encompasses Memphis and its surrounding suburbs—have affected the 
membership rates of the SBC.232 Ever since the early 1990s the SBC has been declining in 
Shelby County, and Trundle argues that this is because of the denomination’s failure to attract 
non-white members. In other words, so long as there were enough whites in the region, the 
SBC churches’ racial uniformity was unproblematic; however, towards the end of the century, 
as the population of African Americans in Shelby County started to exceed that of whites, the 
denomination’s membership and market share began to suffer. According to Trundle, the two 
main reasons for the failure of the SBC to attract African Americans are the denomination’s 
reputation problems and its conservative doctrine. African Americans not only tend to 
practice more socially and theologically liberal forms of Protestantism, but also, ‘in Finke’s 
and Stark’s economic model, the cost of being a Southern Baptist’ was simply too high.233 It is 
hardly a revelation that the success of Bellevue and other conservative churches during the 
1970s hinged on attracting whites, who were far more likely to attend “strict”, theologically 
conservative churches. However, the effects that this racial uniformity had on congregations 
during a period of intense urban change are far less acknowledged or understood. After 
discussing Memphis’s transition from a fixation on desegregation to a preoccupation with 
busing, this chapter examines the links Bellevue had started to form with “white flight” in the 
1970s, and the numerous understudied effects of these connections.  
 
From Desegregation to Busing: The Acceleration of “White Flight” in Memphis 
 
Early on in Rogers’ tenure there was one incident which would remind Bellevue’s 
congregation that the issues that had forced themselves into every southerner’s conscience in 
the decade before were still very much alive. In around 1972, a young African American man 
came to Bellevue during a Sunday to be converted. In keeping with the church’s routine for 
converting new members, Rogers brought the man to the pulpit and at the end of the 
ceremony asked the congregation if there was anyone who opposed to his evangelisation. At 
this point “one old lady raised her hand”, and Rogers asked the woman to explain to the rest 
of the church why she disapproved of the conversion. She replied that God did not intend for 
“the Negro and the white man to worship together”. Rogers responded by declaring that he 
would resign from the church if anyone was turned away because of their race. According to 
Rogers’ daughter Janice Ediston, Rogers was not aware of how the church would react to this, 
but that in the end “the whole congregation spontaneously came to their feet and applauded” 
his assertion.234 The episode of the young black man converting at Bellevue is representative 
of the church’s approach towards integration in the 1970s, and it also hints at the wider lack 
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of progress made by the city of Memphis in implementing the Brown ruling. Twelve years 
after the kneel-in movement first forced the issue onto Bellevue, the church was, like other 
white congregations in the city and the region, fully “integrated” in the sense that African 
Americans could enter or join without any formal restraints or discrimination practices. 
Additionally, as the last chapter demonstrated, Bellevue’s racially moderate stance eradicated 
the informal barriers in the way of African Americans attending the congregation. In practice, 
however, this lack of formal or informal constraints made virtually no difference to the 
numbers of African Americans joining the church. In fact, according to Janice Ediston, “when 
we moved there were no blacks involved in the church” at all.235  
In the early years of Rogers’ pastorate Bellevue thus continued with its racially 
moderate but laissez-faire policy towards ethnic minorities. Rogers, in a similar way to what 
his predecessor had done in 1960, publically decried racial discrimination and even risked his 
job in defence of the principle that African Americans should be able to freely worship at 
Bellevue; but the church nonetheless remained an overwhelmingly white organisation.236 As 
discussed in the last chapter, Bellevue’s lack of interest in “reaching out” to attract minorities 
was one reason for its racial uniformity during the civil rights movement and beyond. But up 
until 1971—when the advent of busing forced Memphis to address many of its racial 
imbalances—Bellevue’s lack of integration merely reflected the situation in public spaces all 
over the city. Indeed, the public school system of Memphis was exceedingly slow desegregate, 
and even in 1961—seven years after the Brown ruling—there was still yet to be a single black 
student in a white public school in the city.237 This was largely due to the political resistance 
to desegregation, which resulted in ‘legislation in Tennessee and elsewhere intended 
specifically to curtail, or at least delay, the desegregation process’.238 Although the city’s first 
genuine attempts at breaking the colour line were praised for their orderliness, the number of 
desegregated schools in 1966 was still only twenty. 239  Moreover, at this point the city’s 
definition of what constituted an integrated school was tenuous, since a school was classified 
as ‘integrated’ so long as there was more than one black student studying there. A more 
meaningful indication of the extent to which Memphis’s schools were integrated was the total 
percentage of blacks enrolled at white schools. In 1966, this stood at just 2.59 percent of the 
city’s school-age black population, despite almost half of Memphis’s total number of pupils 
being African American.240  
 After periods of ‘initial inaction’ and ‘widespread resistance’, followed by some 
successful litigation cases challenging the constitutionality of Memphis’s slow desegregation 
(one of which made it all the way to the Supreme Court), the Memphis Sanitation Strike in 
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1968 marked a turning point for race relations in Memphis.241 Up until the fateful day when 
two black sanitation workers died gruesome deaths whilst operating faulty garbage 
compressors, Memphis had been celebrated as a beacon of ‘peaceful, if slow, progress’ 
towards racial equality.242  But the increasing racial tension caused by the strike, and the 
shockwaves caused by the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. two months after its 
commencement, suddenly transformed Memphis into a symbol of the US’s “race problem”.243 
Two weeks after the tragic deaths the sanitation workers—who were mostly black—had 
begun the strike. Demanding better wages, safer conditions, and union representation, the 
Sanitation Strike was in many ways a microcosm of the broader struggle against the 
widespread existence of inferior working conditions for blacks. Moreover, by distinctively 
combining worker rights with civil rights the campaign had caught the attention of Dr King, 
who by this point had become the nation’s leading civil rights activist. King led a solidarity 
march in Memphis on March 28, which turned sour when a group of African American youths 
left the march and started to break windows on Beale Street in downtown. Soon after, a 
sixteen-year-old black boy was killed by police gunfire while the security forces sought to 
dampen the violence. In the wake of escalating tension and violence, a curfew was introduced 
and the National Guard ‘move into the city’. 244  Ever determined to keep the movement 
nonviolent, and aware of the potential gains to be made from the strike, Dr King came to 
Memphis again on April 3 ‘with plans to hold a second march’.245 The evening after he arrived, 
while he was waiting for a District Court to lift an injunction that stood in the way of another 
march, Dr King was shot in the neck by a bullet from a sniper while standing with friends on 
the balcony of his downtown motel. He was pronounced dead an hour later. 
 The events of 1968 effectively destroyed any ‘efforts to maintain law and order and to 
achieve peaceful—if slow—desegregation’ in Memphis.246 They also brought about a new and 
prolonged era of ‘greater polarization and confrontation’, not just between the black and white 
citizens of Memphis, but also between pro-integration campaigners and the city’s 
conservative political establishment.247  In 1967, mere months before the Sanitation Strike, 
Henry Loeb was elected to serve a second term as mayor of Memphis, despite intense 
resistance from the black community. Loeb played a key role in the polarisation of blacks and 
whites throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Rather than adopting the role of mediator 
between the two groups during the height of Memphis’s racial crisis in 1968, Loeb spoke out 
against the strikers and was largely responsible for their harsh treatment by the police. A 
devoted segregationist throughout his career, Loeb was elected on a ‘white unity ticket’ and 
for his second term he received ‘less than 2%’ of the city’s black vote.248 The atmosphere of 
racial polarisation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as well as the efforts by a conservative 
political administration to obstruct the forces of desegregation, resulted in severe delays to 
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the progress of race relations and integration in Memphis. In no instance were these delays 
more noticeable than in the city’s schools—so often the barometer by which the extent of a 
city’s integration can be measured. In 1970, two years before the arrival of Dr Rogers at 
Bellevue, 130 of Memphis’s 155 public schools were still at least 90% racially uniform, and 
fifty-four of those were entirely racially uniform.249 Additionally, thanks in part to public 
housing authorities deliberately practicing segregation and ‘racial restrictions’ all the way up 
until 1965, ‘residential segregation in Memphis actually increased between 1950 and 1970’.250 
At the beginning of the decade, then, little progress had been made in penetrating Memphis’s 
colour line. Instances of neighbourhood or school integration were still relatively rare, even 
after public facilities such as schools and parks had been subjected to numerous litigation 
cases aimed at pushing through integration via the courts. Against this backdrop the racial 
uniformity of the city’s religious institutions comes as little surprise.  
Memphis’s firmly entrenched segregationism, combined with Bellevue’s lack of 
interest in attracting African American members, therefore meant the church was never likely 
to be anything other than uniformly white in the early 1970s. But what sealed Bellevue’s racial 
uniformity in the longer term—as well as triggering a shift in its congregational culture over 
the next two decades—was the church’s links with another phenomenon: “white flight”. 1971 
marked the beginning of a new episode in the protracted battle between the forces of 
integrationism and obstructionism, as the debate suddenly shifted from desegregation to 
busing. In that year, the Supreme Court clarified the criteria for integrated schools established 
by Brown, via the Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education ruling. On one hand, the 
Court decided that it was not necessary for every public school to reflect the proportion of 
black and white pupils in the system as a whole. Additionally, it was decided that single-race 
schools were not necessarily unconstitutional, so long as it could be demonstrated that pupils 
were not enrolled on the basis of any kind of racial discrimination. However, in Swann the 
Court also outlined the methods a district should use to ensure that it was classified as 
properly integrated. And more controversially, this included the ‘transportation of students as 
a proper method of desegregation’.251  
The expectation that councils would correct insufficient levels of integration by 
transferring students to schools in different neighbourhoods was met with fierce and 
widespread opposition across the South, not least in Memphis, which had never practiced 
pupil transportation of any kind and was still controlled by a segregationist administration in 
City Hall. Indeed, resistance to busing in the early 1970s was comparable in scope to the 
response from many southern white communities to the Brown v. Board of Education ruling of 
1954. Mayor Loeb even introduced an ordinance which would give ‘the city council line-item 
veto power over the school budget’.252 Loeb made this move in the hope that public opposition 
to pupil transportation would force the Council to stop funding busing. Although the Mayor 
was wrong to think that his ordinance would be able to block the implementation of Swann in 
Memphis, he correctly anticipated the level of public backlash against the ruling. In April 
1972, four months before the first round of busing was due to take place, the newly-formed 
                                                          
249 Ibid, p. 285. 
250 Ibid, p. 287. 
251 Ibid, p. 290. Emphasis added. 
252 Ibid. 
61 
 
“Citizens Against Busing” campaign organised two days of boycotts, temporarily 
withdrawing tens of thousands of white pupils from the city’s schools.253 Nonetheless, in 
September 1972 some thirteen thousand pupils in Memphis were transported from their 
homes to schools in other neighbourhoods as the Swann ruling was implemented in Memphis 
for the first time. 
The main reason for the fierce resistance to the Swann ruling was, of course, that it 
threatened to realise the kind of meaningful integration that had eluded most school systems 
ever since Brown. In the seventeen years since 1954, the apologists of segregation had 
successfully managed to prevent, block and resist—via all manner of means—the numerous 
integration initiatives from achieving their intended outcomes. Moreover, in comparison with 
other public facilities such as parks, the stakes were set uniquely high for the issue of school 
integration: preserving or establishing de facto-white schools in neighbourhoods with little or 
no black presence was in essence about protecting the privileges white communities had 
enjoyed throughout the Jim Crow era—i.e., superior facilities, higher quality education, and 
exclusive access to better housing. As one anti-busing campaigner from Charlotte, North 
Carolina argued, “So many of us made the biggest investment of our lives—our homes—
primarily on the basis of their location with regard to schools. It seems like an absurdity that 
anyone could tell us where to send our children”. 254  For its opponents, busing thus 
represented a belligerent governmental intrusion into the gains earned by a hard working 
“Silent Majority”.255  
Like the white community’s initial response to Brown, there was no violence in the 
immediate aftermath of Swann in Memphis.256 Instead, once it finally became clear that busing 
was an inevitability, many white communities simply stepped-up their withdrawal from 
majority-black inner-city areas of the city. Swann, in other words, led to an acceleration of the 
phenomenon known as “white flight” in cities across the nation. This was particularly the case 
in Memphis and its surrounding suburbs. By the beginning of the second full school year of 
busing, for which a district judge ordered the transportation of almost forty thousand students 
(more than double the amount from the year before), over twenty thousand white pupils 
permanently ‘abandoned the city school system’ in favour of private or public schools in the 
suburbs, where only a tiny minority of African Americans resided.257 As a result, there was a 
rapid reduction in the proportion of white pupils studying at public schools in the inner-city 
areas of Memphis. In the space of just nine months between January and September 1973, the 
percentage of white students in the Memphis public school system dropped from 42% to 32%. 
Predictably, there was a parallel increase in private school enrolment. And between autumn 
1972 and May 1973 the number of private schools in Memphis rose from 64 to 90.258 Such was 
the extent of white withdrawal from the inner-city that Shelby County, the district 
encompassing Memphis and its suburbs and where the majority of relocating whites moved 
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to, struggled to build enough schools to cope with the demand.259 The widely cited and often 
celebrated lack of race-related violence in Memphis in the wake of the Swann ruling thus 
concealed the extent to which white flight in the city was preventing the implementation of 
an integrated school system. As legal scholar Roger Biles has noted, ‘the absence of violence 
and the relative ease with which modest change occurred gave Memphis the undeserved 
reputation of a city that effectively handled the mandate for desegregation’.260 As one observer 
has commented, however, the way Memphis dealt with busing in actual fact led to a 
‘disastrous desegregation saga’ in the city.261 
The responses of the white communities of Memphis—including citizens, activists, 
politicians and churches—to busing had long lasting effects on the prospect of future racial 
integration in the city.  Most visibly, the mass exodus of whites from the inner-city to suburban 
districts resulted in a continuation of de facto segregation in the majority of Memphis’s 
schools and neighbourhoods. This lasted long after the initial phase of busing. In 1979, eight 
years after Swann, a study by the US Department for Health, Education and Welfare ranked 
Memphis the ‘fifty-third least desegregated’ public school system out of a total of six 
thousand; and in 1981 blacks constituted a considerable ‘76 percent of the [public] system’s’ 
enrolment. 262  The private, suburban Shelby County schools, meanwhile, ‘provide a near-
mirror image’ of these figures.263 In 1990 there were over thirteen times as many whites as 
blacks in private schools—a rate which was ‘nearly twice as high as the second most 
segregated private school system’ in the country. 264  Patterns of residential segregation 
mirrored the situation in the city’s schools. Although far from being exclusive to Memphis, 
the River City’s patterns of school and residential segregation were particularly acute in 
comparison with the rest of the country, and have showed little signs of subsiding, even sixty 
years after Brown. The lack of integration in Memphis throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century and beyond has led one observer to conclude that the ‘promise of Brown, 
an end to separate and unequal education, seems to have evaded Memphis entirely’.265  
Unsurprisingly, white churches in Memphis’s suburbs benefited from the influx of 
new residents who were withdrawing from the city’s public school system. Many white 
suburbanites joined churches in the same neighbourhoods as their new homes and their 
children’s new schools. But some suburban congregations played a more active role in 
facilitating white flight than merely welcoming new members to their pews. From the early-
1970s onwards, a number of white Protestant churches in Memphis, including Baptist and 
Presbyterian congregations, began to buy and run old private academies (though Bellevue 
itself was never affiliated with a school). Although the ostensible purpose of these new faith 
schools was to provide a “Christian alternative” to the secular city schools, they effectively 
catered for the new generation of white suburbanites who could not afford the fees of the 
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more expensive, established and elite prep schools.266 One of the most prominent of these was 
the Southern Baptist Educational Center (SBEC), established in 1972 and situated in the 
Southaven suburb of Memphis. Thanks to the extremity of white flight in the city, schools like 
the SBEC ‘continued to thrive in Memphis as in no place else,’ and ‘quickly became an 
institutionalized part of the Memphis schooling scene’.267 Some pastor-headmasters denied 
that the emergence of church-affiliated private schools had anything to do with inner-city 
integration measures or busing.268 Others, however, were more sceptical. One administrator 
of suburban faith school In Memphis stated in 1973 that “It seems mighty strange that 
Christian education only became important enough during the time of school busing for these 
schools to be formed”.269 Whatever the true reasons for white Protestant churches’ greater 
involvement in education, such schools undoubtedly facilitated white abandonment of the 
public school system, and ipso facto the geographical withdrawal of white communities from 
the inner-city; without churches running these schools there would have been less space for 
parents to enrol their children in the private schools system. The new members gained 
through white flight, as well as the additional funding received by running fee-paying private 
schools, resulted in widespread growth for white suburban churches in Memphis.  
As one would expect, white flight had the opposite effect on many inner-city 
congregations. Indeed, the processes described above thrust many white congregations into 
crisis, as the demographic composition of their surrounding environments begun to change 
dramatically. The manner in which churches responded to such demographic transformation 
became the crucial variable on which their survival depended. In order to avoid declining, 
congregations were forced to choose between either adapting to demographic change, 
resisting it, or relocating to more demographically suitable neighbourhoods.270 For churches 
like Highland Park Baptist Church (HPBC) in Detroit, the subject of Darren Dochuk’s study 
on the suburbanisation of fundamentalism, this latter choice became a reality.271 The Highland 
Park district of the city experienced an alarming 18 percent drop in population between 1950 
and 1960, and by 1970 it had been transformed from a majority-white to a predominantly 
black neighbourhood.272 Because the congregation was ‘ill equipped’ to adapt to or resist the 
economic and social changes which were ‘overtaking the community’, HPBC went into 
decline, before completing its move in the late 1960s.273 The story of HPBC was in many ways 
typical of the plight of white congregations all over the nation: desegregation and the abolition 
of discriminatory housing allocation practices led to an influx of African Americans into 
formerly all-white neighbourhoods; meanwhile, racism, massive resistance and busing let to 
an acceleration of white withdrawal during the late sixties and seventies; white congregations 
then mimicked the suburbanisation of the majority of their members. Desegregation, busing 
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and white flight were thus intimately linked to the fates of white congregations in cities like 
Memphis. 
 
“Becoming Suburban”: The Effects of Bellevue’s Connections with Memphis’s 
Suburbs 
 
Situated on North Bellevue Boulevard in Midtown, just two and a half miles from the centre 
of Downtown, Bellevue Baptist Church was one of the many white inner-city churches to be 
affected by the wave of demographic change that swept Memphis in the 1970s. But Bellevue 
was, unlike other white inner-city congregations, to a large extent protected from the 
challenges associated with residing in a racially diverse neighbourhood. This was thanks to 
its status as the largest and most famous church in the city, as well as its renewed growth 
during the beginning of the Rogers pastorate. Consequently, Bellevue did not complete its 
own relocation to the suburbs until relatively late, in 1989 (the subject of this thesis’s final 
chapter). Nonetheless, Bellevue’s medium-term rootedness in Midtown did not stop it from 
being affected by the demographic and socioeconomic changes that were taking place in the 
city during the 1970s. On the contrary, Bellevue’s presence throughout the 1970s in the heart 
of Midtown betrayed the extent to which the congregation was being transformed by white 
flight and the creation of the political, cultural and economic entity of Memphis’s suburbs. 
Alongside the allure of Rogers, Bellevue’s status as a megachurch was perhaps the main 
reason why it was able to continue to attract whites even as they were moving in their droves 
out of the inner-city to the suburbs. While smaller congregations usually attract attendees 
from a very limited geographical area, megachurches are able to able to draw people from a 
far broader catchment of neighbourhoods and districts. By the end of the 1970s, Bellevue had 
long since evolved from being a “neighbourhood church” into a “regional church”. Its location 
in Midtown therefore did not present Bellevue with the same immediate problems as smaller 
congregations, since it was able to attract people to worship even while they were living in 
relatively remote areas. Ultimately, this ability to appeal to a new generation of white 
suburbanites, even while the congregation resided in the inner-city, became the driving force 
behind a shift in the congregational culture of the church. Therefore, whereas other white 
congregations displayed their relationships with demographic flux in the most physically 
obvious of ways—i.e., by relocating to the suburbs—the changes wrought upon Bellevue 
during the first ten years of busing related instead to the impact of outside forces on what was 
happening within the church’s pews. 
As already demonstrated, the rejuvenation of Bellevue’s growth during the beginning 
of the Rogers pastorate entailed attracting a broader cross-section of whites while maintaining 
the church’s laissez-faire approach towards ethnic minorities. Unsurprisingly, Bellevue’s 
continued reliance on attracting whites during the acceleration of white flight resulted in 
increasingly strong connections with the suburbs. But these connections were about more than 
the shifting geographical locations of the church’s congregants; Bellevue’s suburban 
connections were also about the influence upon the church of the socioeconomic and even 
political features of the suburbs, which were transforming rapidly thanks to the development 
of the Sunbelt. The following paragraphs show that as Bellevue’s ties with the suburbs 
strengthened, its congregational culture started to reflect to a greater extent the middle-class, 
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relatively young constitution of the city’s eastern fringes. In other words, over a decade and a 
half before its actual relocation, Bellevue was starting to become progressively more 
“suburban” during the early 1970s. This shift in the congregational culture helped preserve 
the church’s de facto racial segregation and lay the foundations for a conservative political 
culture at Bellevue (as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4) and other churches like it 
which fostered the evangelical movement’s subsequent alignment with the Republican Party.  
By refraining from racially diversifying its membership during the acceleration of 
white flight in Memphis, the proportion of Bellevue’s congregants who were living in the 
suburbs inevitably increased. Although there is no record of precisely when individual 
members of the church moved, or exactly where it was they moved to, the scale of white flight 
in Memphis between 1970 and 1980 all but eradicates the possibility that Bellevue—as the 
largest white congregation in the whole city—was unaffected by mass white suburbanisation. 
The changing socioeconomic characteristics of Memphis’s suburbs during the 1970s provide 
a clue about the nature of their influence on Bellevue during the first ten years of Rogers’ 
pastorate. Statistics reveal how neighbourhoods on the eastern edges of the city’s perimeter 
rapidly became bastions of white, middle class affluence. Prior to the 1970s, Memphis’s 
suburbs were surprisingly mixed (albeit sparsely populated), with a proportionally high 
number of African American and low-income residents. But the racial and class composition 
of suburban neighbourhoods was rapidly transformed by the wave of post-busing 
demographic change.  
A typical example of these effects was the Germantown Parkway area, which is located 
thirteen miles east of Downtown, and encompasses the Cordova neighbourhood, where 
Bellevue would eventually move to in 1989. Between 1970 and 1980 Germantown’s 
population soared from 3,474 to 21,467 residents—an increase of over 600%.274 This compares 
to a net population increase of just 3.7% for Memphis and 7.6% for Shelby County. 275 
Moreover, in contrast to the city and county, whose population increases were both the result 
of a net growth in the African American population, Germantown’s population increase can 
be explained solely by white suburbanisation, since during the same decade the district went 
from being 67% to 90% white.276 Meanwhile, Memphis and Shelby County’s net decrease in 
the white population was due to whites moving to neighbouring, less metropolitan counties 
such as Fayette and Tipton.277 As a result, although the overall proportion of whites living in 
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the whole of Shelby County actually decreased during the 1970s, certain neighbourhoods like 
Germantown were subjected to dramatic increases in the concentration of white residents. In 
other words, the white families that chose not to withdraw from Memphis and Shelby County 
during the 1970s were increasingly likely to reside in suburban locations like Germantown 
and Bellevue’s future neighbourhood, Cordova. The surge in white suburbanisation in 
Memphis post-Swann thus led to a racial homogenisation of the city’s suburbs which was 
almost as extreme as Bellevue’s own racial homogeneity. During the 1970s there were also 
clear changes to the average age configuration of the neighbourhood. People between the ages 
of 18 and 34 went from constituting 22% of the population in 1970 to 39% in 1980. 278 
Meanwhile, Germantown also underwent a transformation in the average socioeconomic 
profile of its residents. The proportion of people with four or more years of college education 
rose sharply from 8% to 26%, while the median household income for the area rose from 
around $9,000 in 1969 to over $22,000 in 1979, an increase which comfortably outpaced the 
rate of inflation.279  Taken as a whole these figures hint at how, as the 1970s progressed, 
Memphis’s two-tier educational, residential and socioeconomic system—split, as always, 
along racial lines—became increasingly entrenched. As the population of the city’s eastern 
suburbs burgeoned, districts like Germantown became strongholds of white, middle class 
prosperity.  
These processes were, of course, facilitated by the extreme patterns of white flight in 
the city. But the social and racial homogenisation of districts like Germantown was also rooted 
in the broader, structural forces of economics and government policy in the 1970s South. To 
begin with, Memphis was one of a large handful of southern cities which were affected, albeit 
to varying degrees, by the phenomenon known as the “Sunbelt Boom”. In the 1970s various 
town planners, politicians and businesses initiated a series of ‘development strategies’ aimed 
at sucking economic resources from the traditional industrial heartlands of the Northeast and 
Midwest and rapidly industrialising the South.280 Aided by the federal government, which 
had been awarding prestigious manufacturing contracts to southern companies ever since the 
1950s, the Sunbelt region quickly became synonymous with high-tech industries such as 
defence, aerospace and electronics.281 Overall, the Sunbelt boom succeeded in bringing skilled 
jobs and net economic growth to a region which, even at the tail end of the 1960s, had been 
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lagging far behind its regional competitors in terms of industrial development. Population 
figures are perhaps the best illustration of the economic appeal of the region during the 
Sunbelt boom. During the first half of the 1970s the Sunbelt had what has been described as 
an “incredible explosion” in North to South interstate migration, as the region’s population 
grew by 2.6 million.282 In a dramatic and rapid reversal of the Great Migration of the first 
seventy years of the twentieth century, the South had become one of the United States’ 
‘dominant growth region[s]’. While the population of the country as a whole increased by 11% 
between 1970 and 1980, many congressional districts in Sunbelt states such as California, 
Texas and Florida more than doubled in population.283 Indeed, by the end of the Sunbelt’s 
population boom, the region had become the ‘demographic centre gravity’ of the whole 
country. 284  But the benefits of the South’s economic boom—i.e. high-skilled jobs, wealth 
creation and superior housing and schooling—were distributed unevenly, with the lion’s 
share of resources filtering through to suburban areas, thereby accentuating the 
socioeconomic discrepancies between black and white districts of southern cities. This was 
reflected in the racial characteristics of the Sunbelt’s population explosion. Although there 
were also significant increases in the population of Latin American and Asian immigrants, the 
majority of the Sunbelt’s new settlers were, like in Germantown itself, white, college educated 
and conservative. 285  Interstate migration during the 1970s therefore helped accentuate a 
process that white flight in Memphis had already set in motion: the greater concentration of 
wealthy, middle class, conservative whites in suburban locations like Germantown. 
Memphis never quite acquired the same level of industrial growth that other southern 
cities such as Houston and Atlanta had achieved during the height of the Sunbelt Boom.286 
Whereas some of its regional neighbours had been transformed by huge, federally-subsidised 
investment initiatives, the River City’s gains were relatively modest in comparison; the main 
sectors of growth were the city’s professional sports promotion sector, agricultural equipment 
trade and, thanks to the often-celebrated decision by FedEx to open its new global 
headquarters at Memphis International Airport, the distribution industries. 287  But one 
characteristic that Memphis did share with its fellow Sunbelt cities was its method of 
attracting investment. That is, its growth model consisted of creating a fertile “business 
climate” for the private sector, whereby city officials would use the typically-southern 
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features of low-wages, low union membership, and low corporate taxation to lure enterprises, 
businesses and federal funding to the city.288 It was these city council members who ‘in the 
metropolitan Sunbelt represented concrete moneyed interests’, and who had ‘principle 
leverage over the allocation of federal funds’ for a city’s infrastructure, urban renewal and 
transportation.289 Up to a point, this strategy achieved its intention of attracting private sector 
investment to Memphis, creating jobs and economic growth, and in turn ‘enhanc[ing] the 
city’s comparative advantages’.290 But  these initiatives also helped perpetuate Memphis’s 
dependence on low wage labour, and even contributed to worsening poverty levels. Most 
notably, the symptoms of business strategy disproportionately affected the city’s black 
population which, thanks to the processes described above, was already far more likely to 
have access to lower quality schooling and housing than whites. As argued by historian of 
Memphis Wanda Rushing, the city’s successive attempts at industrial development therefore 
often had the effect of ‘reproduc[ing] old patterns of inequality’ rather than reversing them.291  
The construction of Memphis’s “business climate” thus accentuated the city’s two-tier 
educational, residential, and socioeconomic system which was split clearly along race and 
class lines and whose border was the frontier between suburbs and inner-city. Indeed, by the 
end of the 1970s Memphis was a city made up of two ‘economic and social landscapes, 
suburban sprawl and affluence outside the I-240 [interstate] expressway ring and urban 
poverty within’.292 Furthermore, the bipolar residential system was actively protected by the 
city’s white political elites, who had a vested interest in preserving white affluence in the 
suburbs. Historian Matthew Lassiter argues that Memphis was one of several archetypal 
examples of southern cities which funnelled disproportionate sums of ‘power and resources’ 
to what he refers to as “island suburbs”—‘a cluster of upper-middle class and wealthy white 
neighbourhoods located inside the city limits and protected by exclusionary zoning policies 
from racial integration and socioeconomic diversity’.293 Furthermore, throughout the 1970s 
and beyond, numerous ‘city-friendly annexation laws’ were passed which enabled Memphis 
to unite multiple eastern Shelby County districts with the rest of the city and in turn 
incorporate up to 150,000 new residents from predominantly white neighbourhoods.294 In 
Memphis and elsewhere, this was part of a bid by city authorities to ‘minimize the impact of 
white out-migration from areas experiencing black residential expansion, and therefore 
maintain elite control of municipal politics’. The attempts made by city authorities to hang on 
to white power and economic privilege was, concludes Lassiter, nothing less than an 
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‘apartheid agenda’.295 By shifting the field’s focus from white flight to government policy, 
Lassiter’s study represents a timely attempt to understand the structural forces that 
contributed towards post-busing residential segregation and socioeconomic inequality in 
southern cities. Lassiter correctly notes that ‘the white flight thesis’ often ‘obscures the 
constellation of government policies that drove postwar suburbanisation, excising structural 
analysis in favour of a narrative that revolves around individual racism’. 296  In reality, 
decisions that were made at both a federal and City Hall level contributed at least as much to 
the two-tier racial and economic system in Memphis as white flight did.   
For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is the effects, rather than the causes, of post-
busing residential segregation that are of most interest. As demonstrated by Lassiter, the most 
important symptom of the creation of racially and socially homogenous “island suburbs” was 
the formation of a powerful grassroots political force which helped prompt the ‘emergence of 
a centre-right dynamic that has dominated American politics since the 1960s’.297 In a process 
which was aided by interstate migration to the South during the 1970s, which was 
disproportionally white and Republican, residents of suburbs like Germantown increasingly 
become proponents of a racially conservative ‘discourse of suburban innocence that depicted 
residential segregation as the class-based outcome of meritocratic individualism rather than 
the unconstitutional product of structural racism’.298 Although a minority of such residents 
were involved in political campaigns, it was ‘suburban homeowners who were neither 
committed activists nor conservative ideologues’ who represented the most ‘crucial 
demographic that came to drive the electoral strategies of both parties’.299 The term employed 
to describe such a group—the “Silent Majority”—was embraced by the suburban residents 
themselves and used by Richard Nixon as part of his strategy of using racially coded language 
to indirectly promise to preserve white middle class privilege during the era of colour-
blindness.  
It was in this atmosphere of racial, socioeconomic, and political polarisation in 
Memphis that Bellevue’s growth during the first ten years of the Rogers pastorate was taking 
place. The almost uniformly white nature of Bellevue’s post-Pollard revival, combined with 
the increasing concentration of whites residing in the suburbs, meant it was always likely that 
the church would be affected by the transformations that were taking place in the suburbs. 
But Bellevue’s connections with the suburbs were about more than chance; the specific 
features of the congregation, combined with the church’s racially uniform growth strategy, 
had the effect of strengthening the church’s ties with white suburbanisation. Bellevue was in 
many ways the ideal cultural and theological (although prior to its relocation, by no means 
geographical) environment for the new generation of white suburbanites who had migrated 
from the inner-city and from the Rustbelt cities of the Northeast and Midwest. Not only did 
Bellevue’s culture of strict conservatism appeal to white middle class worshippers, but the 
church’s theological inerrantism—which, as discussed earlier, emphasised individual 
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explanations for social problems—was a natural bedfellow for the Silent Majority’s colour-
blind ideology. These features contributed towards the appeal that Bellevue had towards 
white suburbanites, and relate to the reasons why “strict” churches were growing. 
The tilt towards younger, more educated, and wealthier residents in places like 
Germantown was indeed reflected in the type of audience Bellevue was beginning to attract 
during the first ten years of the post-Pollard revival. Chapter 1 referred to a 1950 study of 
Bellevue by The Christian Century, which described the church’s congregants as ‘8,000 of the 
common people’ of Memphis.300 But as part of the transformation of the church’s congregation 
which would begin from around 1972, much of Bellevue would become wealthier and more 
middle class in later years—a pattern which reflected the nationwide trend of upward social 
mobility that was taking place amongst Southern Baptists from the 1980s onwards.301 In 1993, 
one Bellevue member described the change in the class composition of the church that had 
taken place over the last two decades: “lots of [Bellevue members] came to this town with 
mud on their shoes and became reasonably prosperous”.302 Meanwhile, a journalist writing in 
the 1990s described Bellevue’s contemporary congregation as made up of ‘middle-income, 
small business types and first generation suburbanites’.303 Although the difference between 
the class makeup of the congregation in 1950 and 1980 was not necessarily extreme, it hints at 
a widening of appeal which was necessary for the church’s post-Pollard revival, and is 
reflective of the developments which were taking place in white Memphian communities after 
Swann.  
From the very beginning young, middle class families became Rogers’ most important 
target audience, and would duly become one of the church’s core constituencies of the post-
Pollard era.304 Rogers’ daughter Janice Ediston has recalled how the Bellevue pastor “attracted 
many young families. There is no doubt about that”. 305  This was part of how, from the 
beginning of the church’s revival under Rogers, Bellevue’s congregational culture started to 
increasingly resemble the socioeconomic features of Memphis’s suburbs. Bellevue’s 
congregational suburbanisation therefore began two decades before the church’s actual 
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relocation. As Chapter 4’s direct analysis of Bellevue’s congregational culture during the 1980s 
will show, these linkages with the suburbs would have important political ramifications. 
Years before any kind of partisan political pronouncements were being made by the Christian 
Right’s leaders, a process was underway in churches like Bellevue which was helping to forge 
conservative evangelicalism’s alliances with the Republican Party. This process had little to 
do with direct, overt forms of mobilisation, but was instead about the creation of a 
conservative political culture which facilitated engagement with Republican Party politics 
during the 1980s.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has discussed the developments at Bellevue during what was, for both the church 
and the city that it resided in, a decade of significant change. To begin with, in 1972 Rogers 
became only the third pastor to be inaugurated at Bellevue in the last forty-five years of the 
church’s history. He soon attracted new members at a rate that had not been seen at the church 
since the height of the Lee pastorate in the 1950s. This was thanks to his exceptional pastoral 
and preaching skills, as well as his keenness to attract younger worshippers from a broader 
socioeconomic (though not racial) spectrum. This chapter has also demonstrated that 
Bellevue’s growth was also intimately linked to the general growth trends of Protestantism 
during the 1970s. As a charismatic, strictly-inerrantist pastor, Rogers fulfilled the criterion of 
spiritual “seriousness” that was of crucial importance for white conservatives in the post-civil 
rights religious landscape. Meanwhile, Rogers’ strong commitment to evangelism 
emphasised the religious “purity” of Bellevue at a time when alternative religious agendas 
such social gospel were growing increasingly out of favour amongst white Protestants. 
Although SBC congregations which adhered to this framework would, as the demographic 
constitution of urban counties like Shelby changed, suffer from their lack of appeal towards 
racial minorities, during the 1970s it enabled them to take an unprecedented amount of 
worshippers from mainline denominations.  
 The second half of this chapter discussed the demographic, socioeconomic and 
political changes that took place in Memphis, and their effects on the congregational culture 
of Bellevue. The first instances of busing in Memphis in 1972 triggered particularly extreme 
levels of “white flight”, effectively sealing the city’s status as one of the most racially polarised 
and segregated urban environments in the whole country. This was evident most of all in the 
racial composition of Memphis’s schools and neighbourhoods—not to mention the city’s 
churches. Post-civil rights white flight was further accentuated by deliberate attempts made 
by Memphis’s white political elite and even the federal government to protect residential 
segregation and white prosperity in the suburbs. Lastly, the political economy of the Sunbelt 
helped exacerbate the two-tier residential, educational and socioeconomic system in 
Memphis. As ground-breaking studies on the creation of the Silent Majority show, the 
dramatically increased concentration of affluent and middle-class whites in suburbs like 
Germantown helped create a conservative political culture which embraced colour-blind 
explanations for racial inequality and suburban privilege.  
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 The case study of Bellevue demonstrates that the socioeconomic, demographic and 
religious transformations that took place in the 1970s were, in this southern, urban context, 
connected to one another in important but unexamined ways. Although the notion that 
Bellevue’s conservatism and theological strictness helped the church to grow comes as little 
surprise, the socioeconomic and even political implications of this growth have up until now 
been little understood. This chapter has demonstrated that rather than being separate, 
unrelated phenomena, the post-1960s growth of white evangelicalism was, in cases like 
Bellevue, connected to the creation of racially and socioeconomically homogenous suburban 
neighbourhoods. Since a core component of Bellevue’s post-Pollard revival was attracting 
young, middle-class whites—the vast majority of whom were, by the end of the 1970s, 
residing in the suburbs—the church’s connections with the socioeconomic and political entity 
of the “island suburbs” increased. These links were strengthened thanks to the continuation 
of Bellevue’s laissez-faire approach towards attracting minorities and by the church’s 
theology, which naturally complemented colour-blind approaches towards inequality like 
those that could be found in Memphis’s suburbs. Bellevue’s links with these socioeconomic 
and political features resulted in a congregational culture which was becoming increasingly 
“suburbanised”.  
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Chapter 3: Adrian Rogers and Ed McAteer’s Role in the Mobilisation of 
SBC Conservatives 
 
In June 1979 Adrian Rogers became the third pastor in Bellevue’s history to be nominated as 
president of the Southern Baptist Convention, following Robert Lee from 1949 to 1951 and 
Ramsey Pollard in 1960. The significance of Rogers’ nomination, however, far exceeded that 
of his predecessors’ circumstances. Rogers was the first president to be elected as part of the 
Conservative Resurgence, a battle waged on ostensibly theological grounds to wipe out all 
traces of liberal and moderate impulses from the denomination. Rather than attempt to add 
to the considerable work written about the causes of the Conservative Resurgence, this 
chapter focusses narrowly on the roles of Rogers and Bellevue layman Ed McAteer between 
1979 and 1982, with a view to understanding how this related to Bellevue. Around the same 
time as the beginning of Rogers’ involvement with denominational politics, the former 
business executive McAteer embarked on his own career in political advocacy, and thanks to 
his ability to bring together people from different corners of the evangelical movement, was 
able to forge an alliance between the SBC, the Christian Right and the Republican Party. The 
majority of this chapter focusses on Rogers’ and McAteer’s joint efforts to use the issue of 
school prayer to bring these three branches of conservatism closer to one another, as part of 
the campaign to increase the influence of evangelicalism over the GOP. It is argued that school 
prayer was prioritised by SBC conservatives like Rogers and McAteer for two reasons: firstly, 
the current constitutional status of school prayer was seen as evidence that the federal 
government had become increasingly hostile towards religion. Campaigning to remove 
constitutional restrictions on prayer in public schools was thus part of a broader initiative by 
SBC conservatives to encourage the government to accommodate Christianity in the public 
sphere to a greater degree. Secondly, since it was in many ways an archetypal church-state 
issue, school prayer could be used as an instrument in the conservatives’ battle with SBC 
moderates and liberals. By the early 1980s, conservatives had a far less strict approach towards 
church-state separation than moderates and liberals, who were strongly opposed to any 
derestriction of the constitutional status of school prayer. If conservatives could defeat 
moderates and liberals on one of the issues they cared most about, their control over the 
denomination’s entire organisational bureaucracy could be confirmed.  
 This chapter’s analysis of Rogers’ and McAteer’s denominational and political activity 
is, of course, carried out with a view to understanding how this activity related to Bellevue. 
Chapter 4 discusses the existence of a new conservative political culture at Bellevue during 
the 1980s, but the final section of this chapter shows that Rogers sought to keep his 
denominational and ministerial duties separate. Although, as subsequent paragraphs outline, 
Rogers and McAteer played important roles in forging an alliance between the conservative 
evangelical movement and the Republican Party, both figures were hesitant about making 
partisan pronouncements from Bellevue’s pulpit. This reluctance existed in similar forms at 
other leading conservative megachurches, such as at at Thomas Road Baptist Church in 
Lynchburg, Virginia, where Christian Right leader Jerry Falwell exhibited a similar tendency. 
Given the high degree of loyalty that conservative evangelicals exhibited towards the 
Republican Party ever since the 1980 election, this phenomenon is surprising; but it has 
nonetheless received little attention in the historiography of contemporary evangelicalism, 
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which has often assumed that conservative evangelical churches became sites of more overt, 
direct forms of partisan mobilisation. It suggested here that the main reason for this reluctance 
is that pastors like Rogers did not want partisan political matters to dilute or interfere with 
their ministerial duties. Even during the height of his denominational activity, Rogers insisted 
that his main priority was preaching at Bellevue. Moreover, laypeople who knew Rogers at 
the time have also suggested that Rogers’ wanted to minimise the overlap between his 
denominational and ministerial duties. All of this is consistent with this thesis’s contention 
that rather than being created intentionally, the political culture found at conservative 
evangelical churches like Bellevue during the Christian Right era was primarily the product 
of indirect forces. 
   
Background to the Conservative Resurgence  
 
Perhaps Ed McAteer’s most important achievement was his role in turning the 12.5 million 
member SBC into a strong political ally of the Christian Right. By the 1982 SBC convention in 
New Orleans, the denomination had effectively dropped its nonpartisan pretences. Following 
the denomination’s approval of Reagan’s proposals to overturn the Roe Vs. Wade abortion 
ruling and reject the Equal Rights Amendment, at the 1982 convention the SBC officially 
endorsed the Republican Party’s plan to reintroduce school prayer. Symbolising the 
newfound intimacy between the Christian Right, the SBC and the GOP, that year’s meeting 
was brought to a close with a speech by Vice President George H. W. Bush, who held that 
“The famous wall of separation between church and state is there to keep the state from 
interfering with the churches, not to keep the churches or individual religious leaders or 
ordinary church members from participating in our politics”. 306  But without the 
denomination’s notorious Conservative Resurgence of 1979, the allegiance between these 
three powerful branches of contemporary conservatism would not have been possible. The 
following paragraphs contextualise Rogers’ and McAteer’s involvement with the SBC’s 
transformation and politicisation by briefly describing the various causes of the Conservative 
Resurgence.  
Up until the beginning of the Resurgence the SBC had been, for the majority of the 
twentieth century, a relatively diverse denomination led by a broad coalition of centrists and 
moderates who were ‘positioned in the middle of the Southern Baptist theological 
spectrum’.307 There had always been dissenting voices on both the left and right, but prior to 
1979 neither side had had much ‘representation on boards of denominational agencies or on 
the faculties of the six seminaries’.308 An implicit agreement referred to by scholars such as Bill 
Leonard as the “Grand Compromise” was what helped gel the denomination together and 
avoid conflict between the different factions. This entailed Southern Baptists from all 
theological orientations implicitly agreeing that the ‘Convention would resist all attempts to 
define basic doctrines in ways that excluded one tradition or another, thereby destroying 
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unity and undermining the missionary imperative’.309 In 1979 this long-standing agreement 
between Southern Baptists of all persuasions would come to an end when a determined group 
of inerrantist conservatives declared war on the denomination’s moderates. Convinced that 
the denomination had become too liberal, SBC conservatives were afraid that ‘by allowing 
latitude in matters of theology, it was going the way of other mainline denominations’ by 
moving away from an evangelistic, orthodox version of the faith.310 Moreover, unlike their 
more liberal coreligionists, conservatives wanted the SBC to adhere to the confessionalism 
strand of denominational governance, which holds that no theological diversity should exist 
within a single communion. Armed with these convictions and a dogged determination, SBC 
conservatives then set off on their campaign to spread their brand of theology to all corners 
of the denomination, and to wipe out moderate and liberal impulses from all positions of 
influence. 
Beyond the conservatives’ ostensible theological grounds for orchestrating their 
rebellion, what other factors led to the Resurgence? In other words, why did conservatives 
mobilise in 1979, over a hundred and thirty years after the denomination’s formation? 
Although not every scholar working on the history of the controversy has paid the period due 
attention, its origins can be traced back as far as the civil rights era, when Baptists at opposite 
ends of the denomination’s conservative-liberal divide clashed over how Protestantism 
generally and the SBC specifically was to respond to America’s “race problem”.311 Before that 
time the Grand Compromise had ensured that the hostilities between the denomination’s 
competing factions were kept under control. But race was one issue which Baptist 
conservatives, most of whom were openly segregationist, were willing to jeopardise the 
Compromise over. Thus, many conservatives reacted to moderates’ relatively progressive 
positions during the civil rights movement with furious resistance. Liberal and conservative 
approaches towards race and segregation were in part symptomatic of theological differences 
between the two camps. Whereas progressives favoured collective responses to social 
problems such as racism, most conservatives were biblical inrrantists who argued Baptists 
should concentrate on soul winning, and assumed that inequalities were the result of 
individual responsibility rather than structural forces. But these different approaches towards 
social ministry had always existed in the denomination; in reality, then, it was the threat to 
the racial order posed by liberal Baptists and the civil rights movement which undermined 
the Grand Compromise. As Carolyn Dupont has argued, ‘only in response to progressive 
attempts to engineer a far-reaching and meaningful response to America’s racial crisis…did 
[the] disparities’ between liberals and conservatives of the SBC begin to ‘appear 
insufferable’.312  
Despite the vigour with which many conservatives had defended the racial status quo 
during the earliest stages of the Resurgence, segregationist Baptists were inevitably forced to 
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concede that they were on the wrong side of history. By the beginning of the 1970s the whole 
of the denomination was ostensibly backing ‘the trajectory towards racial inclusiveness’.313 If 
they had not already done so, Southern Baptists of all theological and ideological persuasions 
were forced to adopt moderate positions with regard to race. But this did not mean that 
conservatives changed their stances on other social issues. On the contrary, though most 
conservative Baptists were ‘willing to be progressive and in the cultural mainstream on this 
one topic’, with all other issues they remained staunchly conservative.314 The theological and 
ideological incompatibilities between the two factions thus continued to exist long after the 
civil rights movement. The conclusive defeat of racism and segregationism in the cultural 
mainstream of post-civil rights American society can help explain why conservatives waited 
until 1979 to wage a battle against their more liberal coreligionists. Irrespective of the true 
extent of racism in the SBC during the 1970s, by being on the losing side of the desegregation 
debate fundamentalism was in a less tenable cultural position than it had been during the 
decade before. Since fundamentalism had become strongly associated with racism (and the 
vast majority of overtly segregationist SBC congregations had indeed been fundamentalist 
and irrerantist), conservative Southern Baptists had suffered a loss of credibility which 
reduced their legitimacy and in turn weakened their power within the denomination. 
Although this was not the only reason why SBC conservatives did not mobilise until 1979, the 
outcome of the civil rights movement gave moderates and liberals additional legitimacy going 
into the 1970s. 
Another explanation for the somewhat belated post-civil rights remobilisation of 
Southern Baptist conservatives is that the cultural and industrial transformations that took 
place in the South during the 1970s—as discussed in the last chapter—were necessary 
preconditions for the Resurgence. The cultural convergence that had begun to take place 
between the Northeast and the South had led SBC conservatives to believe that ‘the South was 
no longer immune to diversity, pluralism, and secularism’, which had been defining features 
of northern culture for generations;315 this notion provided a key motive for conservative 
Baptists’ mobilisation, since fundamentalism by definition ‘includes not only a distinctive set 
of orthodox religious beliefs but also a sense of being in opposition to key aspects of modern 
culture’.316 In this context the Conservative Resurgence thus represented ‘the first stage of 
mobilization’ against the rapidly changing surrounding culture that southern 
fundamentalism had grown to be in conflict with:317 in other words, by taking control of the 
whole of their denomination, SBC conservatives would be able to wage war with their cultural 
and political enemies in the most effective way possible.  The South’s sudden pluralisation 
meant that although the region ‘remained religiously distinctive, Baptists…could no longer 
                                                          
313 Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, p. 243. 
314  Ibid. It was not until 1979 that SBC conservatives acted with unity around the abortion issue, 
however. As the Introduction to this dissertation has already discussed, Baptists such as W. A. Criswell 
had defended the Roe Supreme Court ruling as late as 1973. 
315 Ibid, p. 2. 
316 D. Paul Johnson, “Confronting Conservative Complexity among Southern Baptist Fundamentalists”, 
Review of Religious Research, Vol. 50 (October 2008), pp. 66 – 68, p. 66-7. 
317 Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, p. 2. 
77 
 
claim an unchallenged place at the centre of southern culture’.318 But rather than gradually 
chip away at orthodox religiosity in the region, this exposure to modernism and pluralism in 
the South actually resulted in an increase in ‘support for both the denominational and national 
conservative agendas’. 319  This was because fundamentalism tapped into anxieties felt by 
conservative southerners about not just the sudden onset of cultural pluralism in the South, 
but also, at a broader historical and geographical level, towards ‘the disturbing revolutionary 
decisions of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren and to the excesses of student 
protesters…during the Vietnam War’.320  
Seen in this context, the Resurgence was a political response to what SBC conservatives 
believed to be a ‘cultural crisis that necessitated a warlike struggle against the forces that were 
hostile to evangelical faith’.321 Prior to the civil rights movement—while the SBC’s place ‘at 
the centre of southern culture’ remained unchallenged—the Grand Compromise was strong 
enough to keep the denomination’s left and right factions from periodically waging civil wars 
against one another.322 But as demonstrated by some conservatives’ responses Brown and 
desegregation, significant threats to distinctively southern ways of life were liable to disturb 
the balance of the Compromise. Once the ‘denominational machinery’ was in their hands, 
conservatives planned to ‘fight and win’ the culture war and re-establish the denomination’s 
authority in the South.323 Rather than merely being about theology, then, the impetus behind 
the Resurgence lay in driving ‘moderates from positions of influence’ so that conservatives 
could ‘create a new and very different posture diametrically opposed to the dominant 
institutions of American culture’.324 SBC conservatives’ enemies were precisely the same as 
those of the trans-denominational (albeit predominantly evangelical) Christian  Right, which 
explains why the post-Resurgence SBC represented an ideal political ally to the latter group. 
Adrian Rogers has been described as one of the three principle “architects” of the 
Conservative Resurgence, along with biblical scholar Paige Patterson and appeals court judge 
Paul Pressler.325  According to this interpretation Patterson functioned as the movement’s 
theologian, Pressler as the ‘organizing tactician’, and Rogers served as the popular and 
charismatic pastor.326 Rogers was initially reluctant to consider nominating himself for the role 
of SBC president. He had always thought of himself a devoted pastor, and did not envisage a 
denominational position as part of his career plans. But he was nonetheless extremely 
concerned about the liberal direction that he and his fellow conservatives had perceived the 
denomination to be taking. At one point shortly before the decision was made to run for SBC 
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president, Rogers was so disturbed by the growth of liberalism in the SBC that he even 
considered withdrawing his church from the denomination entirely.327 For numerous reasons, 
this would have been an extremely controversial procedure; for a congregation the size of 
Bellevue to withdraw would have sent shockwaves through the whole of the SBC, and 
possibly even have caused severe instability within the denomination. Moreover, it was 
difficult to gauge how much of a congregational mandate Rogers would have had to 
withdraw his church from the denomination. Rogers’ daughter Janice Ediston recalls how her 
father had said to his wife at the time, “I think they [the congregation] will go [out of the SBC] 
with me, but maybe not”.328  
Eventually, Rogers decided that rather than take the drastic step of withdrawing his 
church, he would pursue the more ambitious option of helping to overhaul the denomination 
from within. Despite his reluctance, his friends Patterson and Pressler had been able to 
convince Rogers that he was their man to help “turn the ship around”.329 Sometime in between 
when Rogers was considering withdrawing Bellevue from the SBC and when he formally 
submitted his nomination in the spring of 1979, the three architects of the Resurgence “came 
up with a plan [where] they were able to appoint people on committees, and they were able 
to get the presidents they wanted as heads of seminaries”.330 The conservative strategy for the 
1979 convention meeting in Houston, Texas was to get Rogers elected on an inerrantist ticket, 
and part of this entailed campaigning to get as many conservatives and fundamentalists to 
attend the meeting as possible. Prior to the 1979 election staunchly-conservative presidential 
candidates were rare, but this time ‘conservatives had a clear choice’ among the candidates.331 
Moreover, the architects of the Resurgence had been able to ‘rally their troops to stand behind 
Rogers’.332 On a June afternoon in Houston in 1979, the Bellevue pastor won with fifty-one 
percent of the vote, demonstrating that almost half of those in attendance favoured a less 
conservative direction for the denomination. Nonetheless, Rogers’ share of the vote was 
enough to ensure he was elected as president of the Convention, and for the SBC conservatives 
to begin to implement their plans to transform the denomination.  
 
Rogers, McAteer, and School Prayer: Uniting the SBC and the Christian Right 
 
During the mobilisation of SBC conservatives and the Christian Right, Adrian Rogers and 
Bellevue’s most politically active layman, Ed McAteer, shared a common cause: to promote 
the reversal of the 1962 Engel Vs. Vitale Supreme Court decision, which ruled that government-
authorised school prayer represented “religious establishment” and was therefore 
unconstitutional.333 School prayer was, of course, not the only issue that SBC conservatives 
like Rogers and McAteer were involved with during the height of their denominational and 
political influence. Neither was it the case that school prayer was the single issue which 
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motivated conservatives to adopt accommodationist stances with regards to church-state 
separation.334 However, although abortion was by 1979 the moral priority for almost all SBC 
conservatives, as the following paragraphs show, Rogers and McAteer saw unique 
opportunity in the school prayer initiative. This section argues that the reasons for Rogers’ 
and McAteer’s crusade to derestrict school prayer laws were twofold: firstly, Engel Vs. Vitale 
was seen as evidence for the increasing hostility of the federal government towards religion, 
and the growing secularisation of American society. Although the Engel case had taken place 
a full seventeen years prior to the beginning of Rogers’ and McAteer’s battle, it was only once 
the Conservative Resurgence was fully underway that SBC conservatives could resist such 
measures in a unified way. Although Rogers, McAteer, and other SBC conservatives never 
advocated an outright dissolution of the separation between church and state, they did want 
the American government to adopt a “friendlier”, accommodationist stance towards religion, 
as opposed to what they saw as the aggressively secularist approach of recent Supreme Court 
decisions. The school prayer issue therefore represented a key battlefield in SBC 
conservatives’ war against “secular humanism”.335  
More importantly, school prayer represented one of the final frontiers of the 
conservatives’ campaign to wipe out the presence of moderates and achieve full control of the 
SBC. This was because unlike other evangelical “social issues”, school prayer was in many 
ways a quintessential church-state issue. Liberals and moderates of the SBC tended to have 
far stricter approaches towards church-state separation than conservatives; they therefore 
resisted the school prayer initiative with greater tenacity than they had with other issues such 
as abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment. As late as 1980, much to the disdain of 
conservatives, moderates had actually managed to pass an official resolution at the SBC which 
disapproved of any attempt to undermine the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling forbidding 
government sponsorship of school prayer. 336  Therefore, if SBC conservatives could push 
through a reversal of the SBC’s endorsement of the Engel Vs. Vitale ruling—thereby defeating 
moderates and liberals on one of the issues they cared most about—then it would be clear that 
from then onwards conservatives would be able to exercise full control over the 
denomination’s organisational apparatus. Events following the 1982 SBC convention, when 
conservatives finally succeeded in establishing a pro-school prayer position in the 
denomination, appeared to vindicate this inkling, since moderates’ influence would continue 
to dwindle throughout the 1980s and beyond, and future resolutions would reflect the 
accommodationist direction that conservatives favoured. Once SBC conservatives had 
achieved their ambition of taking over their denomination, they were able to forge an alliance 
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between the denomination and the Christian Right, a process which McAteer was largely 
responsible for. 
SBC conservatives’ mobilisation in part originated from their suspicion that the 
traditional method of protecting religious freedoms, i.e. by erecting a “wall of separation” 
between church and state, was no longer valid, since the surrounding culture—not to mention 
the three branches of the federal government—had become so hostile towards the liberties 
and principles of the Baptist faith. Conservatives’ solution to this problem was to adopt an 
“accommodationist” stance. As opposed to moderates, who still insisted on the strict 
separation of church and state, accommodationism ‘holds…that government should take a 
friendly stance towards religion, accommodating it wherever possible’.337 This had particular 
pertinence with regard to the school prayer debates. Prior to the Resurgence, conservatives 
had generally stayed faithful to the official SBC position that school prayer should fall under 
the legal jurisdiction of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. As interpreted in the 
Engel v. Vitale ruling, the contemporary use of the Clause considered school prayer in public 
schools to be an example of the government helping “establish” religious practice, hence the 
custom was considered unlawful. However, while the Resurgence was taking place 
conservatives had started to argue that school prayer was not an Establishment-related issue 
but rather a free-speech or free-exercise concern. In other words, conservatives now suggested 
that tolerating religion in public schools was a matter of freedom of expression rather than of 
government promoting or “establishing” religion. This subtle but significant shift enabled 
conservatives to argue for both the separation of church and state and simultaneously a 
greater involvement in politics.  
Despite conservatives’ protestations to the contrary, many moderates and liberals saw 
the shift towards accommodationism as a violation of the denomination’s longstanding 
endorsement of church-state separation. One of these figures was Foy Valentine, who was one 
of the denomination’s most prominent liberals and who presided over the Christian Life 
Commission (CLC) between 1960 and 1987. The CLC was the SBC’s public policy division, 
and had in recent decades garnered a reputation for being one of the denomination’s most 
liberal agencies. For example, as head of the CLC during the civil rights movement, Valentine 
had angered many segregationist Baptists with his progressive approach towards racial 
equality. And as a theological moderate Valentine also, throughout the Conservative 
Resurgence, occupied a position ‘on the front edge of resistance to the fundamentalist 
movement’.338 Valentine’s liberalism meant he was strongly against any attempts to bring the 
denomination closer to the three branches of the federal government. But as noted by a former 
colleague of Valentine’s, Robert Parham, the CLC’s liberal stances made the agency “an early 
takeover target” for Rogers.339 Although Valentine survived in his role as CLC director until 
1987, the agency eventually succumbed to the conservative takeover and in turn became what 
Parham refers to as “an arm of the religious right”.340  
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Meanwhile, years before Valentine’s removal from the agency, in 1979 Rogers oversaw 
the formation of the Christian Citizenship Corps (CCC), a subdivision of the CLC.  The CCC 
was formed with the explicit purpose of ‘generat[ing] increased political involvement among 
the SBC’s 13.2 million members’.341 Although spokesmen for the CCC were coy about the 
extent of its political ambitions, it was clear that the organisation was a SBC conservative, 
accommodationist brainchild. In an interview with a Tennessee Baptist press William H. 
Elder, a CLC staff member, said the CCC was set up as a “grassroots network of Southern 
Baptists” which would be “interested in what government is doing locally, statewide and 
nationally, and willing to make their voices heard in those areas”.342 Elder claimed that rather 
than being explicitly politically-biased like, for example, Christian Right groups such as the 
Moral Majority, the CCC merely functioned to “coordinate and facilitate communication” 
between members and government, in the hope of raising awareness of “legislative issues and 
their ethical implications”.343  He insisted that the organisation “recognizes and defends the 
doctrine of separation of church and state”.344 But the Corps was nonetheless the first instance 
of an SBC organisation being established ‘to mobilize political action through an organized 
structure’.345  
While working behind the scenes to help establish groups like the CCC, Rogers 
promoted the accommodationist cause through his personal school prayer campaign. In 
January 1980, Rogers joined the Coalition for the First Amendment (CFA), an 
accommodationist lobby group comprised mainly of SBC conservatives, and which included 
amongst its endeavours the school prayer initiative. The establishment of the Coalition 
corresponded to similar efforts made by Southern Baptist Senator Jessie Helms, who brought 
the crusade directly to the halls of Congress. Other high-profile members included Paige 
Patterson and future president of the SBC Charles Stanley, both of whom shared Rogers’ 
theological stances and were instrumental players in the Conservative Resurgence. But as the 
incumbent SBC president Rogers was the most high-profile member of the Coalition, and his 
decision to join was met with a furious backlash from moderates, who argued he was 
undermining the SBC’s commitment to church-state separation. Rogers’ main reason for 
joining the Coalition was that he believed “we have become almost anti-God and humanistic 
in our approach to some of our school systems because of the misapplication of the Supreme 
Court rulings”.346 Federal judgements had become too extreme, he argued, because they had 
too often interpreted the First Amendment as if it had banned voluntary prayer in public 
schools. By attempting to make schools as religiously neutral as possible, Rogers maintained, 
the Supreme Court had inadvertently helped prevent or at least discourage the free exercise 
of religion in schools. The solution, Rogers and his cohort of accommodationist Baptists 
argued, was to allow each state to decide how to apply the First Amendment ruling in schools. 
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This would enable “judges closer to and more responsible to us” to rule, and to eradicate the 
possibility of any extreme federal misapplications.347 “I think we’ve gotten some grotesque 
interpretations of First Amendment,” Rogers concluded, and his solution was necessary to 
“bring the corrections needed”.348   
 While embarking on his public crusade to remove school prayer from the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court, Rogers insisted that his stances did not in any way contradict the 
traditional SBC commitment to church-state separation. “I want to reiterate that I am 
diametrically opposed to state dictated or enforced religion,” Rogers asserted in an interview 
conducted shortly after he joined the Coalition.349 But despite Rogers’ efforts to downplay his 
membership, in many quarters of the Baptist establishment his actions were seen as a 
potentially dangerous assault on the principle of church-state separation. For example, in an 
article for the Kentucky Publication the Western Recorder, C. R. Daley said Rogers was entitled 
to his personal opinions about church-state separation, ‘even if they are out of line with the 
historic and present Southern Baptist position on’ the issue. 350  But he believed that the 
Coalition potentially sought to undermine the Supreme Court rulings separating church and 
state, which the SBC had officially endorsed in special resolutions in 1964 and 1971. Moreover, 
‘the truth is he is convention president and whatever he says or does reflects upon the 
convention’.351  Therefore, Daley concluded, ‘lend[ing] his name and the Southern Baptist 
presidency to this movement’ was an irresponsible move, since it risked jeopardising ‘what is 
probably the most important contribution of Baptists in American life’.352 An article in another 
publication argued Rogers’ suggestions jeopardised the rights of religious minorities, and that 
this was ironic, given that the ‘Baptist faith was born in 17th-century England, where there was 
an official religion and it wasn’t Baptist’.353 But ‘now that the Southern Baptist denomination 
is large and powerful,’ the article concluded, ‘some of its leaders put less value on the rights 
of religious minorities’.354 Meanwhile, other portions of the Baptist press did praise Rogers’ 
stances. One newspaper argued ‘his reasons are worth considering’, and that Rogers was right 
to resist ‘the business of shutting God out from society’ that he saw was taking place in recent 
years.355  
 Perhaps the most articulate resistance to Rogers’ church-state stances came from James 
E. Wood, Jr, who was executive director of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs (BJC) 
from 1972 to 1980. The BJC was a Washington-based association promoting religious liberty 
and church-state separation, representing numerous American Baptist denominations, 
including the SBC. The Conservative Resurgence marked the beginning of a prickly 
relationship between the SBC and the BJC, which culminated in 1991 with the SBC 
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withdrawing its funding for the organisation, due to widening gap between the two 
organisations’ stances on key moral issues.356  Known for its strict separationism, the BJC 
disapproved of the accommodationist direction that the SBC had been taking since 1979. 
Meanwhile, SBC conservatives lamented the relative liberalism of the BJC, with Paige 
Patterson telling Christianity Today in 1984 that the association’s representatives were 
“hobnob[ing] with the liberal establishment in the House and Senate”.357 The disagreement 
between Wood and Rogers over the latter’s involvement with the Coalition was the first 
instance of conflict between the SBC and the BJC that took place publically. A furious Wood 
told the Baptist and Reflector he was “dismayed” and “disappointed” at Rogers’ campaign.358 
Going a step further than C. R. Daley of the Western Recorder, Wood argued Rogers had 
“completely repudiated the official resolutions of the Southern Baptist Convention” by joining 
the Coalition.359 “Rogers did not consult with anyone on our staff about the serious First 
Amendment questions raised by the position of the new coalition,” he continued. 360  In a 
blistering conclusion, Wood argued that the Coalition’s position “in fact runs precisely 
contrary to that taken repeatedly through the years by the Southern Baptist Convention, the 
Baptist Joint Committee, and its other member bodies”.361 
 Rogers and Wood expressed their disagreements over the school prayer issue 
publically in February 1980, when the two confronted one another after a speech the president 
made to the SBC’s Executive Committee. Rogers’ address was not intended to be about school 
prayer, but he concluded it with some “personal comments”, ‘which included a statement on 
his much publicized stance’ on the issue.362 After the speech was over, Wood went over to the 
stage floor and greeted Rogers. The pair addressed one another respectfully, shaking hands 
‘amiably’ before ‘engaging in dialogue over their differences’.363 Rogers claimed that people 
were wrong to believe that his stance was against the SBC resolutions. He said ‘he would 
never “knowingly go against the will of our great denomination”’, before reiterating his belief 
that federal rulings had become more anti-God and humanistic in their approach towards 
religion in schools.364 Wood countered that the Supreme Court already catered for voluntary 
prayer in public schools, and that the struggles of Senator Jessie Helms and the CFA were 
“dangerous”.365 Wood then articulated his three primary objections to removing voluntary 
prayer from the jurisdiction of the federal courts, which were that the measure would lead to 
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attempts to amend the Constitution without ‘referring to the states for their approval’; that it 
could also ‘set a precedent…for the destruction of First Amendment freedoms’; and that the 
procedure could lead to a ‘hodgepodge of approaches to the issue of prayer’.366 In response 
Rogers then outlined his rationale for supporting state authority over the issue, arguing 
“federal judges are not always without error,” and that “we…have a vital concern that the 
Supreme Court may misrule”.367 He also maintained that this system would not lead to states 
‘forcing religion in schools’, which was a scenario Wood argued was in fact very much 
possible.368 At the end of the encounter Rogers and Wood ‘verbally expressed love for one 
another,’ with Rogers saying he did not call the BJC before joining the Coalition because he 
“felt…[he] was not controverting the decision of the SBC”.369 “We have different positions for 
the same reasons,” he said.370  
In the middle of May 1980, Rogers unexpectedly announced that he would not be 
standing for re-election at the upcoming SBC presidential elections, which were scheduled to 
be held around a month later in St. Louis, Missouri. His decision would have taken many by 
surprise, since as incumbent he was constitutionally entitled to run for a consecutive 
presidential term. Instead, Rogers became only the fourth president in SBC history to decline 
to stand for re-election.371 Rogers said the man reason for his decision was the challenges 
ahead at Bellevue.372 “Our church is in a period of growth unprecedented in its history,” 
Rogers stated in an interview with the Baptist and Reflector.373 “These are days, therefore, that 
I want to maximize for my church”.374 The first half of the 1980s was indeed an exceptionally 
busy period for Bellevue, as the church struggled to cope with the dramatic membership 
increases and began to make plans for a new building programme (culminating on the 
church’s decision to relocate). Rogers also expressed a desire to spend more time with his 
family, and said he began to consider his future while he was recovering from a gall bladder 
operation in Memphis the preceding February. But as he had always insisted was the case, 
church duties were his overriding priority: “As much as I love my denomination, my church 
is still my first responsibility”.375  
While Rogers was withdrawing from the denominational scene, there was another 
associate of Bellevue whose career in political advocacy was beginning to launch, and who 
would have an equally important role to play in promoting the accommodationist cause. In 
1980, native Memphian and lifelong Bellevue layman Ed McAteer was becoming one of the 
conservative evangelical movement’s most influential figures. A skilful and wealthy 
networker who was endowed with the ‘skills of persuasion that he needed to market New 
Right ideology’, perhaps McAteer’s greatest achievement was to facilitate a strong alliance 
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between the SBC, the Christian Right and the Republican Party, so that by 1982 the three 
organisations were working together closely to promote evangelical-friendly legislation.376 
Born in 1926, McAteer’s mother died when he was four years old and his father was rarely 
present, so he was raised ‘a virtual orphan’ by other family members.377 It was these foster 
parents—along with his wife Faye Carter, whom he married in 1948—who ‘instilled in him 
[a] strong…religious devotion’.378 As a young man McAteer served in World War Two as a 
Merchant Marine, before getting a job in the advertising department of the Colgate-Palmolive 
Company. McAteer soon proved to be a gifted salesman, and ‘within four months [he had] 
received his first promotion’.379 He went on to devote twenty-five years of his life to Colgate-
Palmolive, rising through the ranks to become an executive at the company. But according to 
one commentator, in the late-1970s, when McAteer was in his early fifties, ‘something [started] 
gnawing away at him’.380 McAteer’s firmly entrenched conservative Baptists beliefs were the 
root cause of the profound discontent he had begun to feel about what he saw as the ‘growing 
secularization of the country and a feeling of time-honoured traditions being overturned’.381 
His grievances were essentially the same as those aired by Rogers, Patterson, and others 
working to increase the influence of SBC conservatism—namely, the perceived increase in the 
influence of “secular humanism”, and the perception that the federal government was 
undermining their Baptist principles. In 1979, the same year Rogers became president of the 
SBC, McAteer decided the time was right to quit his high-earning executive position at 
Colgate and devote himself fully to his campaign to increase the influence of conservative 
evangelicalism. 
Had he been a clergyman rather than a layman at Bellevue, McAteer might have been 
tempted to pursue his agenda via a denominational route, like the pastor of his church had 
already done. However, although McAteer lacked the credentials to be able to seek a 
denominational position alongside Rogers, this did not hinder his ability to contribute 
towards the SBC conservative cause. In fact, as a rich and well-connected layman McAteer 
was able to act with a degree of independence which most denominational officials were not 
able to exercise. Advocacy was McAteer’s preferred instrument for influencing the political 
system, and it was through this mechanism that he left his most lasting legacies. In 1979, 
McAteer played a crucial role in convincing his preacher and televangelist friend Jerry Falwell 
to help mobilise evangelicals, despite the fundamentalist pastor’s reservations about entering 
politics.382 The Bellevue member helped Falwell establish the Moral Majority, one of the New 
Christian Right’s most well-known and influential independent organisations.383 But McAteer 
was not content with merely helping his friend establish an advocacy group; he had ambitions 
of his own to run such an organisation, and in September of the same year he launched the 
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Religious Roundtable in a conference room in Washington, DC. There was obvious symbolism 
attached to his decision to arrange the organisation’s first meeting in the epicentre of 
America’s political world. Like the Moral Majority, the Religious Roundtable sought to ‘rally 
fundamentalists to politically conservative causes’, and to maximise the influence of 
conservative evangelicalism on federal legislation. 384  The organisation’s tasks were made 
easier by the fact that it was being ran by a wealthy former business executive: alongside his 
job at Colgate, McAteer had spent half a lifetime acquiring powerful contacts from inside the 
SBC hierarchy. Thanks to these connections McAteer was able to appoint several high-profile 
conservative evangelicals to the board of directors of the Roundtable. These included future 
SBC president Charles Stanley, a pastor at a fundamentalist megachurch in Atlanta, 
televangelist star Pat Robertson, as well as his close ally Falwell.  
In August 1980 the Roundtable hosted an event in Dallas which is often considered a 
watershed moment in the history of the Christian Right’s journey towards gaining 
mainstream political influence. The National Affairs Briefing (NAB) was a ‘two-day gathering 
of politically conservative evangelicals’ which attracted a total of twenty thousand people, 
including five thousand pastors, four hundred journalists, and over one hundred media 
organisations. 385  The keynote speaker at the event was Republican presidential nominee 
Ronald Reagan, who, after years of disappointments during the Carter administration, 
conservative evangelical leaders had already identified as the right person to lead their cause. 
Recognising the untapped political potential of mobilised conservative evangelicals on the 
eve of the 1980 election, Reagan made a speech at the Briefing that enthusiastically embraced 
his hosts’ struggles. “I know this a non-partisan gathering, and so I know you can’t endorse 
me,” the former Governor of California stated. “But I want you to know that I endorse you 
and what you are doing”. 386  Suggesting that he was sympathetic towards the 
accommodationist cause, Reagan argued that recent Supreme Court decisions had been 
hostile towards religion and sympathetic towards humanism: “Under the pretence of 
separation of church and state,” he argued, “religious beliefs cannot be advocated in many of 
our public institutions. But atheism can”.387 At the end of Reagan’s speech the ‘Reunion Arena 
erupted in cheers’.388 With one of the clear frontrunners for the 1980 presidency endorsing 
several of the movement’s staple stances, ‘conservative evangelicals could hardly believe their 
good fortune’.389 Although the Briefing was ostensibly a nonpartisan gathering, soon after the 
event conservative evangelicals ‘abandon[ed] their pretence of nonpartisanship [and] became 
enthusiastic champions of the Republican ticket’.390  
The success of the Roundtable and McAteer’s career in political advocacy were stunted 
somewhat by events surrounding the NAB. The first damaging event took place during the 
Briefing itself, when the newly-inaugurated SBC president Baily Smith made an anti-Semitic 
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remark. Reagan was forced to publically distance himself from the remark, and the 
Roundtable’s reputation was tarnished. Pat Robertson was the most high-profile Baptist 
figure to quite the Roundtable as a result of the furore caused by the comments, and the 
organisation soon ‘experienced a sharp decline in size and influence’.391 Three months later, 
shortly after Reagan’s landslide victory, McAteer was left disappointed by the new president’s 
decision not to appoint “qualified Christians” to join his White House staff, despite assurances 
by Reagan during the NAB that he would consider McAteer and other evangelicals for top 
roles.392 These disappointments were compounded by the first eighteen months of the Reagan 
administration, when concerns over employment figures and the economy comfortably 
overshadowed any willingness to engage with conservative evangelical issues. However, in 
the spring of 1982 hopes were boosted again by Reagan’s decision—largely made thanks to 
pressure from McAteer and Falwell—to propose constitutional amendments to restore prayer 
in public schools and ban (or at least restrict) abortion.  
McAteer saw the Reagan administration’s school prayer bill as the ideal opportunity 
to finish what Rogers had started and push through an SBC endorsement of the proposed 
legislation. Since moderates within the denomination still strongly opposed state-sponsored 
school prayer, such a move would signify that conservatives had, once and for all, emerged 
victorious in their “Holy War”. In turn, an endorsement of the school prayer initiative would 
enable the SBC to act in unison with the rest of the Christian Right. This was significant 
because, as recognised by McAteer, the largest Protestant denomination in the country had a 
potential influence that was far greater than lobby groups such as the Moral Majority and the 
Religious Roundtable.393 The Republican Party’s relationship with evangelicals therefore to a 
large extent hinged on this conservative denomination of over thirteen million people. The 
1982 SBC convention meeting in New Orleans had been scheduled to take place a couple of 
weeks after Reagan made his proposals, and McAteer saw this as his golden opportunity. A 
logistical problem prevented the meeting McAteer arranged between Rogers and Reagan at 
the White House—timed to coincide with the President’s school prayer announcement—from 
taking place. But McAteer took no chances in New Orleans. He made sure ‘that the resolutions 
committee’ at the convention meeting ‘was filled with school prayer supporters’.394 He also 
instructed his accommodationist pastors present at the convention to make speeches which 
tapped into anxieties many evangelicals had towards the creeping influence of “secular 
humanism”. The resolution, McAteer and his allies argued, was about protecting religious 
liberty as opposed to restricting it. The current ban on state sponsored school prayer, they 
contended, played into the hands of secularists and atheists, who were openly hostile and 
intolerant of religion. What was needed was a constitutional amendment which took into 
account these hostile forces. McAteer’s tactic was successful, and during the 1982 convention 
his resolution passed by a three-to-one majority. SBC conservatives’ successes in 1982 have 
subsequently been seen as a seminal ‘historical marker for the SBC,’ since they were ‘part of a 
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monumental shift in the church-state position of the denomination’. 395  Subsequent SBC 
resolutions would continue to reflect this position, until the denomination ‘officially began 
lobbying for accommodation in 1991’.396 Conservatives had achieved an important victory 
over their liberal and moderate coreligionists, beating them over one of the issues which the 
latter group cared most about. This signalled to the whole denomination that conservatives 
now had complete control over the SBC’s organisational bureaucracy. 
Later, when the school prayer and abortion proposals were put to Congress in 1984, 
neither one was successful; the former failed to pass the Senate by eleven votes and a watered 
down abortion bill fell short by eighteen votes. Although the Reagan administration could 
perhaps have fought harder to convince Congress, the failure of both bills was in the end 
down to the general public’s lack of interest endorsing the proposals.397 The proposals are, of 
course, evidence in themselves of the political power McAteer and other Christian Right 
leaders had managed to attain, but their ultimate failure is also indicative of how the 
movement’s key figures tended to exaggerate the extent to which there was a public mandate 
for socially conservative legislation. This is applicable not just to abortion and school prayer, 
but also to subsequent failed attempts by the Christian Right and other conservative groups 
to block liberal legislation, such as the legalisation of marijuana in some states and the federal 
legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2015. As seen, even during what was one of the high 
points of the movement’s influence, the ability of the Christian Right to translate its political 
power into a legislative reality was often limited.398 Nonetheless, the 1982 convention was in 
political terms highly significant for SBC conservatives, since it confirmed one of their 
important goals: the realisation of a lasting and intimate alliance between nation’s largest 
Protestant denomination, the Christian Right and the GOP. This allegiance between 
evangelical and Republican elites was reflected in a similarly long-lasting electoral loyalty 
towards Republican presidential candidates by normal evangelical churchgoers.  
 
Conclusion: The Conservative Resurgence, the Christian Right, and Bellevue 
 
This chapter has discussed the involvement of Adrian Rogers and Ed McAteer in the SBC 
conservative movement, demonstrating how the two Bellevue colleagues used the issue of 
school prayer to consolidate conservative power within the denomination and form a strong 
political alliance between the SBC, the Christian Right and the Republican Party. But how did 
this three-year period of intense political and denominational activity by Bellevue’s two most 
powerful figures relate to and influence the church itself? The answer to this question is in 
some ways surprising: Rogers, like pastors at other conservative evangelical churches, had a 
hesitancy towards bringing these ostensibly partisan political matters directly into their 
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churches. The historiography’s lopsided interest in the Christian Right’s elite-level 
mobilisation has left little space for discussing this issue, but if we are to fully understand 
conservative evangelicalism’s post-1970s mobilisation it is surely necessary to attempt such 
an endeavour. After all, the vast majority of the SBC’s thirteen-million members in 1980 were 
regular churchgoers, and did not have Rogers’ and McAteer’s political influence. But it was 
the behaviour of these churchgoers that ultimately constituted conservative evangelicalism’s 
longstanding and disproportionately high loyalty towards the Republican Party from the 1980 
election onwards.  
 Unlike the atmosphere of partisanship that could be felt at the 1982 SBC convention 
(as symbolised by the speech made by Vice President Bush at the end of the conference), there 
was a reluctance at Bellevue to translate the SBC’s political inclinations into something similar 
within the churches pews. Indeed, Rogers often made deliberate attempts to put distance 
between his status as SBC president and his role as senior pastor of Bellevue. For example, 
when asked in an interview with a Baptist newspaper in 1980 about how his joining the CFA 
related to his ministerial duties, Rogers insisted “my involvement [in the Coalition] is as 
Adrian P. Rogers. Period. It’s not as president of the Southern Baptist Convention or as pastor 
of Bellevue Baptist Church”.399 “I see myself more as a prophet than a politician. I’m not a 
political creature,” Rogers declared in another interview conducted in 1993. 400  Similarly, 
Bellevue layman David Coombs, who was a friend of McAteer until the lobbyist died in 2004, 
has claimed that McAteer never spoke to the church from the pulpit about his political 
endeavours, but he did occasionally speak about such issues at his home.401  Meanwhile, 
outside of Bellevue efforts to downplay the political ramifications of conservative 
evangelicalism during the era of the Christian Right were frequently made by elite members 
of the movement. Although Jerry Falwell declared in the early 1980s that he had “a divine 
mandate to go right to into the halls of Congress and fight for laws that will save America,” 
‘as a minister, he did not want to appear too blatantly partisan’.402 ‘Like other fundamentalists 
and conservative evangelicals,’ Christian Right expert Daniel K. Williams argues, Falwell 
‘thought that it was unseemly for a pastor to participate directly in a political campaign’.403 
Even though it had always been obvious that Falwell was politically conservative, shortly 
before his lobbying career began in earnest the Lynchburg, Virginia-based pastor even went 
as far as saying he didn’t “talk politics”.404  Part of this conundrum admittedly relates to 
semantics. Falwell perhaps made these comments because he believed there was nothing 
“political” about his moral crusades against abortion and secularism. Nonetheless, it is a 
conundrum that is worth understanding in order to fully grasp conservative evangelicalism’s 
engagement with the political domain during the late 1970s onwards.  
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 One explanation for this contradiction between the political activities of evangelical 
leaders on one hand and their unwillingness to bring partisan politics into the pulpit on the 
other is that Falwell et al did not want political matters to interfere with or dilute the purity 
of the evangelical message they were preaching in their churches. Rogers frequently insisted 
that preaching the Gospel and other ministerial tasks were always his main priority, even 
while he was serving as SBC president. Indeed, the main reason Rogers cited for why he 
declined to stand for re-election in 1980 was that the “pressing duties” at Bellevue would 
require his full attention.405 This view is corroborated by Coombs, who argues that Rogers’ 
“primary ministry up until the day he died was preaching the message of the Gospel. The 
denomination was never at the forefront of his mind or ministry. The denomination stuff was 
pretty much external to the church”.406 Even Falwell, the quintessential Christian Right figure, 
‘did not want to sacrifice his ministerial career for a political cause’.407 Meanwhile, it was the 
SBC and the halls of power in Washington—not the churches themselves—that were seen as 
being the most appropriate institutions through which to change American politics and 
society. Based on the observation that evangelical leaders were reluctant to bring partisan 
politics into their churches, it is logical to conclude that the primary impetus behind 
churchgoing evangelicals’ lasting electoral loyalty to the GOP must have been something 
other than direct partisan pronouncements from pulpits like Bellevue’s. The next chapter will 
demonstrate that it was a shift in congregational culture—brought about indirectly through a 
combination of theological, demographic and cultural factors—which enabled churches like 
Bellevue to eschew partisan mobilisation while simultaneously facilitating the build-up of an 
electoral and political alliance between conservative evangelicalism and the Republican Party. 
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Chapter 4: Towards a Political-Cultural Explanation of the “Christian 
Right”: The Congregational Culture of Bellevue During the 1980s and 
Beyond 
 
To what extent was there a version of Christian Right politics at conservative evangelical 
churches during the height of the movement’s nationwide activity, and what forms did this 
dimension of the Christian Right take? Chapter 4 seeks to answer these questions through a 
close analysis of Bellevue’s congregational culture during the 1980s. By shifting attention 
away from elite-level mobilisation, it is hoped that this chapter will begin to describe the 
nature and experiences of the Christian Right at a congregational level. This will in turn lead 
to an enhanced understanding of the mechanisms through which conservative evangelicalism 
was involved with politics and the Republican Party at a non-elite level. The following 
paragraphs confirm the suggestion made at the end of the last chapter, that during the height 
of the Christian Right’s political influence Bellevue’s leaders hesitated to bring partisan 
politics into the pulpit. Rogers never, for example, explicitly endorsed the Republican Party 
during his sermons or in any other medium, even in the wake of the SBC’s embracement of 
the GOP at the 1982 denomination convention. Instead, this chapter finds that during the 
1980s a new form of political culture had started to exist at the church, which despite being 
ostensibly non-partisan mirrored key features of Christian Right and Republican Party 
conservatism during the period. This entailed a novel willingness to apply conservative 
evangelical principles to the issues which had, by the beginning of the 1980s, become the key 
Christian Right battlegrounds, including abortion, women’s rights and church-state 
separation. Bellevue’s new form of political culture also consisted of a mimicking of 
Republican Party conservatism, such as the church’s staunch patriotism and pro-military 
rhetoric. Thus, although Bellevue’s leaders never went as far as actively endorsing the GOP, 
the church’s new form of congregational culture had the effect of bringing, in cultural and 
political terms, the congregation closer to the Party. These findings are important because 
when applied at a broader level they provide a framework for explaining conservative 
evangelicalism’s post-1980 political and electoral affinity with the Republican Party. It is not 
difficult to see how the political culture elucidated below translated into partisan voting 
behaviour and conservative political ideology.  
 
As demonstrated in the last chapter, Adrian Rogers’ decision to run for the SBC presidency, 
and in turn become heavily involved with main denominational branch of the Christian Right, 
was taken a short space of time before the 1979 election itself. Prior to his decision, he had 
been concerned for some time about the liberalism of the SBC’s seminaries, and at one point 
even considered withdrawing Bellevue from the denomination; but before 1979 these 
concerns were seldom aired publically, either in the church or elsewhere, and he had appeared 
to be too focussed on his duties as a pastor to consider a denominational role up until that 
point. There is no evidence to suggest that Rogers sought to actively raise awareness of or 
mobilise support for his SBC campaign at Bellevue any time prior to his nomination. Thus, his 
nomination for the SBC presidency came as a surprise to most Bellevue members. One 
Bellevue layman who has been at the church since the Pollard era even recalled that “the first 
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time anyone knew anything about it was in the news. It came as a surprise.”408 But once 
Rogers’ campaign was underway, to what extent did the SBC conservative movement—in its 
various different forms—impact on the congregational culture of Bellevue, as one of the 
largest and most significant members of the Southern Baptist Convention? For some, the 
answer to this question was that the Conservative Resurgence had little or no effect on the 
church, even as Rogers was at the height of his denominational influence in 1979 and 1980. 
When asked if it felt like the atmosphere of the church had changed in the wake of Rogers’ 
election, or if Rogers’ sermons mentioned the Resurgence or targeted any particular issue 
more after the spring of 1979, Bellevue member David Coombs replied, “Not really. Of course 
he did preach and mention consistently what the issues were, you know, what the Bible says 
about these issues. He covered some of the issues [like abortion] in some of his sermons. But 
his primary ministry up until the day he died was preaching the Gospel. The denomination 
was never at the forefront of his mind or ministry”.409  
 Coombs’ notion that the politics of the SBC conservative movement did not directly 
trickle down to the congregation is consistent with Rogers’ insistence that he was always more 
concerned with his church than he was with his denomination, and with his contention that 
there was a clear dividing line between his denominational and political activity on the one 
hand, and his ministerial duties on the other. Rogers was fond of declaring that he was only 
interested in preaching what he saw as the infallible truths contained in the Gospel, as 
opposed to occupying himself with denominational or political issues during his sermons. 
Coombs suggested that the apparent lack of any denominational engagement at Bellevue is 
not surprising, given that, as a member of the Southern Baptist Convention, the church 
exercised full autonomy over its congregational affairs. “The denomination stuff was pretty 
much external to the church,” Coombs suggested, “and that’s the way it’s designed, each 
church is an autonomous thing”.410  Bellevue, like other Southern Baptist churches, has a 
Congregationalist polity, which means all of its ‘authority rest[s] at the local church level’.411 
Without any formal bureaucratic, religious or financial authority coming from the 
denomination, SBC churches are often less inclined to engage substantively with 
denominational issues. Formally speaking, then, the denomination did not have a stake in the 
way Bellevue was run, meaning the church was always likely to be less involved with the SBC 
than it would have been if the church had had to answer to a higher authority. 
 In 1980 the total membership of Bellevue stood at over 11,000. It was therefore 
inevitable that such a large congregation had at least some variation in terms of the extent to 
which individual congregants engaged with denominational and political issues. For many 
people in the congregation, Bellevue’s religious culture was consumed solely as a means to 
individual spiritual enrichment, rather than for its place in relation to the broader 
denominational realms that existed outside of the church’s pews. When asked if there were 
any particular denominational, political or social issues which concerned him as an 
evangelical during the seventies and eighties, David Coombs replied, “No. I was in my 
twenties and raising a family and starting a career. And I was more focussed on that stuff. 
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Which was also the case for most of the people around me”.412 Based on these insights, it 
would be an exaggeration to suggest that the severity of the SBC’s overhaul was reflected at 
a local congregational level by an equally drastic increase in engagement with the SBC 
conservatives’ political and denominational agendas. In other words, for some members of 
Bellevue, the Conservative Resurgence and the politics of the Christian Right were spiritually 
as well as geographically remote features of their religious lives, and were easily 
overshadowed by concerns closer to home, such individual spirituality, families, and careers.  
 In 2005, Bellevue was the subject of a presentation by historian of the SBC Barry 
Hankins, which was delivered to a Southern Historical Association conference held in 
Memphis. Although the paper was devoted mainly to the pastoral history of the church and 
its relocation to Cordova, Hankins briefly addressed the question of whether Bellevue had 
become more conservative during Rogers’ tenure. He suggested that Bellevue had not ‘shifted 
to the right’ in the last thirty years because ‘the church has always been very conservative’.413 
As previous chapters have touched upon, it is true that each of Bellevue’s pastors has, 
theologically speaking, been stongly conservative and strictly inerrantist. In political and 
economic terms, however, it is difficult to determine where the majority of Bellevue’s 
members stood prior to the civil rights movement, but there is no evidence to suggest that the 
congregation was liberally inclined during the first half of the twentieth century.414 It would 
therefore be inaccurate to suggest that the arrival of Rogers represented an increase in the 
degree of conservatism at the church. Moreover, since the raison d'être of most religions is to 
offer a set of universal moral truths—with universalism being a particularly important value 
for biblical inerrantists—most evangelicals would argue that whether or not they have become 
“more conservative” is irrelevant, since they aim to abide by the same fixed principles which 
by definition never change. Thus, rather than probing into whether Bellevue had become more 
conservative during the Rogers pastorate, it is perhaps more worthwhile to consider whether 
there had been a change in the way Bellevue’s brand of SBC conservatism was channelled: that 
is, to what extent did Bellevue’s religious discourses and congregational culture change 
during the important period of Rogers’ tenure, even if the essence of the church’s theology 
remained the same? 
 
Beyond Theological Conservatism: Bellevue and the Equal Rights Amendment 
 
Archival evidence suggests that from around the time of Rogers’ first presidential term, 
Bellevue started to display new forms of engagement with the political initiatives of the 
                                                          
412 Coombs, interview with author. 
413 Hankins, “White Flight, Shift to the Right”. 
414 Due to a lack of resources available for the period, there is limited scope for determining where the 
majority of Bellevue’s members stood on the political and economic spectrum in the first half of the 
twentieth century. But Wayne Flynt has shown that despite their theological conservatism, Southern 
Baptists in Alabama during the 1930s were overwhelmingly supportive of Roosevelt’s economic 
programme, demonstrating that—during the Great Depression at least—conservative evangelicals 
often had few qualms about voting Democrat. Wayne Flint, “Religion for the Blues: Evangelicalism, 
Poor Whites, and the Great Depression,” The Journal of Southern History, 71 (2005), pp. 3 – 38, accessed 
March 31, 2016, DOI: 10.2307/27648650. 
94 
 
Christian Right, sharing the movement’s preoccupations with “moral issues” such as 
abortion, church-state separation and the family. This new engagement demonstrates that 
Bellevue’s conservatism was for the first time being channelled in more ostensibly political 
(though not partisan) ways, and suggests that the church’s congregational culture was starting 
to become a more hospitable environment for Republican Party conservatism. One of the first 
examples of this was in May 1980, when Rogers hosted a major three-day conference at 
Bellevue which discussed evangelical approaches to “women’s issues”. The Mid-Continent 
Christian Women’s Concerns Conference attracted 4,000 women from all over the country 
and ‘packed two auditoriums’ at the church. 415  Rogers used his opening speech at the 
Conference to ‘warn…against yielding to humanistic morality’ and “attempting to solve the 
problems of mankind apart from God”.416 Rogers also made the biblical case for conservative 
gender roles, arguing “I’m of the opinion that a woman is infinitely superior to a man—at 
being a woman—and a man is infinitely superior than [sic] a woman—at being a man…We 
are equal but thank God we are not the same”. He argued that succumbing to humanistic 
morality was “a highway to hell”, and that people should instead adopt values based on the 
Word of God.417  
Although the views expressed by Rogers come as little surprise, the timing and scale 
of the event suggests there was more to it than simply an arbitrary occasion to discuss 
evangelical approaches towards women’s roles. Not only did the Conference—the first of its 
type to be held at Bellevue—take place during Rogers’ first term as SBC president, but it also 
corresponded to the height of the controversy surrounding the Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA), a campaign dating back to the 1920s which sought to legally guarantee equal social 
and economic rights for women. By the beginning of the 1970s supporters of the ERA were 
becoming increasingly hopeful that ratification could be achieved, with the Amendment 
passing through Congress in 1972 and thirty-five of the necessary thirty-eight states 
approving the Amendment. Conservative evangelicals, however, were fervently against the 
ERA because they saw it as a threat to conservative “family values” and gender roles. While 
the momentum behind the Amendment was peaking, the Christian Right became heavily 
involved in the fight against its ratification. Predictably, Jerry Falwell stepped in to the debates 
to become one of the ERA’s harshest critics. He ‘explicitly tied the feminist movement’s 
rejection of traditional gender roles to social disintegration,’ arguing in his typically 
hyperbolic and reactionary style that “the Equal Rights Amendment strikes at the very 
foundation of our entire social structure”. 418  Accordingly, conservative evangelicals’ 
campaign relied on stigmatising proponents of the ERA, who were labelled as “anti-family” 
radicals. Although the first deadline for the Ratification of the amendment passed in 1979, in 
1978 the cut-off date had been extended to June 1982. This meant that during the Conference 
at Bellevue in May 1980 there was still a possibility that the amendment would gain the 
required number of state approvals to become enshrined in law. Although the newspaper 
report which covered the Women’s Concerns Conference at Bellevue made no explicit 
                                                          
415 “Rogers Urges Women to Reject Humanism”, Baptist New Mexican, May 24, 1980, p. 3. 
416 Ibid; Adrian Rogers, quoted in ibid. 
417 Ibid. 
418 Brantley W. Gasaway, Progressive Evangelicals and the Pursuit of Social Justice, (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2014), p. 55; Jerry Falwell, quoted in ibid. 
95 
 
mention of the ERA, the content and timing of the event leaves little doubt that it was 
organised in direct response to the perceived threats posed by the Amendment. Indeed, the 
unwillingness by Bellevue and the conservative Baptist press to explicitly mention the ERA 
supports this thesis’s suggestion that even during the era of Bellevue’s new form of political 
culture, the church’s leaders wanted to avoided the partisan political implications of the issues 
they were engaged with. “It’s not a matter of equality. Before the Lord Jesus we are all equal, 
but we are not the same”, Rogers argued in his opening speech, alluding to the language of 
the women’s rights campaign.419 
The ultimate failure of feminists and equal rights campaigners to force through the 
ratification of the ERA can be explained in part by the success of conservative evangelicals in 
mobilising resistance to the Amendment at both governmental and grassroots levels. In the 
South—the heartland of the SBC and the Christian Right—resistance to the ERA was 
particularly high. Each state in the South either refused to ratify the ERA, fell just short of 
ratifying it, or rescinded its ratification sometime between 1974 and 1978 (Tennessee ratified 
in 1972 but then rescinded in 1974). By the end of the decade, every state in the South was 
officially against ratification. Sensing a shift of momentum in the battle between the pro- and 
anti-ERA campaigns, the Christian Right decided in 1979 to elevate ‘their opposition to a 
national scope’. 420  Exercising the unprecedented political influence that the group had 
attained in recent years, the Christian Right helped convince the Republican Party to ‘drop its 
previous support of the ERA’. 421  This officially took place at the Republican National 
Convention in 1980, just two months after the Women’s Concerns Conference at Bellevue. As 
was often the case with the Christian Right, the movement’s success in derailing the ERA 
campaign would not have been possible without tapping in to the simmering resentments of 
southern white evangelicals at a grassroots level. ‘Conservative evangelicals’ successful 
grassroots campaigns against the ERA’s final ratification inspired many evangelicals to 
oppose the “anti-family” agenda of feminists,’ and ultimately helped tip the scales of the 
debate towards an overall veto.422  As a grassroots campaign, meetings like the Women’s 
Concerns Conference at Bellevue were therefore crucial instruments for rallying resistance to 
the ERA. Although those in attendance would have already been sympathetic towards the 
principles of the anti-ERA campaign, the Conference and other similar events motivated 
evangelicals to resist the Amendment more actively. With around 4000 in attendance, 
Bellevue’s Conference was one of the larger meetings of its kind, and it took place at an 
important historical moment when the anti-ERA campaign was close to defeating the 
Amendment outright. The event demonstrates that from the early 1980s onwards, Bellevue’s 
congregation was displaying a greater willingness to apply its conservative evangelical 
principles to political situations.  
 
Bellevue’s Political Culture During the 1980 Presidential Election and Beyond 
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In November 1980, six months after the Women’s Concerns Conference and on the eve of the 
United States presidential election, Rogers gave a sermon at Bellevue which tackled another 
key SBC conservative issue: the relationship between church and state. As discussed in the 
last chapter, many SBC conservatives argued that since the surrounding culture had become 
more hostile towards the Southern Baptist faith, the state should adopt a “friendlier” stance 
towards religion than its current approach. Rogers would spend much of his last twenty-five 
years as a preacher emphasising—or, as many secular historians would claim, grossly 
exaggerating—the role of Protestant Christianity in the drafting of the US Constitution and in 
influencing American political life thereafter. 423  Rogers’ views were ‘consistent with the 
populist critique of [secular] scholarship’ that was emerging in SBC conservative circles in the 
1980s.424 He would ‘label as revisionists all those who would like to take away “our Christian 
heritage” by omitting from their work references to God and his providence’. 425  In the 
aforementioned sermon at Bellevue, which was entitled “The Great Debate between Church 
and State”, Rogers fleshed out some of the arguments that he had made to the denominational 
community during his SBC presidency:  
“I want to remind you that the framers of our Constitution were men whose lives 
had been soaked in the Holy Scripture, and therefore they wrote this First 
Amendment…it says that Congress is not going to establish a new church, and 
Congress is not going to prohibit the free exercise of our worship. But let me say this: 
what we call the separation of church and state was never in their wildest dreams 
considered to mean the separation of God from the government. They knew better 
than that, as a matter of fact when they declared their independence they said, ‘We 
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are endowed by their Creator’”.426 
The sentiment of this extract epitomises Rogers’ perspective on the relationship 
between religion, state and government. As he would do throughout his career as a 
preacher and denominational politician, Rogers recognised the separation of church and 
state while at the same time insisting that God and spirituality should have a greater role 
in politics and government than the current situation. Rogers’ favourite mantra, repeated 
innumerable times in sermons, church literature, articles and denominational material, 
was that “I am strongly opposed to any state-supported religion, but I do not believe in the 
separation of God and government, and neither did our founding fathers”.427 As discussed 
in detail in the last chapter, although Rogers never went as far as rejecting the separation 
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of church and state outright, he nonetheless argued that First Amendment rulings had 
gone too far in their applications. As he argued in an interview conducted in 1997, “I 
think the First Amendment, rightly understood, allows for free expression of our 
religious values, but I think we’ve done an extreme overkill to try to keep a few from 
being offended”.428 The Bellevue pastor’s approach towards church-state separation and 
America’s Christian heritage mimicked those of other leading conservative evangelical 
pastors who were associated with the Christian Right. His views on the Founding Fathers 
were, for instance, almost identical to those of Jerry Falwell, who argued in a well-known 
sermon that “This is a Christian nation. And was so intended to be by our Founding 
Fathers…Our Fathers came to this continent to forge one nation under God”.429 
In the “The Great Debate between Church and State,” Rogers’ views on the 
relationship between religion and government lay the foundations for a justification for 
Christians to involve themselves with politics. He used the sermon as way of introducing 
to his congregation the same accommodationist principles that he had been working hard 
to promote during his first term as SBC president. In the second half of the sermon Rogers 
argued that there were six “duties to government” which every Christian should abide 
by. These included the importance of paying taxes, praying for the government, and 
respecting the law. But the most important of Rogers’ guidelines for the purposes of this 
chapter were the fourth and sixth principles, which taught the importance of preaching to 
the government and of participating in the government respectively. These maxims 
provide an insight into the theological rationale behind Rogers’ willingness to encourage 
his church to actively engage with what he and his movement saw as the pertinent 
political issues of the period, whilst simultaneously avoiding making a direct 
endorsement of the Republican Party’s current electoral campaign. Using passages from 
the Bible to support his arguments, Rogers argued “We need to preach to our country. 
We need to prophesise to our country. There are some people who tell us because of the 
separation of church and state, that we who are Christians are not supposed to say anything! 
That suddenly because we are saved and we belong to some church, we are to be mute, 
we are to be disenfranchised…The Founding Fathers never meant that because we belong 
to some church…we cannot speak and prophesise”.430 Rogers applied this reasoning to 
abortion, which by 1980 had become, alongside school prayer, the dominant Christian 
Right concern: “Dear friends, if we are silent, God is going to hold us accountable. You 
think of the terrible sin of abortion in America today. Dear friends, that one thing alone 
is going to bring us down as a nation if we don’t solve it…We dare not be silent…I believe 
it is time God’s people spoke up”.431  As with the “women’s issues” conference, this 
example illustrates how one of the Christian Right’s core issues became the subject of 
discussion at a congregational level, and how a theological imperative was used to justify 
political engagement with the matter (whilst simultaneously avoiding making the kind 
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of partisan endorsement that one might expect at a church which was part of a religious 
group which was disproportionately Republican in its political orientations).  
 Rogers’ sixth and final imperative was for Christians to “participate in 
government”, by which he meant the necessity of voting. “You need to vote,” he 
proclaimed. “You are sinning against God [if you don’t vote] …And when you vote…you 
vote principle. You find out what’s right from the Word of God. And you vote [for] that 
principle.432 It’s not a matter of parties, it’s not a matter of policies, it’s not a matter of 
personalities, it is a matter of divine principle”. Rogers concluded his sermon by 
instructing, “Don’t you put your hope in any political process, or in any political person, 
you put your faith in God…It’s not right and left, it’s right and wrong”.433 Here Rogers 
was informing his audience that it was their moral obligation to engage with politics and 
to vote according to which candidate most closely aligned with God’s principles. A few 
years later, while Rogers was serving his third term as SBC president, and when the 
pastor’s nationwide recognition was arguably at its peak, Rogers repeated these 
sentiments in an interview with a national newspaper. When asked if he thought there 
was anything wrong with religious leaders engaging with politics, Rogers replied, “I 
believe in the right of every American, whether he be religious or not, to participate in 
the political affairs of our country. As a matter of fact, I believe I think a Christian sins if 
he does not participate”.434  
As with the Women’s Conference, one of the most significant aspects of Rogers’ 
sermon was its timing. As the last chapter demonstrated, 1980 was a highly important 
year for the SBC and the Christian Right, as well as for Rogers and McAteer’s careers. But 
in order to grasp the real significance of the church-state sermon at Bellevue, it is 
necessary to pay attention to exact day on which it was delivered. Rogers preached “The 
Great Debate between Church and State” on November 2, 1980—just two days before 
that year’s presidential election. Although the sermon made no mention of the election 
or of the two main candidates, the content of the address, combined with the political 
context for conservative evangelicals in November 1980, would have left few in the 
audience with any doubt about who they were supposed to be voting for the following 
Tuesday. By November of 1980, the majority of conservative evangelicals had turned 
their back on the incumbent and Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter. Despite being a 
born-again Christian and therefore “one of their own”, ‘fundamentalists and 
conservative evangelicals quickly realized that Carter’s type of Christianity was far 
removed from their own’.435 His liberal stances on issues such as women’s rights—as 
demonstrated by his support for the ERA—left evangelicals of Rogers and McAteer’s ilk 
feeling disillusioned. Meanwhile, in the wake of the National Affairs Briefing and other 
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important campaign events, Ronald Reagan had emerged as the new posterchild of 
conservative evangelical causes. Within months of winning the Republican primaries, 
Reagan had publically endorsed a bill which would see unborn foetuses become legally 
protected against abortion by the Fourteenth Amendment, and had presided over a party 
that had dropped its decade-old support for the ERA.436  While the Carter campaign 
struggled with the all-but-impossible task of appealing to both its left-of-centre Democrat 
base and the growing electoral force of conservative evangelicals, Reagan unequivocally 
endorsed socially conservative values in a way that resonated far more clearly with 
Southern Baptists.437 Back at Bellevue, for a congregation that had been urged to vote 
according to evangelical moral principles (but not, it is important to note, with explicit 
instructions to vote for a certain candidate), Reagan’s unambiguous stances made 
deciding who to support in the forthcoming election a straightforward task. Like with 
countless other SBC churches, Reagan had captured the hearts and minds of Bellevue’s 
members, and inspired countless evangelicals who had never voted before to embrace 
the Republican party. As a result, ‘Carter took a horrendous beating in the South,’ with 
‘his share of the Southern Baptist vote dropp[ing] from 56 percent in 1976 to 34 percent 
in 1980’.438  
 
Bellevue’s greater engagement with politics continued, albeit sporadically, throughout 
the 1980s and beyond. In 1983 a notice appeared in Bellevue’s official church bulletin, the 
Bellevue Baptist Messenger, which advertised an event at the church which would discuss 
‘God’s solution to this moral pollution’. ‘Are you troubled by the moral degradation in 
our nation?’ the flyer asked. ‘Are you appalled by the moral perversion that is sweeping 
our city?’ ‘Are you concerned about the moral decay that is eroding our homes?’ it 
continued. The meeting was arranged to discuss Christian responses to these issues, and 
to have ‘informative seminars on abortion, pornography, rock music and humanism’. 
The ‘special guest speaker’ for the event was to be Ed McAteer who, in a similar vein to 
Rogers’ sermon three years earlier, would talk about the separation of church and state 
at the event.439 Although there is no further record of the event or McAteer’s speech, the 
content of the meeting indicates that Christian Right-style religious discourse did exist at 
the church during this important period. The attempts made by the church to channel 
conservative evangelical discourse in a more public setting continued into the decade, 
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with Rogers delivering a ‘keynote address’ at the annual Walk for Life anti-abortion 
campaign in 1989, which took place in Memphis. ‘A crowd of approximately 1,400 
persons, many from Bellevue, filled the auditorium of Central High School,’ and the 
event ‘concluded with a peaceful walk to the office building housing Planned 
Parenthood, where a brief ceremony was held’.440  
  Forty-three years after the magazine first ran a profile on the church, when it 
described Bellevue as one of the ‘great churches of America’, Christian Century returned 
to Bellevue in 1993 in an attempt to understand the ‘metamorphosis’ that it had 
undergone ‘over the past four decades’. 441  By the 1990s Bellevue’s most obvious 
transformation was, of course, its change of location from Midtown Memphis to Cordova 
(as discussed in detail in the next chapter). But the article also addressed the relationship 
between the different forms of conservatism that existed at the church, and the findings 
support this chapter’s contention that Bellevue’s congregational culture was more 
receptive to political conservativism in the 1980s and 1990s than it had been in previous 
decades. Historian of American Protestantism Randall Balmer, the article’s author, first 
noted the militaristic tone of the Sunday service, which included renditions of “Victory 
in Jesus” and “Mighty Warrior” by the church choir and orchestra. In the sermon Balmer 
attended Rogers once again bemoaned how American society and political life had lost 
touch with God: “Americans used to live by the word of God and run the government 
by the Constitution that came out of the word of God. Today we’re just making it we as 
we go along”.442 Balmer argued that the church’s conservatism sat ‘well with the people 
of Bellevue, despite the trappings of middle-class America [that were] evident 
everywhere’ in and around the new Cordova campus.443 He noticed that the “creek bank” 
theology that Bellevue had held on to despite its move to the suburbs had, under Rogers, 
‘manifest[ed] itself in adulation for the military and an old fashioned patriotic fervor’.444 
Ever since 1976, the US bicentennial and Rogers’ fifth year at Bellevue’s helm, the church 
had held an annual “Celebrate America” day, featuring music performances and military 
re-enactments. Balmer noted that during the event Bellevue’s worship centre ‘looked for 
all the world like the Republican National Convention’.445  
 Blended together with Bellevue’s strict, inerrantist theology and patriotic zeal, 
Balmer argued, was a political conservatism which, according to some of the people the 
journalist spoke to for his article, was informed by Bellevue’s version of religious 
conservatism. ‘When I asked Trent Hall [a Bellevue layman] how his theology affected 
his vote, he opined that “someone who pretends that his beliefs don’t affect how he votes 
has jello for brains”’. Others identified strongly with the need for school prayer and 
“family values”, and spoke out against abortion. As if to symbolise the increased 
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willingness to apply conservative evangelical principles to politics, while Balmer was 
visiting the church it had even installed a voter registration booth. As Balmer conversed 
with members next to the registration booth after the sermon, one woman told him that 
‘voters coming out of Bellevue Baptist were conservative and Republican—that is, “if 
they’re really in tune with what’s being taught here”’.446 These findings support this 
chapter’s contention that from the beginning of the 1980s a new conservative political 
culture was being created at Bellevue. As Balmer confirms, this political culture mirrored 
some of the key features of the GOP’s right wing during the 1980s—such as fervent 
patriotism and conservative “social values”—and in some instances even led to an active 
embracement or endorsement of the Party from within the church’s pews (although not 
from Rogers himself).  
Not everyone involved with the church approved of Bellevue’s recent slant 
towards politics. For some, Bellevue’s engagement with the political domain was an 
unwise distraction from the church’s core purpose of preaching the gospel. This was a 
view held by Bellevue layman Dan Greer, who argued that sometime in the mid-1990s, 
in the wake of the election of Bill Clinton and the apparent lull in influence of the 
conservative movement, Bellevue’s congregation came to the realisation that ‘the answer 
for the church was not in Washington but was in a renewed faith in God. This entire, 
painful process was a real blessing,’ he continued, ‘because the church was beginning to 
be involved in many social and moral issues that were draining resources away from the 
main mission of proclaiming the gospel of Jesus Christ to a lost and dying world’.447 
During the height of the congregation’s engagement with politics, Bellevue had become 
‘distracted by the seductive powers of the entire political process,’ Greer concluded.448 
This chapter’s assertion that there was a tangible shift in the congregational culture at 
Bellevue from the beginning of the 1980s is supported by the fact that not everyone 
approved of the church’s political engagement. The discontent felt by some towards the 
direction the church was taking suggests that the shift was palpable enough for at least a 
portion of the church to have taken notice. Although not every member of the 
congregation engaged with this new dimension of Bellevue’s environment, a new 
impulse behind applying the church’s long-held conservative evangelical principles to 
political situations nonetheless existed.  
 
Conclusion 
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The aim of this chapter has been to examine the transformation of Bellevue’s 
congregational culture that took place in the wake of the processes described in previous 
chapters. Although most of Chapter 4 has been devoted to arguing that a new 
conservative political culture was created at the church from the beginning of the 1980s, 
it began by acknowledging that there also existed a notable proportion of the 
congregation that was unengaged with the agendas of the Conservative Resurgence and 
the Christian Right. For Bellevue members like David Coombs, personal concerns such 
as spirituality, family and career comfortably eclipsed any interest they may have had 
with applying their faith to the public sphere. In other words, for these members the SBC 
headquarters in Nashville and the corridors of power in Washington were as spiritually 
irrelevant as they were geographically distant. Indeed, with a membership of over eleven 
thousand in 1980—a number which would continue to rise exponentially over the course 
of the decade—it is not surprising that there were different degrees to which Bellevue’s 
members engaged with denominational and political issues. This chapter has also 
warned against the notion that Bellevue suddenly became more conservative in in the 
early 1980s—at least in terms of theology. The cornerstone of Bellevue’s belief system has 
always been its staunchly conservative, inerrantist theology. The essence of this theology 
can be traced as far back as the church’s early twentieth century establishment, and to all 
intents and purposes it did not change from one pastor to the next.  
Rather, this chapter has suggested that what was taking place from the early 1980s 
onwards was a change in the way Bellevue’s conservatism was channelled. This entailed 
applying, in novel ways, its long-held conservative evangelical principles to political 
situations, and was part of the creation of a new political culture at the church which 
mirrored several key features of Republican Party and Christian Right conservatism. 
Although Rogers refrained from ever making partisan political endorsements from the 
pulpit, he did sometimes display a new keenness for his congregation to make informed 
judgements about who to vote for based on conservative evangelical principles. 
Meanwhile, Rogers also allowed his church to become, albeit sporadically, a venue for 
discussing SBC conservative and Christian Right agendas. The political cultural 
framework discussed in this chapter has provided insights into the forms the so-called 
“Christian Right” took at a non-elite level. The findings also help explain how the 
movement’s long-standing electoral and political allegiances with the Republican Party 
were orchestrated within conservative evangelical churches themselves.  
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Chapter 5: “Claiming our Canaan”: Bellevue’s Relocation to Cordova 
 
Bellevue Baptist Church is perhaps the best-known example of a Southern Baptist church 
which relocated from an ethnically diverse inner-city neighbourhood to a white suburb. But 
aside from rudimentary accounts of evangelical suburbanisation, which often take the concept 
of “white flight” for granted, little serious work has been done to explain Bellevue’s relocation 
or the countless other cases of white Protestant urban withdrawal.449 This chapter attempts to 
answer the question of why Bellevue eventually decided to relocate from Midtown Memphis 
to a site in Cordova, thirteen miles east of the old facility. It tells the story of the seven-year 
process of deliberation, construction and preparation that took place between 1982 and 1989, 
and which culminated in the withdrawal of the church from the neighbourhood it had been 
based in for eighty-six years. As the following paragraphs will demonstrate, Bellevue’s 
relocation was the result of a complex combination of strategic considerations, racial and 
demographic issues, congregational demand, and religious agendas. It is argued that 
Bellevue’s relocation was ultimately facilitated by three main, interrelated factors: its spiritual 
priority of soul saving over social ministries (a product of its inerrantist theology), the 
church’s lack of connections with its surrounding community, and its low level of racial 
integration (both of which were symptoms of Bellevue’s indifference towards “reaching out” 
towards the changing Midtown community). These latter two points are also related to the 
creation of Bellevue’s new form of political culture, as described in the last chapter. That is, 
Bellevue’s political culture during the 1980s was incompatible with a progressive approach 
towards race and segregation because its preoccupation with certain issues such as abortion 
deflected attention away from race, and also because the same political culture helped 
marginalise African Americans through the church’s close associations with the the 
Republican Party, the Conservative Resurgence and the “New Right”.  
 Besides offering insights into the causes of evangelical white flight, a secondary aim 
of this chapter is to begin to investigate the religious meanings and spiritual significance of 
evangelical white flight. This will be achieved by examining the ways in which Bellevue 
constructed religious discourses in response to its experiences of urban withdrawal. An 
analysis of the various documents, bulletins, letters, pastoral interviews, and other church 
documents that were published around the time of Bellevue’s relocation reveals how the 
church’s suburbanisation was imbued with different forms of spiritual meaning. This has 
allowed for a new understanding of the religious significance of the otherwise familiar 
concept of “white flight”. Bellevue’s congregation and leadership could never truly avoid the 
potential moral ramifications of “withdrawing” from, “departing” or “abandoning” a 
struggling inner-city neighbourhood (as the frequent local newspaper coverage of the move 
made sure of). But the clear approval of the relocation by the majority of the church’s 
members—combined with the numerous logistical and religious benefits of the move—
enabled the church to create a celebratory atmosphere around the relocation. Within 
Bellevue’s pews, the relocation was labelled a “Victory in Jesus”, and the new site in Cordova 
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was considered to be Bellevue’s very own “Promised Land”.  Overall, this chapter suggests 
that the causes and experiences of Bellevue’s relocation were intimately linked with—and 
indeed a direct legacy of—the type of relationship that the church had created with urban 
change and its surrounding community over the previous three decades.  
 
Ten Year Plan 
 
In September 1982, on the tenth anniversary of Adrian Rogers’ tenure at Bellevue, an 
important announcement was made to the congregation. After around three years of 
discussions with Bellevue’s Long Range Planning Committee, Rogers was finally ready to 
publically introduce the “Ten Year Plan”, an ambitious initiative which aimed to complete the 
church’s transformation from the struggling inner-city congregation that pastor Pollard had 
left behind to a thriving, modern megachurch. Over the next decade, the announcement 
declared, Bellevue sought to baptise ten thousand people, spend $20 million dollars on 
missions, expand its ministries and, in order to accommodate such a plan, spend a further $30 
million on a building program which included a proposed new worship centre with a capacity 
of between six and ten thousand people. The scale of Bellevue’s ambitions spoke volumes 
about how far the church had come in the space of just ten years. In 1972, Bellevue appeared 
to be in a terminal decline: during Sunday services the church’s sanctuary was often half-
empty, and its membership was made up disproportionally of elderly people from the Pastor 
Lee era. But, as discussed in Chapter 2, the arrival of Rogers had transformed Bellevue’s 
fortunes. In his first ten years at Bellevue he had attracted almost four thousand new members, 
doubled the average Sunday school attendance, and quadrupled the total amount of 
charitable donations received. As incredible as it would have seemed a decade prior to the 
announcement of the Ten Year Plan, by the 1980s Bellevue was in desperate need of more 
space to accommodate the growth that the church had achieved since Rogers had become 
pastor. One indication of Bellevue’s need for more space was the fact that Rogers was having 
to deliver three separate Sunday sermons at the church each week. It was clear, therefore, that 
Bellevue would need more than simply an expansion of its current facilities; instead, it would 
need a sanctuary which was capable of housing several thousand more than the current three 
thousand-seat venue. Along with the issue of how Bellevue was going to fund the program, 
the main question was therefore where Bellevue was planning on building the new facility. 
 As a white congregation in an increasingly African American neighbourhood, the 
possibility of relocating to the suburbs must have been taken seriously by Bellevue’s Long 
Range Planning Committee from the very beginning of the Ten Year Plan. There were several 
obvious advantages to moving away from the inner-city. Since many of Bellevue’s members 
had already moved away from Midtown as part of the Memphis’s post-busing wave of white 
flight, the suburbs would have been a far more demographically “appropriate” site than its 
current location. Moreover, land was both cheaper and more plentiful in the suburbs than it 
was in the crowded inner-city. Despite these advantages, however, during the early stages of 
the Ten Year Plan Bellevue appeared to be surprisingly resolute about committing its long-
term future to Midtown. A few days after Rogers officially unveiled the Ten Year Plan, the 
church’s official bulletin, the Bellevue Baptist Messenger, hinted that the site for the new 
sanctuary was closer to home than many would have expected: ‘At this time, we anticipate 
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that upon this land will have to be built a new worship center with a seating capacity of between 
6,000 and 10,000’.450 But the most unequivocal declaration of Bellevue’s commitment to stay 
in Midtown came from Dr Rogers himself. Church leaders had flirted with the idea of 
relocating, Rogers admitted in an interview with a local Memphis newspaper in September 
1982, “But we have decided, emphatically decided, that God has planted us right here in the 
heart of Memphis, Tennessee”.451 Nonetheless, despite the ardent tone of Rogers’ pledge to 
stay in Midtown, less than a year later the church would vote overwhelmingly in favour of 
moving to the suburbs. What were the causes of Bellevue’s decision to relocate? By examining 
the various structural, social and religious forces involved, this chapter hopes to answer the 
question of why Bellevue ultimately opted to withdraw from the inner-city and move to the 
suburbs of Cordova.  
 The extent of Bellevue’s commitment to Midtown during the early days of the Ten 
Year Plan went much further than Rogers’ rhetoric. In fact, in the spring of 1983 Bellevue’s 
Long Range Planning Committee went as far as commissioning a Dallas-based architecture 
firm to carry out a “master plan” for Bellevue’s expansion in the Midtown area. The firm 
published a report to outline its recommendations which contained five key “assumptions” 
about the church’s expansion—one of which was that ‘Bellevue Baptist Church will remain at 
its present location in midtown Memphis’.452 The firm suggested Bellevue acquire more land 
on the ‘existing site’ so that the campus would eventually encompass a whole “superblock” 
of church facilities. As long as enough land could be attained, the report concluded, there 
would be enough space for the church to build a new worship centre and parking facilities, 
amongst other things. Bellevue was already in the advanced stages of this plan by the time 
the decision was made, in November 1984, to relocate. David Coombs, who was on the 
building committee for the Midtown expansion, recalls how “We had no intention of moving 
from where we were. So we were acquiring land to build a new auditorium”.453 At one stage 
the church had acquired around fifty parcels of land in the area surrounding the church ‘on 
which’, as one local newspaper saw it, the church ‘plan[ned] to build the cornerstone for the 
congregation’s future’. 454  The acquisitions included ‘two relatively modern occupied 
apartment buildings’, the attainment of which drew criticism from locals for ‘spreading an 
“asphalt jungle” in the neighbourhood and displacing residents’. But irrespective of the social 
effects that Bellevue’s purchases had on the neighbourhood, its land parcels project was a 
further indication of the willingness of the church to stay on the existing site rather than 
relocate.  
 It is not immediately clear why, at the outset of the Ten Year Plan, Bellevue’s leaders 
were so convinced by the idea of staying in Midtown. Countless other large white evangelical 
congregations in the South and beyond had, by the 1980s, long since abandoned their inner-
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city neighbourhoods. The two existing academic studies of evangelical white flight—both of 
which examine congregations in Rust Belt cities, rather than the South—featured case studies 
which had withdrawn from the inner-city no later than the end of the 1970s, which was at 
least ten years prior to Bellevue’s own relocation. But these examples are merely the tip of the 
iceberg; thousands of other white congregations across the nation participated in the 
phenomenon of white flight at some point between 1950 and 1980.455 And as Mark T. Mulder 
discusses in his study of evangelical congregations in Chicago, Protestant churches are often 
particularly susceptible to suburbanisation because they tend to ascribe to ‘their surroundings 
less religious or spiritual significance’ than, for example, Catholic churches.456 In sum, it is in 
many ways surprising that Bellevue did not choose to relocate several years earlier, 
particularly given the extremity of white flight in Memphis during the 1970s. As well as 
demographic considerations, Bellevue’s decline during Dr Pollard’s pastorate could, for 
example, also have been taken as an indication that the church would stand a better chance of 
success if it relocated to a majority-white neighbourhood.  
On the surface it therefore seems plausible to interpret Bellevue’s commitment to 
Midtown as a noble and commendable form of resistance to the phenomenon of post-civil 
rights white flight, which, as numerous scholars have demonstrated, has undoubtedly 
contributed towards the decline of inner-city neighbourhoods all over the United States.457 
Mulder’s study of evangelical white flight demonstrates that congregations which withdraw 
from inner city neighbourhoods relatively late are often those which have a greater sensitivity 
to the moral implications of urban withdrawal, stronger attachments to their surrounding 
communities, and are less preoccupied with preserving their ethnic, religious or racial 
identities. One Chicago-based Reformed Church congregation from Mulder’s study saw 
“changing neighbourhoods” as a “great opportunity to reach out in many ways”. Rather than 
“clos[ing] its doors because of the changing complexion of the community,” the church sought 
to “minister for the many nationalities and races moving into the area” and to “integrate them 
into the life of the church”.458 Churches like these resist relocation for longer because staying 
in a neighbourhood which has been subjected to a high degree of demographic flux and urban 
decay is seen as an ethical obligation as well as an opportunity to minister for people from 
less advantaged racial or ethnic groups. In other words, the moral necessity of being 
committed to a particular neighbourhood is seen as outweighing the economic or social 
benefits of suburbanisation. In turn, ‘rather than simply following familiar resources to the 
suburbs, the church[es] would survive with a different identity that would attract the newly 
arrived African Americans and any remaining white holdovers’. 459  Although many such 
congregations eventually succumbed to demographic change, their progressive principles 
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and willingness to accommodate neighbourhood change help explain why they relocated on 
average far later than many other inner-city white churches. 
To what extent did the ethics of urban withdrawal or local community attachments 
play a part in Bellevue’s initial commitment to stay in Midtown? Despite Rogers’ rhetoric of 
“God planting us right here in the heart of Memphis,” the main priority of the Ten Year Plan 
was not to minister for Midtown per se. Rather, in keeping with its traditional emphasis on 
evangelism, it was to expand the church’s facilities in order to accommodate its aim of 
baptising ten thousand people over the next decade. During the early stages of the Ten Year 
Plan, Rogers did hint that he had a ‘desire to become more active in social ministry’. 460 
However, he also ‘maintain[ed] his strong belief that evangelism comes first’. 461  Thus, 
although Bellevue was prepared to expand its social ministry and stay in the inner-city, it was 
only willing to do so on the condition that the Midtown expansion would enable the church 
to fulfil the numerical targets set by the Ten Year Plan. Bellevue’s leaders were prepared to 
seek other options if they thought the Midtown expansion would be unable to meet these 
targets. Similarly, there is little evidence to suggest that Bellevue’s initial commitment to 
Midtown had much to do with community attachments. While Bellevue was in Midtown, the 
church was focussed predominantly on evangelism and ministering for its own members 
rather than for the broader community. Unlike the aforementioned Reformed Church 
congregations in Chicago, community outreach did not have a major role to play in the 
activities of the church.462 When asked about the kinds of attachments Bellevue may have had 
which could have could have delayed the relocation, Bellevue layman David Coombs 
mentioned the high number of elderly members who still lived Midtown, but he had little to 
say about any other connections the church may have had with the broader community.463 
This emphasis on ministering solely for the church’s current members severely limited the 
attachments Bellevue had established with its surrounding community, and made the 
prospect of relocation more tenable in the eyes of the church’s members. 
Bellevue’s theology and its approach towards racial integration support the notion 
that ethical considerations or community attachments had little to do with its willingness to 
stay in Midtown. Bellevue belongs to a theological tradition which tends to place a strong 
emphasis on individual salvation and eschew the more liberal Social Gospel framework. One 
symptom of Bellevue’s individualistic theological outlook was a lack of a willingness to 
minister for the broader community as well as for its own members. Bellevue’s lack of racial 
integration further weakened the ties it had with Midtown. As Chapters 1 and 2 
demonstrated, during desegregation Bellevue made no attempt to redress its racial imbalance 
by reaching out to the African American community. As Midtown evolved from being a 
majority-white to a majority-black neighbourhood, an increasing number of the church’s 
members would therefore begin to reside in other locations. One implication of this was that 
Bellevue’s ties with its community would further weaken, since by the 1980s it was mainly 
ministering to people in other neighbourhoods. As the church’s centenary publication put it, 
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‘many of Bellevue’s members had moved to East Memphis or to the suburbs in the 1960s and 
1970s, and [by the 1980s] Bellevue was no longer a true “neighbourhood church”’.464 Overall, 
Bellevue’s willingness to stay in Midtown at the early stages of the Ten Year Plan was 
probably more to do with the progress of its land parcel project and the success the church 
had had ever since Rogers became pastor than it did to do with neighbourhood attachments.   
 Whatever Bellevue’s motives behind staying in Midtown, its plans were eventually 
scuppered by the barriers in the way of attaining all of the land that it required. Since the 
necessary land was in a heavily developed area, the church was forced to negotiate 
individually with landowners who had property on the proposed sites. Whereas many 
proprietors were willing to offer Bellevue their land for a fair price, others were less eager to 
give up their assets for anything less than a huge premium. Building committee member 
David Coombs blamed one particularly manipulative property speculator for ruining the 
church’s plans to stay in Midtown: “We were trying to buy a lot of the property around us. 
An individual anticipated and saw that that might be going on. So he went and bought an 
apartment complex which was the one that we needed. And he went and paid about $250,000 
for it. And so several months later, when we came to him to buy it he wanted $900,000 for it. 
He said, ‘I know you need it, and I’m not selling it for anything less than that’. So it was a 
pretty expensive as a property, and for buying nothing—we were just going to tear it 
down!”465  The required land was an essential part of Bellevue’s Midtown plans, but the 
church’s leaders were unwilling to meet the derisory valuation of the property (Rogers 
himself referred to the pricing as “highly exorbitant”).466 The speculator’s demands were the 
final nail in the coffin for Bellevue’s hopes of staying in Midtown.  
As the rest of this chapter will show, there were numerous demographic and religious 
forces which contributed towards Bellevue’s decision to relocate to an entirely different 
location in the suburbs, as opposed to one that was still within the inner-city. As Andrew 
Trundle argues, Bellevue ‘certainly had the means, and Dr Rogers certainly had the appeal, to 
successfully relocate within the city’.467 Where the church decided to relocate was therefore far 
more significant than the fact that it needed to move in the first place. Nonetheless, it was the 
property speculator episode that first triggered a re-evaluation of the Ten Year Plan, and 
represents the first step in Bellevue’s long process of relocation. As soon as it became clear 
that the Midtown initiative would have to be shelved, Bellevue’s building committee began 
to investigate other possibilities. “We started making trips around the country looking at 
worship centres the size that we wanted that we could build,” Coombs remembers. “And 
every time we went the church that we looked at had relocated from the original location. 
And so we started seeing this pattern. When this guy wouldn’t sell the building…[Rogers] 
asked us [the building committee], ‘What do you think about relocating?’ And we said, ‘it 
sure would be a lot easier to raise money to build something closer to where everyone 
lives’”.468 Another report was hastily commissioned by the church, this time to investigate the 
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feasibility of moving to a neighbourhood called Germantown, a rapidly growing district on 
the eastern fringes of the city. The report examined how the area surrounding the proposed 
site had changed in the ten years between 1970 and 1980, during the height of white flight in 
Memphis. Its findings demonstrated conclusively that the suburbs had become far more 
demographically, racially and socially similar to Bellevue’s congregation than Midtown 
currently was. The study noted a dramatic increase in the population of Germantown, made 
up mostly of whites who had relocated in the wake of busing: the proportion of whites living 
in the area had risen from 67 % in 1970 to 90 % in 1980.469 Meanwhile, young, well-educated 
adults had become one of the major demographic categories of the area, with a seventeen 
percent increase in residents between the ages eighteen and thirty-four and an eighteen 
percent increase in residents with four or more years of college education. The extremely high 
proportion of whites living in Germantown (compared to white proportion of around 50 % of 
the total population of Memphis) was an obvious indicator of its demographic “suitability” 
for Bellevue’s new sanctuary. Alongside this racial dimension, the influx of younger, more 
educated residents into Germantown also reflected changes that had been taking place within 
the church ever since the beginning of the Rogers pastorate. 
The Germantown study’s findings soon convinced Rogers and Long Range Planning 
Committee that a relocation offered the best likelihood of achieving the aims of the Ten Year 
Plan. Soon after the report was completed, the building committee found a vast, three 
hundred-acre site close to Germantown, thirteen miles east of Midtown and just outside of 
the Memphis city limits. The advantages of moving to this site were numerous. The available 
lot was cheap (at around a million dollars less than the total amount of land required in 
Midtown) and easy to acquire: “It just fell into our lap,” as Coombs put it.470 As well as being 
cheap, easy to attain and demographically appropriate, the site was also far more easily 
accessible for the majority of Bellevue members. The church claimed that the proposed new 
location would be closer than the Midtown sanctuary for up seventy percent of the 
congregation, meaning around sixty percent of the church’s members would be within a 
fifteen-minute drive from the new campus.471 Additionally, the new site was just yards away 
from the second longest interstate highway in the country, I40, which snaked around the 
north-eastern perimeter of the city before arriving at the Hernando de Soto Bridge near 
Downtown, while continuing its long journey towards California.472 The site’s proximity to 
I40 would make it easier for people commuting from nearby suburbs or counties to access the 
church; it also symbolised Bellevue’s transformation from a “neighbourhood church” in the 
heart of the inner-city to a fully-fledged “regional church” which was able to attract 
worshippers from a broad catchment area. Lastly, the sheer size of the proposed land tract 
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would mean it would comfortably accommodate ‘all future plans for [the] expansion of 
church facilities and that space would never be an obstacle to growth again’.473  
While the idea was still at the consultation stage, Bellevue acquired an option on the 
proposed site, which reserved the land for if the church officially approved of the relocation. 
By this stage Rogers “already had a group of people on board…He waited until all of his 
advisors were on board behind the scenes before he ever presented anything publically”.474 
Before the proposal to relocate was officially aired to the congregation, Rogers met with 
church’s deacons and building committee, and “After praying about it everybody 
concurred”.475 All that was left to do was for Rogers to take the recommendation to the church. 
The question over whether to stay in Midtown or relocate would be put to a vote amongst 
Bellevue’s members. ‘About 4,000 people packed into the sanctuary’ on Sunday, October 30, 
1983 ‘to hear Pastor Rogers explain the details’.476 As a further demonstration of the lack of 
community attachments Bellevue’s members appeared to have to Midtown during the 1980s, 
the proposal to relocate was approved by a landslide. Of a total of around two thousand 
voters, less than ten voted against the relocation plans. Within a few short months of the 
abandonment of the Midtown plans, Bellevue had found a promising new site for the 
expansion and had won a resounding congregational mandate to begin the relocation. Now 
the church was ready to make its first steps towards “claiming its Canaan”. 
 
“Claiming our Canaan” 
 
Once the relocation had been approved, the development of the programme progressed 
quickly. Between December 1983 and January 1984 Bellevue had managed to raise $3.1 million 
through donations during special fundraising services. In January 1985, after a morning 
service when members ‘viewed a visual presentation’ of the designs, the congregation 
‘unanimously approved’ the specific ‘conceptual plans’ for the new facility in Cordova.477 But 
despite these encouraging developments, Bellevue was still in desperate need of extra money 
to fund the programme. There was still the money to come from the sale of the old facility, 
but the church had yet to find a buyer for the property and it was difficult to gauge how much 
it could be sold for. In order to pay for the enormous, three-hundred-acre new campus—
complete with a 7,000 seat sanctuary and 3,000 space car park—Bellevue estimated that it 
would need to raise up to $18 million (by the end of the building programme the total cost of 
the relocation would add up to $34 million, although the eventual sale of the old campus 
contributed towards these costs). Being wary of the financial challenges that lay ahead of the 
church, Rogers appealed to his congregation in the form of an open letter to all Bellevue 
members in February 1984: ‘This campaign is to help us raise construction money so we may 
build without placing our church into financial bondage. Our desire and plan is to ask you 
and every other family unit of our church to prayerfully consider making an over and above 
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sacrificial, financial commitment,’ Rogers pleaded.478 As well as introducing the fundraising 
initiative, Rogers’ letter was also one of the first occasions where the religious motifs of 
Bellevue’s relocation were publically presented. ‘I firmly believe that God is leading us in our 
move to Canaan…I am calling the family units of our church to fervent prayer for the “Victory 
in Jesus” campaign’.479 “Claiming our Canaan” and “Victory in Jesus” would become central 
themes of Bellevue’s fundraising initiative and the run-up to its relocation. The slogans would 
be used frequently in church literature, campaigns, and sermons when referring to the move 
to Cordova. They provided the church with a spiritual framework for the relocation which, in 
the context of this chapter, sheds light on the nature and meanings of post-war evangelical 
white flight. 
The complex ways in which churches in the US applied spiritual meanings and 
discourses to their experiences of white flight illustrates how religious white flight differed—
in often significant ways—to secular instances of the phenomenon. Nonetheless, the question 
of how Protestantism has influenced the character and meanings of white flight has received 
surprisingly little attention within the fields of post-war urban and evangelical history. As 
suggested by Darren Dochuk, ‘such a gap in historical dialogue is curious considering the 
degree to which Protestant hegemony continued to shape the urban experience in the postwar 
period’.480 Even Mark T. Mulder’s monograph about evangelical white flight in the South Side 
of Chicago places a far greater emphasis on causes than it does on the meanings and spiritual 
implications of white withdrawal. 481  To date, one of the few studies of ‘how urban 
change…acquired religious significance’ in the Protestant context is Dochuk’s analysis of an 
evangelical church in Detroit.482 As well as discussing the causes of Highland Park Baptist 
Church’s relocation to the Detroit suburbs, Dochuk sought to understand how ‘patterns of 
ritual, language and theology’ were constructed in response to ‘urban change’. 483  As the 
following paragraphs will show, Bellevue’s “Victory in Jesus” and “Claiming our Canaan” 
themes ascribed religious meanings to the relocation and provided distinctly evangelical 
responses to the ethics of urban withdrawal. The former term was the name given to 
Bellevue’s fundraising initiative; it was part of the triumphalist language that permeated 
Bellevue’s justification for the relocation, and was symptomatic of the church’s devotion to 
the theological principle of individual soul saving. Meanwhile, the notion of “Claiming our 
Canaan” imbued the physical site of the new campus with spiritual significance, which in turn 
provided an epic narrative and a further rationale for the relocation.  
 There are many overlaps between the cultural, historical and theological identities of 
Bellevue and those of Dochuk’s case study, Highland Park Baptist Church (HPBC) in Detroit. 
Both churches began as inner-city congregations residing in neighbourhoods which, during 
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the first half of the twentieth century, were overwhelmingly white and reasonably 
prosperous. (This was particularly the case of Highland Park, which during its heyday in the 
1910s and 1920s ‘established itself as one of the most desirable places to live in the whole 
metropolitan Detroit area’).484 Both neighbourhoods were then subjected to a dramatic wave 
of post-war demographic change which eventually transformed Midtown Memphis and 
Highland Park into majority-black communities and, thanks to dwindling economic 
resources, facilitated sharp rises in poverty, unemployment and crime. For reasons that were 
related to this demographic change and economic decline, both Bellevue and HPBC 
eventually withdrew from their original locations to minister in majority-white suburban 
neighbourhoods (although HPBC did so far sooner than Bellevue—1966 compared with 1989). 
As a symptom of the shifting socioeconomic dynamics of their respective cities, the class 
compositions of Bellevue and HPBC’s congregations evolved over time, but both hovered 
around the middle class stratum for much if not all of the second half of the twentieth century. 
Lastly, the two congregations shared a fundamentalist Baptist theology which played a crucial 
role in determining their responses to urban change and relocation. 
Despite these numerous similarities, however, there was a big difference between the 
connections Bellevue and HPBC had with their respective communities. This in turn created 
radically different congregational reactions to the prospect of urban withdrawal, which was 
evident in how each church imbued its relocation with religious significance and how they 
interpreted urban withdrawal. Although HPBC shared with Bellevue a ‘strict adherence to an 
inerrant view of scripture’ and a strong emphasis on evangelism, it also—somewhat 
unusually for a white fundamentalist church—‘promoted an irenic form of religiosity that 
easily corresponded with the needs, sensibilities, and opportunities afforded by the 
community’.485 HPBC’s congregational culture ‘placed more emphasis on Keswick holiness 
and revivalist teachings which called for a broader engagement with community than on the 
more dogmatic and potentially (though not necessarily) separatist emphasis of 
premillennialism’. 486  In contrast to Bellevue, which, as already mentioned, had a strong 
emphasis on ministering for its own members while it was in Midtown, HPBC’s ‘ongoing 
commitment to mass revivalism in the community was as much about maintaining a 
collective, public presence in Highland Park as it was about saving individual souls’. 487 
Instances of HPBC’s intimate engagement with its surrounding community included a 
ministry which taught newly-arrived immigrants how to be “American,” hospital visits, and 
‘neighbourhood and child evangelism’.488 Though HPBC often displayed prejudice in terms 
of its treatment of African Americans—‘blacks shaped HPBC culture only insofar as they were 
considered degenerate and in desperate need of the gospel’—there was a genuine willingness, 
during the early stages of Highland Park’s demographic transformation, to minister for 
newcomers of all racial and ethnic backgrounds. In other words, sincere attempts were made 
to adapt to neighbourhood changes and to ‘improve the church’s standing in the 
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community’.489 This was most evident in the foundation of its Promotional Committee in 1953, 
which was tasked with keeping ‘the city “aware of the program and activities” of HPBC’ 
through bulletins and newspaper announcements.490 By 1960, the funding allocated to its 
Promotional Committee even outweighed the amount assigned to the Evangelization 
Committee. 
 Despite these attempts to minister for its rapidly transforming neighbourhood, HPBC 
ultimately failed to offer ‘any kind of response to the changing racial dynamics of Highland 
Park,’ and ‘by the late 1950s, this paralysis left [the church] with only one option: relocation’.491 
But HPBC’s relocation would not have been possible without a ‘deep ideological 
transformation’ which shifted the church’s emphasis from a strong community conscience 
and towards the notion that ‘Detroit and Highland Park were already lost causes’.492 At a 
crucial time during the late 1950s, when the socioeconomic changes in Highland Park were 
starting to overwhelm the church, HPBC appointed Lehman Strauss as senior pastor. Strauss 
instilled in his congregation an ‘apocalyptic fear’ of Highland Park’s apparent degeneration, 
and eventually the church appeared ready to ‘relinquish’ what it saw as its ‘sacred position 
and mandate in Highland Park’.493 But before, during and after the process, HPBC’s relocation 
was haunted by the notion that in withdrawing from the inner-city the church had spiritually 
abandoned Highland Park. There was a lingering guilt about leaving a neighbourhood in 
desperate need of social ministry for the comfortable but ‘potentially numbing psychological, 
moral and spiritual effects of life in the suburbs’.494 Resistance to the relocation existed at every 
level of the church hierarchy, and persisted long after it had taken place. Many individual 
members of the congregation disapproved of the relocation, arguing community ministries 
should take priority over all other considerations. Strauss’s successor, Robert McMillan, even 
resigned over the issue of the relocation, but not before bemoaning HPBC ‘for abandoning its 
commitment to community’ in one of the church’s weekly bulletins.495 Such was the intensity 
of the moral furore surrounding the relocation that its tremors could still be felt a whole 
generation later. During a missions conference held at the church in 1993, HPBC’s incumbent 
pastor Leonard Crowley suggested that ‘by hiding for so long from the communities around 
them…churches like HPBC had simply “lost them”’.496  
The ethics of urban withdrawal were scrutinised heavily in the local press during the 
run-up to Bellevue’s relocation. It seemed as though Bellevue’s status as the largest white 
church in the region had magnified the spiritual and moral ramifications of the move. The 
two issues which dominated media coverage of the event were the moral problem of urban 
withdrawal and—unsurprisingly given the local context—race. Shortly after the relocation 
was decided upon, one newspaper asked Dr Mark Matheny for his opinion on the move. 
Matheny was senior pastor at Madison Heights United Methodist Church, just a few blocks 
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from Bellevue. He was also president of the Memphis Ministers Association, one of the more 
liberal religious groups in the city. His views on Bellevue’s relocation reflected the progressive 
credentials of the organisation he was in charge of. ‘Bellevue’s move is going to force churches 
that remain in the shadow of Memphis’s poverty to reassess how they stand on social 
ministry,’ he suggested.497 “The major issue is, does the church exist primarily for itself and 
its members or those of its persuasion, or for the whole community?”498 In an interview for 
the same article, Rogers responded by arguing, “We’re not trying to run away from anybody”. 
He suggested the move to Cordova would motivate the church to increase its social ministry. 
“I’ve had in my heart an increasing desire to minister in this way,” he claimed. “I’m hoping 
as we move and get settled in we will have a base for local mission and social work, and 
worldwide mission and social work”.499 Rogers cited his interest in partnering his church with 
a local Free the Children charity initiative as one example of how Bellevue sought to increase 
its social ministry in the future. Moreover, Rogers argued, the church already “spend[s] an 
incredible amount of money on helping people in need, in food, in clothing, in rent, in 
medicine…” Here Rogers was referring to an annual $1.5 million budget ‘for causes outside 
the church and community—“for education, housing, [and] mission work”’.500 But Rogers did 
deem it necessary to issue a word of caution to those tempted to place too high an emphasis 
on social ministry: “I think those of us who are firm believers in the faith…we almost 
sometimes get negative to social work because some who are in it use it as a substitute for the 
gospel of Christ, and I think that’s tragic”. Overall, Rogers believed it was not about “either/or, 
it’s both”. Nonetheless, ‘while expressing a desire to become more active in social ministry… 
[Rogers] maintain[ed] his strong belief that evangelism comes first’.501 
Despite Rogers insistence that social ministry played a part in the past, present and 
future of Bellevue’s activities, it is evident that these ministries were not of the kind which 
forged strong connections with the surrounding community. Like most Protestant churches, 
irrespective of theological or denominational orientation, social ministry did have a role to 
play at the church. But perhaps the more pertinent question is not whether Bellevue 
participated in social ministry per se, but what its priorities were. As Rogers would doubtless 
concede, Bellevue had always emphasised personal salvation over social ministry, even if 
social ministry did over time play a role at the church. Unlike HPBC, which during the 1950s 
was actually more concerned with social ministry than it was with any other initiative, there 
was never any doubt about what would take precedence at Bellevue. These contrasting 
approaches towards social ministry are illustrative of the degrees of strength of Bellevue and 
HPBC’s connections with their surrounding neighbourhoods. As demonstrated earlier, the 
principle purpose of Bellevue’s Ten Year Plan was to enlarge the church so that its facilities 
could accommodate an extra ten thousand members. This was the non-negotiable criterion 
which Bellevue’s leaders were not willing to compromise on, and were prepared to abandon 
the Midtown campus for the sake of. Unlike at HPBC, where resistance permeated every layer 
of the church hierarchy, there is no evidence to suggest that there was anything other than 
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extremely minor opposition to the relocation at Bellevue. Historically, Bellevue laypeople had 
shown themselves to be more than capable of organised dissent, as the church split of 1960 
had shown. But if the vote cast in 1983 is any indicator of members’ attitudes towards the 
relocation, then Bellevue as a whole was overwhelmingly in favour of the move. This suggests 
that sustaining community connections was a relatively low priority in comparison to the 
agenda of individual soul saving and the other benefits of moving to the suburbs. Bellevue 
may have committed to increasing its social ministry, but it is clear that the locale of Midtown 
was not in itself an essential component of these plans.   
Bellevue’s strong emphasis on individual soul saving meant there was not necessarily 
a contradiction between its ethical framework as a church and its decision to withdraw from 
an economically impoverished neighbourhood. For HPBC in Detroit, serving the specific 
locality of Highland Park was clearly an essential component of its ministerial identity; hence, 
each stage of the church’s relocation was plagued by a sense of moral crisis. Meanwhile, the 
example of Madison Heights United Methodist Church in Memphis is indicative of how 
liberal congregations which prioritised social ministry displayed a greater sensitivity to the 
ethics of urban withdrawal, which in turn resulted in a stronger commitment towards their 
original neighbourhoods. It is no coincidence that Matheny’s predominantly-white church 
stayed in its Midtown location a few blocks from Bellevue Avenue until 1994 when, as a result 
of its failure to adapt to demographic change, the church was forced to shut down.502 Madison 
Heights’ fate was part of a nationwide pattern of liberal Protestant churches displaying 
greater effort to adapt to neighbourhood change than their more evangelist-oriented 
coreligionists. 503  It was the near-impossibility of reconciling the social gospel ethical 
framework with the moral implications of urban withdrawal which kept so many white, 
liberal Protestant congregations in inner-city neighbourhoods for so long. Meanwhile, 
although Bellevue was relatively late to relocate, the reason for its deferment was not because 
of ethical considerations; rather, it was because Bellevue’s exceptional megachurch status had 
enabled it to continue to grow despite the changing racial and socioeconomic circumstances 
of the neighbourhood that surrounded it. Once it became clear that Bellevue could tenably 
achieve better growth elsewhere, its ethical and theological worldview easily accommodated 
such a decision. As argued by Dochuck, ‘Protestants, like their Catholic and Jewish 
counterparts, understood and responded to the urban crisis in ways that were consistent with 
the spiritual outlook of their religious institutions’.504  
For Bellevue, then, the moral shortcomings of abandoning Midtown were easily 
outweighed by the moral benefits of converting thousands of more souls by moving to a larger 
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campus outside of Midtown. As Rogers argued in a press release for the relocation, ‘we must 
recognize that in order to maintain a long-term ministry, we must have buildings to operate 
out of. The building is a tool to help us reach people and teach them the Word of God…we 
must never take our eyes off the preaching of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. It is for this reason 
that we exist’.505 This assumption, combined with a theological worldview which stressed 
individualism and a massive mandate for relocation, helped create a religious environment 
for relocation which was radically different to HPBC’s atmosphere of ambivalence. The tone 
of Bellevue’s relocation was celebratory and even triumphalist throughout the process of the 
relocation. The prospect of converting ten thousand new souls was heralded as a “Victory in 
Jesus” (as was the successful fundraising ministry with the same name, which raised over $53 
million from church members between 1983 and 2001); meanwhile, referring to the ancient 
holy country roughly encompassing present-day Syria, Jordan and Israel, the new site in 
Cordova was, during the build-up to the move, presented to the congregation as Bellevue’s 
very own Promised Land. 
This kind of language permeated the congregational culture of the church throughout 
the build-up to the relocation. On March 24, 1985, the church arranged a banquet—‘the largest 
congregational dinner in the history of the church’—as the ‘climax of the’ “Victory in Jesus”’ 
fundraising campaign.506 The dinner provided members with the opportunity to make further 
financial commitments to the programme. Two years later the congregation’s anticipation was 
reaching fever pitch, as building on the Cordova site was finally ready to commence. ‘Bellevue 
Baptist Church will cross its Jordan and take its first step into Canaan during a dramatic and 
history-making ground-breaking,’ declared the church bulletin on July 19, 1987.507 Echoing 
what his predecessor pastor Lee had done during the ground-breaking of the latest Midtown 
sanctuary almost forty years earlier, Rogers was now ready to dig the first spades of earth of 
what would eventually become the new home of Bellevue. However, being no stranger to 
making a show, Rogers wanted Bellevue’s latest ground-breaking to be more than simply a 
traditional ceremony; he wanted to do justice to the biblical significance that had been 
ascribed to the relocation. Lee’s opening of the current sanctuary in November 1949 was itself 
a major Midtown event, attracting over a thousand people to North Bellevue Avenue on an 
autumnal evening; but it would pale in comparison to the scale and pyrotechnics of what 
Rogers had planned in Cordova. The event would attract three thousand people, feature ‘300 
to 400 musicians and singers, [and have] a full worship service’.508  The ground-breaking 
would also be attended by distinguished members of Memphis’s (white) establishment, 
including Richard Hackett, the last white person to be elected city mayor. 
The centrepiece of the ceremony was a retelling of the Twelve Spies, a Book of Numbers 
parable about the territory God had allocated for the Promised Land. In the story, God 
promised Abraham that there would be a nation which would emerge for his son, Isaac. God 
                                                          
505 Adrian Rogers, “Sharing the Joy: Press Release”, church press release, BBT – Claiming Our Canaan 
folder, DMCF. 
506 “All-church Banquet to Be Sunday at Convention Center”, Bellevue Baptist Church Messenger, March 
21, 1985, BBT – Claiming Our Canaan folder, DMCF. 
507 “Bellevue to Step Into Canaan,” Bellevue Baptist Church Messenger, July 16, 1987, BBT – Claiming Our 
Canaan folder, DMCF. 
508 Penni Crabtree, “Bellevue Baptists to break new ground,” The Commercial Appeal, July 18, 1987. 
117 
 
allocated the territory of Canaan, which twelve “spies” would survey to assess its suitability 
for establishing a nation. Although ten of these spies came back with a negative assessment, 
and doubted the ability of God to deliver on his promise, two spies—Joshua and Caleb—had 
faith in His programme and were therefore the only two allowed to enter the Promised Land. 
At the ground-breaking a large stage was erected where costumed actors would play out the 
story. There were also ‘12-foot sign[s] with a giant on,’ each of which was labelled with a 
negative characteristic such as “hate,” “laziness” and “pride”.509 These giants represented the 
first ten spies’ negative assessment of the land. Each negative characteristic had a 
corresponding virtue, such as “joy,” “peace” and “love,” which would be used to overcome 
the negative assessment of the land. Then the ‘pastor announced that the ground-breaking 
was ready to begin. A fanfare, played by 110 trumpets, began. Canon fire erupted’.510 Shortly 
afterwards, the most dramatic event of the ceremony took place: ‘Four pieces of heavy 
equipment, led by a bulldozer, appeared from the trees and headed towards the giants. The 
bulldozer lowered its blade, dug into the ground in front of the platform and knocked over 
the ten giants to the applause of the congregation’.511 Bellevue’s grandiose ground-breaking 
was clearly a product of Rogers’ keenness for “making a show” during important events. Its 
style was of the same ilk as the Singing Christmas Tree annual show, which was also a Rogers 
brainchild. Rogers’ talent for fusing evangelism with novel and entertaining shows was 
undoubtedly one of the reasons why Bellevue thrived during his pastorate. Although Rogers 
never steered clear from his focus on preaching the Gospel, he was also not afraid to innovate 
to attract new members.512 His shows appealed to baby-boomer audiences who, having grown 
up with television, were more receptive to spectacles.  
 Bellevue laypeople first entered the new sanctuary on the weekend of November 18, 
1989, during an open house on the Saturday and then the first Sunday service the next day. 
Even to Bellevue members, who were no stranger to large-scale buildings, the new facility 
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was an intimidating presence. At the far end of car park large enough to accommodate 3,200 
cars was the main entrance of the sanctuary, a huge isosceles triangle supported by seven 
neoclassical columns and featuring a large cross above a stain glass façade. Engraved just 
above the columns in large lettering was a quote from Psalm 43:3: “Send out Thy light and 
Thy Truth”. Once visitors walked inside, they were greeted by the same chandelier that hung 
at the old facility, another homage to the Midtown campus. The centrepiece of the of three-
story building was the new, 7,000-seat worship centre that was fan-shaped like a concert hall 
rather than rectangular like a traditional church. TV screens on either side of the pulpit were 
erected to help those on the further rows of seats to see, further contributing towards the 
concert hall impression of the space. The building also housed a library, bookstore, several 
classrooms, and administrative offices. The opening weekend of the new sanctuary attracted 
attention from far beyond the city. It terms of the size of the congregation and now the size of 
its facilities, Bellevue was now one of the very largest churches in the country.513 Considering 
the cultural and historical significance of Bellevue and the denomination that it belongs to, 
this represented a regional and even national event of sorts. The highest profile form of 
recognition came the incumbent president of the United States, who in a letter to the church 
hoped the church’s ‘new facilities will meet the needs of your growing congregation, allowing 
a greater number of people from all over the Memphis area to celebrate and reaffirm their love 
of God’.514 A newspaper article covering Bellevue’s first Sunday service at the new facility 
reported that the sanctuary was ‘nearly filled twice’ and that ‘roads going into the 376-acre 
site to Cordova…were jammed with cars before and after the services’.515 “It’s a dream come 
true’” one layman rejoiced. “It’s a fresh start for everybody since it’s a new place—a place 
where people can come and meet the Lord Jesus”.516  
 
Race, Segregation and Demographics 
 
As well as delving into some of the religious implications of urban withdrawal, this chapter 
has so far examined two of the most important causes of Bellevue’s relocation: the church’s 
lack of community connections and its ministerial priority of individual soul conversion (as 
opposed to social ministry). The third and final factor which helped pave the way for 
Bellevue’s relocation—which will be the subject of the remainder of this chapter—was the 
complex issue of the church’s lack of racial integration, and how this related to the 
socioeconomic and demographic changes that were taking place in Midtown and beyond. The 
absence of a significant African American presence at Bellevue during the seventies and 
eighties is a key reason why the church lacked any significant connections to its local 
neighbourhood, and in turn why the mandate for relocation was so strong. For years prior to 
when the vote to relocate was cast, Bellevue’s racial composition contrasted with that of the 
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neighbourhood that surrounded it. By the middle of the 1980s Bellevue’s Midtown 
neighbourhood had, in demographic terms, become a reflection of the rest of the inner-city; it 
was racially mixed, with an increasingly high African American presence. This stood in 
contrast to Bellevue itself, which was still overwhelmingly white. But if the church had 
managed to attract a larger number of African Americans to its pews it is likely that there 
would have been a greater resistance to the church’s suburbanisation. Not only would there 
have been a higher number of members living nearby to the church, but it is also possible that 
the congregation would have established firmer connections to its surrounding community 
which could have tied the church to Midtown, or at least the general inner city area. As argued 
by Andrew Trundle, Bellevue ‘certainly had the means, and Dr Rogers certainly had the 
appeal, to successfully relocate within the city’.517  
What, then, explains Bellevue’s lack of racial integration? The following paragraphs 
show that the manner in which the church acquired its success during the Rogers pastorate 
contributed towards its lack of integration. The causes of Bellevue’s success as a megachurch 
reduced the likelihood of racial integration taking place and, in the context of Memphis’s post-
busing landscape of residential segregation, contributed towards the “suburban” 
constituency of the church towards the end of its time in Midtown. Bellevue’s growth under 
Rogers relied on targeting demographic groups who were more “reachable” than ethnic 
minorities. The vast majority of these reachable people were whites either living or in the 
process of moving to the suburbs to the east of Midtown. Additionally, Bellevue’s specific 
brand of doctrinal and even political conservatism—which was itself another key reason why 
the church became successful in the seventies and eighties—deterred many African 
Americans and other ethnic minorities in the surrounding area. As part of this analysis of the 
religious and cultural roots the case study’s lack of integration, the remainder of this chapter 
will also compare Bellevue with other megachurches, demonstrating that congregations with 
different theological orientations and approaches towards church growth were more likely to 
have higher levels of integration. It was therefore not the megachurch status of Bellevue which 
was the main determinant of its lack of integration, but rather its congregational culture and 
its specific approach towards church growth.  
 It is not possible to discuss the religious and congregational roots of suburbanisation 
without first paying attention to the rapid socioeconomic and demographic changes that took 
place in Memphis, and Bellevue’s role in these processes. Although Bellevue’s relocation was 
in large part the result of specifically religious factors, demographic change—along with its 
associated symptoms—was ultimately a major reason why Bellevue and countless other white 
evangelical churches like it were forced to contemplate urban withdrawal in the first place. In 
Memphis and elsewhere, the driving force behind these new demographic arrangements was 
a socioeconomic system in which race and class stratifications were protected and often 
accentuated. In the 1970s busing, the federally-authorised technique of racially rebalancing 
public schools, was met with a white backlash which municipalities, local boosters and 
Sunbelt industries were complicit towards. As Chapter 2 discussed in detail, the result of this 
collaboration between white communities, government, and political economy was a two-tier 
educational, racial and socioeconomic system in Memphis which was split clearly along racial 
lines. This system manifested itself in Memphis’s and Shelby County’s demographic 
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arrangements, with the poorer, African American residents predominantly living in urban 
settings and richer whites living in suburban and rural locations. By the mid-1970s over sixty 
percent of Memphis was black, but the eastern fringes of the city—home to the private, 
segregated schools—were becoming strongholds of white, middle class prosperity. The 
Germantown area, which went from being 67% white in 1970 to 90% white in 1980, was a 
typical example of Memphis’s demographic shifts. 518  No records exist of precisely when 
Bellevue’s own members completed their own relocations, or exactly where they relocated 
too. But the scale of white withdrawal from the inner-city to the suburbs between 1970 and 
1985 all but eradicates the possibility that a significant proportion of the congregation did not 
in some way mirror what was taking place at a broader level. Moreover, interviews conducted 
for this thesis have confirmed that starting in the 1970s Bellevue members began to relocate 
to the suburbs in greater numbers that before.519 
Since post-civil rights residential segregation involved ‘resources following whites to 
the suburbs,’ the economic benefits of the Sunbelt boom were felt disproportionately outside 
of the inner-city. 520  Numerous businesses that had been based Downtown mirrored the 
withdrawal of whites and established new headquarters in Shelby County suburbs. One of 
the most significant examples of this was when, in 1973, distribution company FedEx moved 
its global headquarters to Memphis International Airport to the southeast of the city, and 
followed this shortly afterwards by opening a World Technology Centre in Collierville, an 
east Memphis suburb. The Technology Centre would bring 2,400 jobs to the area, and 
symbolised the broadening economic gap between the suburbs and inner-city of Memphis.521 
As a large, thriving megachurch, Bellevue’s decision to abandon the economically struggling 
Midtown neighbourhood undoubtedly contributed towards the patterns of structural 
inequality that were being accentuated by industrial development in the suburbs. Irrespective 
of its level of integration, Bellevue certainly had an important economic presence in Midtown, 
with its significant financial resources and it being a source of employment for the local 
workforce. As argued by Kimberly Karnes et al, ‘Churches in more modest neighbourhoods’ 
like Midtown Memphis ‘have a far greater potential to influence the local community’s social 
service structure’ than those that exist in wealthy areas where social provisions are not 
required.522 Since large churches are likely to ‘stimulate local commercial development’ and 
‘greater demand for local police, emergency services, and other infrastructural support,’ the 
economic (not to mention social) effects of urban withdrawal are undoubtedly felt by the 
communities that have been left behind.523 Bellevue’s complicity with white flight mirrored 
the nationwide situation with megachurches towards the end of the twentieth century. The 
same study by Karnes et al demonstrates, for example, that megachurches are most likely to 
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be ‘located in areas with highly-educated, relatively wealthy,’ and relatively young 
populations, just like in Bellevue’s Cordova neighbourhood. 524  But although the typical 
environment for a megachurch is well-known, less understood is how the religious features 
of congregations like Bellevue related to their lack of integration and their decisions to 
relocate.   
Many of the causes of segregation in white evangelical churches are rooted in deeply 
entrenched historical patterns of racial conflict, prejudice and division. Overcoming these 
divisions has been extremely difficult, more so than in other contexts of “de facto” 
segregation. As Nancy T. Wadsworth has demonstrated in her study of the evangelical racial 
change movement, the first signs of meaningful, nationwide reconciliation did not arrive until 
the 1990s.525 Path dependency has played a part in white evangelical churches’ failure to 
integrate: decades- and even centuries-old decisions and policies have informed current 
behaviour and attitudes, even though the political and cultural terrain of the post-civil rights 
South is drastically different to that of the Jim Crow era. On the other hand, the influence of 
Jim Crow history on contemporary racial divisions has resulted in a widely accepted but 
nonetheless fallacious notion that racial segregation in white evangelical churches is 
inevitable.526 This view has helped obscure the role of agency in determining the extent to 
which white churches are segregated. But ‘if the “relationship between structure and agency 
is dialectical and history is its synthesis,” then any general account of “white flight” must 
account for…the role of human actors and their day-to-day decisions’.527 As Dochuk suggests, 
evangelical white flight is seldom ‘simply a foregone or inevitable outcome thrust on churches 
like HPBC by larger, unseen economic and social forces’.528 Indeed, HPBC’s withdrawal from 
the inner-city ‘encompassed a ten-year process complete with extensive financial, social and 
spiritual hardship as well as notable dissension over the motivations and implications of a 
move to suburbia’.529 Agency can also go a long way towards explaining why churches which 
have similar theological and cultural characteristics can have radically different approaches 
towards, and degrees of, integration.  
Bellevue made few efforts to reach out to any of the thousands of African Americans 
who had moved to Midtown while Memphis was slowly desegregating. As detailed in 
previous chapters, the church had what is referred to as a moderate, “laissez-faire” approach 
towards attracting African Americans and other ethnic minorities. This meant that the two 
pastors who served during (Pollard) and after (Rogers) the civil rights movement both openly 
condemned racism and saw no inherent biblical or moral reason why whites and blacks could 
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not worship alongside one another. But at the same time neither pastor did anything to 
actively encourage African Americans to join the church, such as running outreach 
programmes or providing social ministry for poorer African American areas of the city. In the 
seventies and eighties, the situation at Bellevue mirrored what was happening in the Southern 
Baptist Convention generally. By this point, most SBC conservatives had conceded that ‘race 
[was] the one issue where progressives [had been] right’.530 But rather than actively engaging 
with the issue, this new generation of politically active white evangelicals (of who Rogers and 
layman Ed McAteer are good examples) instead funnelled much of their energies into 
crusades against “moral issues” such as abortion and women’s liberation. Meanwhile, they 
effectively ignored race and the legacies of Jim Crow segregation.531 In other words, ‘race 
stayed “off the table”’ at Bellevue during the post-civil rights era, just as it did in the SBC.532 
The formation of Bellevue’s new political culture therefore helped deflect attention away from 
the agenda of integration, which in turn slowed down the rate at which racial reconciliation 
could be achieved. As one laywoman observed, prior to Bellevue’s relocation “We were in the 
inner-city, but we did not have an inner-city ministry”.533 This racially coded language hints 
at both the lack of integration at the church and also the taken-for-granted assumption that a 
substantial ethnic minority presence was unlikely be drawn to worship at the church. Without 
any impetus for racial integration, the notion of moving to a more demographically 
“appropriate” neighbourhood steadily became more appealing.  
Closely connected to this lack of racial integration during the Rogers pastorate was the 
specific strategies Bellevue used for attracting new members. As a Bellevue layman who used 
his own church as a case study, Dan Lester Greer’s analysis of the “church growth movement” 
offers an inside account of the methods Bellevue and other megachurches like it used to grow. 
Greer argues that throughout the Rogers era Bellevue followed the megachurch model of 
church growth, which he defines as a ‘very market-driven philosophy of ministry that is 
directed toward their [the church’s] most reachable group’.534 Essential to this methodology is 
the homogeneous unit principle, which in the context of church growth posits that the best 
way of attracting new members is to target people from similar racial, ethnic and social 
backgrounds. The main assumption of the homogeneous unit principle is that people feel 
more comfortable mixing with worshippers from similar backgrounds, and are more likely to 
seek a church which resembles their own demographic and social makeup. Or, as Donald 
McGavran writes, ‘Men like to become Christians without crossing racial, linguistic, or class 
barriers’.535 Based on the findings of this thesis and Greer’s work, it is uncontroversial to 
suggest that Bellevue’s growth under Rogers has been achieved with the homogeneous unit 
principle in mind, and by targeting these more “reachable” groups. Bellevue’s post-Pollard 
renaissance entailed attracting people from slightly different age and class profiles, but these 
were considered far more “reachable” than ethnic minorities, who aside from having 
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drastically different experiences of race were also likely to practice their faith in different 
ways.  Rogers himself has said that “there’s a naturalness for people to want to congregate 
with people they’re culturally comfortable with,” suggesting he was at ease using the 
homogeneous unit principle as a model for church growth.536 His comments also echo those 
made by pastor Pollard years earlier, when he argued African Americans “are not going to 
come to your [white] church, they don’t want to come…they want to be with their own 
people”.537   
Via the case study of Bellevue, Greer’s study takes the form of a theological defence of 
the church growth movement, which some have criticised for placing too great an emphasis 
on numbers, and for being elitist and even bigoted. 538  However, Greer writes, ‘Most 
megachurch pastors have learned through observations of life and from serious study of the 
Scriptures that there is nothing wrong or unbiblical about people preferring to spend time 
with the people who are most like them’. ‘The most effective way to reach a black, inner-city 
neighbourhood for Christ is to start a new black church with a black pastor rather than 
insisting that these believers join a large, predominantly white, upper-middle class 
megachurch in the suburbs,’ he concludes.539 In a decision which shows that Bellevue’s leaders 
had this exact approach towards ministering for ethnic minorities, in the early 2000s the 
church even established two new satellite churches in non-white areas of Memphis. 
According to Bellevue layman David Coombs, these churches were fully funded by Bellevue 
and emerged out of the church’s recent willingness to minister to some of Memphis’s less 
affluent neighbourhoods.540 The two satellite churches were built in the inner-city, in areas 
where a majority of blacks or Hispanics resided.541 Today, Bellevue continues to support these 
churches by “operating them under the organisational structure of the church,” financially 
supporting them, and by providing staff. 542  These initiatives demonstrate that although 
Bellevue was commendably keen to offer a portion of its resources to poorer and more racially 
mixed neighbourhoods of the city, racial reconciliation was not considered a viable or realistic 
option. In other words, the method employed to cater for ethnic minorities did nothing to 
alleviate the patterns of racial segregation within its own pews (and probably had the opposite 
effect of accentuating it).  
More recent work on megachurches has challenged Greer’s notion that there is a 
typical megachurch growth model which places racial, social and religious “reachability” at 
its centre. Scott Thumma and Dave Travis show, for example, that one fifth of all 
megachurches in the United States have an ethnic minority presence of at least twenty percent, 
and that megachurches are also often relatively diverse in terms of social class.543 This means 
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that megachurches—usually defined as a Protestant congregation that has at least two 
thousand regular attendees—are actually more diverse on average in terms of race  and social 
class than smaller congregations, which are usually a reflection solely of the racial makeup of 
the local area. 544  Nonetheless, it is apparent that during the eighties and beyond Bellevue was 
a congregation which, if not representative of the phenomenon of megachurches as a whole, 
was nonetheless an example of how certain very large congregations have achieved high 
growth by targeting and appealing to one race whilst simultaneously refraining from reaching 
out to ethnic minorities. Most of the work carried out on megachurch racial diversity has been 
completed in the last fifteen years, at least a decade after Bellevue’s relocation and the period 
of this chapter’s focus. In the wake of the more concerted racial reconciliation efforts of the 
1990s, megachurches did, generally speaking, become more racially diverse at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century. This was even the case with Bellevue itself which, as the racial 
uniformity of the Cordova neighbourhood started to show the first signs of fracturing, become 
slightly more racially mixed during the 2000s.545 However, it is also true that even during the 
height of the racial reconciliation movement, Bellevue’s racial composition never came close 
to matching that of other megachurches. It is therefore clear that whichever stage in the history 
of the racial reconciliation movement that we examine the church, Bellevue had below average 
levels of racial integration in comparison with other megachurches.546  
The reasons Bellevue’s growth was so disproportionately white—even during a period 
when large churches across the nation were becoming increasingly diverse—become clearer 
when a comparison is made between the religious culture of Shelby County’s largest church 
and other megachurches. Many contemporary megachurches belong to what Kimon Sargeant 
has referred to as the “seeker church” paradigm.547 According to Sargeant’s definition, seeker 
churches ‘tailor [their] programs and services to attract people who are not church 
attenders’.548 They aim to appeal to people who are discouraged from joining a congregation 
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because of the traditional—and often intimidating—worshipping styles of many evangelical 
churches.549 The market they intend to appeal to is often the white, culturally secular baby-
boomer generation, but the features of such churches also often have the effect of appealing 
to entirely different racial and socioeconomic profiles. Moreover, some megachurches actively 
embrace a ‘vision that states that the church is for all people no matter what race, income, or 
educational status’.550 Seeker churches’ first strategy is to appeal to their target market by 
making the congregational practices and features more culturally relevant.551 This openness 
to adapting congregational culture extends to worshipping style, with 59 percent of 
megachurches in a 2005 survey claiming that their format had changed either “a lot” or 
“some”.552  Megachurches even display a propensity for being ‘shaped by the larger secular 
culture’.553 Some seeker churches avoid displaying religious symbols such as crucifixes in their 
campuses, in order to avoid intimidating the more sensitive worshippers.554 In the suburban 
outskirts of Chicago, the nondenominational Willow Creek Community Church—perhaps the 
archetypal example of the seeker church paradigm—has a campus in which ‘every aspect of 
[its] facilities emulates the best of corporate America in quality, design and style. Willow 
Creek’s aim is to reduce…any cognitive dissonance between the religious realm and the 
working and shopping realm of suburban middle class Americans’.555 These examples show 
that aim of seeker churches and other megachurches like them is to accommodate aspects of 
the dominant secular culture of American society into the worshipping culture of the 
congregation. The purity of such churches’ religious culture is therefore sacrificed for the sake 
of appealing to audiences which would otherwise be deterred from joining evangelical 
churches.  
As well as an openness to being influenced by modern culture, another central reason 
why contemporary megachurches are likely to be diverse is doctrine. Although evangelical 
seeker churches do attempt to retain what they see as the “essence” of their theological 
framework, members are also ‘often invited to make their own interpretations of the meaning 
of scripture in their lives’.556 With regard to doctrinal issues such as the literal existence of the 
devil and biblical inerrancy, the proportion of members in megachurches who disagree with 
the evangelical orthodoxy has been found to be around one sixth of some congregations.557 
Striking a balance between protecting what a particular church sees as the integral features of 
evangelical theology on one hand, and tolerating doctrinal deviation on the other, is not easy; 
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churches that fail to satisfactorily balance these agendas are often perceived as being 
doctrinally impure or insufficiently “strict” and, as Kelley and others have argued, are likely 
to lose members.558 However, theological diversity has nonetheless been part of a pluralistic 
approach towards growth at particular megachurches which has resulted in a higher degree 
of racial and socioeconomic diversity than at other comparable churches.  
In contrast to Willow Creek and other members of the seeker paradigm, throughout 
Bellevue’s post-Pollard revival the church retained its strict adherence to traditional 
evangelical worshipping culture—including, most importantly, its doctrinal conservatism. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Bellevue is a good example of a church that achieved high growth as 
a direct result of its strict theological conservatism. Rogers sustained Bellevue’s historical 
commitment to biblical inerrancy, which appealed to the surrounding society’s deeply 
conservative religious culture. Rogers did display an enthusiasm for diversifying and 
expanding the church’s activities. He was keen on “making a show” during some of the 
church’s events, such as at the new campus’s ground breaking or his introduction of the 
Singing Christmas Tree event. These had the effect of attracting the kind of younger members 
who had been leaving the church ever since the beginning of the Pollard pastorate. Despite 
this, throughout the Rogers pastorate Bellevue did not show any signs of adopting any other 
elements which made the seeker paradigm successful; indeed, Bellevue was in actual fact 
actively hostile towards some of the features of the seeker paradigm. Most obviously, as made 
clear by Rogers’ participation in the SBC Conservative Resurgence and the Christian Right’s 
crusade against “secular humanism”, Bellevue would have considered it an affront to its 
values if it had let its congregational culture be influenced by secular culture. Bellevue’s strict 
theological inerrantism, combined with its refusal to adapt its congregational culture 
complement the more secular, globalised and interconnected society that surrounded it, 
ensured the church was never likely to attract members from disparate denominational, 
cultural and racial backgrounds. Instead, Bellevue’s growth was about attracting audiences 
from a demographically narrow but numerically high band of core worshippers who were 
attracted to Bellevue precisely because of its strict doctrinal conservatism and hostility towards 
secular culture.559 Throughout much of the second half of the twentieth century, this lack of 
diversity mattered less in Memphis than it did in other geographical contexts; this was 
because of the high concentration of conservative whites in the city and the surrounding area, 
even during the city’s post-civil rights demographic transformation. However, as the 
twentieth century drew to a close, and whites continued to move out of urban counties like 
Shelby, Southern Baptist congregations in or around Memphis did start to experience the 
negative effects of their failure to attract ethnic minorities.560 
While other models such as the seeker paradigm achieved growth by being more 
tolerant of cultural and doctrinal diversity, Bellevue’s theological and political conservatism 
was undoubtedly one of the reasons why the church thrived during the Rogers pastorate. 
Academic studies by scholars such as Dean Kelley and Finke and Stark have confirmed that 
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while their more liberal counterparts have declined, conservative churches’ more 
uncompromising approaches have inspired far greater loyalty which helped congregations 
like Bellevue thrive. 561  Meanwhile, Bellevue layman Dan Greer himself argues that his 
church’s ‘conservative position has definitely influenced church growth at the local level’.562 
But evidence also suggests that Bellevue’s brand of theological conservatism also had the side-
effect of marginalising African Americans from the congregation. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
one of the main reasons for the racial divisions in American evangelicalism is the radically 
different approaches towards inequality and social ministry that black and white 
congregations practice. Whereas African American Protestants are often theologically 
moderate or liberal and tend to practice a form of social gospel ministry, white evangelicals 
are usually more inclined to be theologically conservative and to prioritise individual soul 
saving ahead of social ministry. The main implication of this division is that black evangelicals 
are far more likely to prescribe social or structural interventions against inequality, while 
white evangelicals typically maintain that converting souls should be the ministerial priority 
of a church.  
Historians Michael O. Emerson and Christian Smith have demonstrated that these 
theological differences have, throughout post-war American history, acted as a formidable 
barrier in the way of the integration of white and black evangelicals. The reason for this, they 
conclude, is that white evangelicals’ theology continues to mould their racial worldview, to 
the extent that they often deny that racial discrimination is a real issue. Perceiving inequality 
in entirely individualistic terms, many white evangelicals interviewed for Emerson and 
Smith’s study either stated that the plight of African Americans is down to insufficient 
leadership, or suggested the problem was more a media construction than a reality. The root 
cause of these attitudes was not racism per se but the internalisation of a theological 
framework which does not account for or even perceive structural inequality.563 In the context 
of southern cities like Memphis, the divisions caused by these theological incompatibilities 
are particularly severe. This made it far easier for churches like Bellevue to attract whites than 
it would have been to attract people from ethnicities which tended to practice more liberal 
forms of the religion. The relationship between race and theology in the post-civil rights South 
therefore undoubtedly effected the extent to which Bellevue integrated during the Pollard 
pastorate and beyond.  
As well as understanding the appeal of Bellevue’s conservative theology, Dan Greer 
is also sensitive to the magnetism of the church’s political conservatism: 
‘The national revival of conservative thinking in America [during the 1980s] 
…positively affected churches like Bellevue [because] all the things that became 
popular among the majority of Americans concerning social and moral issues, 
Bellevue had stood for all along. When people in our area started looking for a 
conservative church that was very patriotic and committed to the family, we were 
there to meet those needs’.564  
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As an example, Greer attributes the ‘very measurable attendance increase’ that occurred at 
Bellevue during the early 1990s to the ‘the national debate on moral values [which was] 
gaining momentum’ during the first Gulf War.565 The creation of Bellevue’s political culture 
which Greer describes and which had existed at the church since the early 1980s was also 
likely to have contributed towards the marginalisation of African Americans from the church. 
As a demographic that was far more likely to vote Democrat than Republican in general 
elections, the staunch political conservatism of Bellevue during the 1980s was incompatible 
with the political orientations of many African Americans.566 ‘The majority of Americans…are 
terribly concerned about the crime and violence they see every night on the news,’ argues 
Greer.567 However unintentionally, this sentiment echoes the language of Republican leaders 
such as Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, who frequently used coded references to African 
American criminality to appeal to disaffected working and middle class whites during general 
elections.568 Greer’s allusion to the ‘majority of Americans’ is indeed reminiscent Nixon’s 
Silent Majority, a “colour-blind” discourse designed to mobilise middle class whites behind a 
strategy aimed at protecting white privilege in southern suburbs just like Cordova.569 As 
mentioned earlier, Bellevue’s political culture—combined with its individualistic theological 
orientation—were features that were naturally compatible with the discourse of meritocratic 
prosperity that was found in Memphis’s suburbs in the era of busing.570 By embracing a form 
of politics which was, however indirectly, antagonistic towards African Americans, Bellevue 
further reduced the likelihood of racial reconciliation. The gap that already existed between 
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white and black religious cultures—which consisted of a variety of different components, 
including theology and worshipping style—was thus accentuated by the political culture 
created at Bellevue during the critical period of the 1980s.  
 Lastly, this chapter’s contention that Bellevue’s theological and political conservatism 
deterred African Americans from joining is supported by research conducted on black SBC 
membership in Bellevue’s native county. In his attempt to explain why the membership of the 
SBC in Shelby County, Tennessee has been declining since the late 1990s, Andrew Trundle 
argues that the combination of changing demographics and the SBC’s doctrinal conservatism 
have been to blame.571 To begin with, the proportion of the population of the county that was 
African American had risen from 44% in 1990 to 49% in 2000.572 During that period the black 
population increased slightly, while the white population decreased by around twenty 
thousand. And since African Americans are far less likely to worship at SBC congregations 
than whites, this increase in the black population of five percent helps explain why the 
denomination has declined. However, Trundle argues that another reason why the SBC has 
been declining in Shelby County is the conservative doctrine of SBC churches. Trundle found 
that several churches in the county had decided to withdraw from the SBC because their 
leaders felt that the denomination had become too conservative. Although SBC churches have 
never been under any obligation to adopt SBC resolutions, ‘the burden of an increasingly 
conservative doctrine and agenda’ was, for many, ‘just too much’.573 ‘Those who have left for 
doctrinal reasons are no longer willing to support these positions, financially or otherwise’.574 
Trundle suggests that moderates are likely to continue to leave the SBC because of the 
strictness of the denomination’s post-Resurgence conservatism, but he also concedes that the 
‘conservative nature of the SBC is what attracts and holds the majority’.575 
 In order to grow again, Trundle argues, SBC churches in Shelby and other counties 
like it must begin to appeal to the growing ethnic minority presence. To begin with, SBC 
churches should ‘stop moving away when the surrounding neighbourhoods grow too 
diverse,’ and should instead ‘work to make the church membership resemble the 
neighbourhood population’; additionally, the denomination should make a concerted effort 
‘to promote minorities within the power structure’ and ‘support racially progressive 
legislation’.576 Currently, ethnic minorities are deterred from joining SBC churches for the 
same reason that many white moderates have left the denomination—i.e. it’s excessively 
conservative doctrine. ‘The overall conservatism of the denomination is often at odds with the 
stated desire to be progressive on the issue of race, and there has simply not been enough 
change…to impress the critics’.577 Meanwhile, the SBC’s history of racism has resulted in a 
reputational problem that has lingered all the way until the present day. In an attempt to 
address this issue, in 1995 the SBC publically apologised for its role in resisting civil rights 
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and for the blatant racism that permeated much of the denomination up until the 1970s. But 
this did little to resolve the SBC’s image problem, particularly amongst the racial group which 
had been on the receiving end of the denomination’s historical prejudices. Quoting Ellen 
Rosenberg’s suggestion that to be southern is to be ‘hyper-American…hyper-
patriotic…hyper-racist and –sexist,’ Trundle argues that these qualities are, in the eyes of 
many, ‘by extension, a description of the Southern Baptist Convention’ itself.578 He concludes 
that ‘race is the largest issue facing the SBC in Shelby County,’ and that if the denomination 
‘cannot adequately minister to the African American community, it will increasingly lose its 
presence in the county’.579 Unlike smaller SBC churches in Shelby County, Bellevue has been 
able compensate for its lack of appeal with African Americans through its popularity with 
whites. This enabled the church to continue to grow throughout the Rogers pastorate, even as 
the SBC as a whole was beginning to decline.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the causes and experiences of Bellevue’s relocation were 
symptomatic of the kind of relationship that the church had had with its local surroundings 
over the previous three decades. Prior to the actual year of the relocation in 1989, Bellevue’s 
laissez-faire approach towards racial minorities—which was itself in part a result of the 
church’s inerrantist theology—had been loosening community ties between Bellevue and 
Midtown ever since the beginning of the civil rights movement. Bellevue’s indifference 
towards changing this policy over the ensuing decades in turn increased the church’s 
connections with the suburbs, as many of the church’s current and prospective members 
moved to neighbourhoods like Cordova and Germantown. Although Bellevue displayed an 
initial willingness to stay in the racially diverse area of Midtown during the start of the Ten 
Year Plan, once this prospect became less feasible it was not difficult to change approach. By 
the 1980s the majority of Bellevue’s members had vacated the inner-city, making a suburban 
relocation of the church highly appealing to the church’s constituents. Even more importantly, 
staying in Midtown was not, unlike many other less conservative evangelical churches, 
considered to be an inherent part of Bellevue’s ministerial identity. On the contrary, since 
relocating to the suburbs would provide the church with more space to realise its numerical 
targets of membership expansion, moving from Midtown was actually considered an ethically 
virtuous decision. This enabled Bellevue to label the relocation a “victory in Jesus”, and to 
consider the new site in Cordova as its own Promised Land. Although media coverage of the 
decision was quick to point out the moral shortcomings of urban withdrawal, the relocation 
was viewed from the inside as a glorious opportunity to advance Bellevue’s spiritual worth. 
In contrast to other evangelical churches like HPBC in Detroit, within the congregational 
culture of Bellevue there appeared to be little or no sense of crisis over the ethics of 
“withdrawing”, “departing” or “abandoning” a struggling inner-city environment. Instead, 
                                                          
578 Rosenberg, The Southern Baptists, p. 4 – 5. Quoted in Trundle, “Doctrine, Demographics, and the 
Decline of the Southern Baptist Convention”, p. 93. 
579 Ibid, p. 95 
131 
 
Bellevue’s theological identity and the priorities of the Ten Year Plan enabled the church to 
sidestep the issue and create a celebratory atmosphere around the relocation. 
 The causes of Bellevue’s lack of racial integration, as discussed in the second half of 
this chapter, are also a reflection of how the church interacted with its spatial and social 
surroundings in the post-civil rights era. Unlike megachurches which belonged to the seeker 
church paradigm, Bellevue’s growth model did not focus on how to attract racial minorities 
and other demographics which were likely to hold less conservative religious, political and 
cultural worldviews. Conversely, the church deliberately focussed on targeting the most 
“reachable” group, which in Bellevue’s case was conservative whites. This chapter has shown 
that the main reasons why Bellevue remained relatively segregated (thereby reducing the 
connections the church had with its demographically diverse surroundings) were precisely 
the same reasons the church was so popular with white conservatives. Bellevue’s fusion of 
theological and political conservatism had the side-effect of deterring African Americans from 
joining, but those very same features were hugely popular with the deeply conservative 
religious culture of white Memphis. The ostentatiousness of Bellevue’s conservatism was 
accentuated by Bellevue’s mimicking of the Christian Right at a congregational level during 
the 1980s and beyond. Meanwhile, Bellevue’s strong associations with the Conservative 
Resurgence was part of the reputational problem of the SBC in counties like Shelby, which 
Southern Baptist churches had started to feel the effects of once the racial composition of such 
areas became less white. This chapter’s exploration of the complex interrelationships between 
theology, congregational culture, and urban withdrawal have, it is hoped, added to the 
limited body of work that currently exists on the significance, meanings and causes of white 
flight in the context of American evangelicalism. 
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Conclusion 
 
Bellevue’s formidable campus in Cordova—built on a sprawling, three hundred-acre site 
thirteen miles east of Downtown, and adjacent to the nation’s second longest interstate 
highway—seems to perfectly embody the transformations that the church, as well as the 
movement it belongs to, have undergone since the 1960s. Walking through the vast parking 
lot towards the south entrance of the sanctuary, with its glass façade and white neoclassical 
columns, one is given the impression of being both geographically and figuratively remote 
from the humble, inner-city roots of the church. The contrast between Bellevue’s current home 
and the environment it left behind in 1989 led one journalist, writing a few years after the 
relocation was completed, to argue that ‘there are really two cities here along the Mississippi’. 
While suburban affluence characterised the neighbourhoods of East Memphis, ‘just a few 
miles away inner-city Memphis struggles to survive, and the contortions of that struggle are 
all too obvious’.580 In this respect, the multimillion dollar facility in Cordova stands as a 
testament to how the rapid post-war growth of conservative evangelicalism was linked with 
the uneven patterns of urban development in racially and socioeconomically divided 
American cities like Memphis. Previous chapters have detailed the various ways in which 
evangelical and urban history were interwoven, demonstrating that the socioeconomics of 
Sunbelt suburbanisation had important effects on one of the largest and most important 
Southern Baptist churches in the United States. The lavish sanctuary in Cordova, as well as 
what the same observer referred to as ‘the trappings of middle-class America [which are] 
evident everywhere’ on the campus, are clear indicators of these transformations.581   
 This dissertation has originated from the need for a study which examines the features 
of contemporary conservative evangelicalism at a local, “grassroots” level, and which is 
therefore receptive to the significance of congregational culture. Bellevue was chosen as a case 
study not because it represents evangelicalism as a whole (no single church could ever come 
close to reflecting the complexity and diversity of American evangelicalism), but because of 
its associations with two of the defining phenomena of the movement’s post-war history: the 
suburbanisation of white congregations and the build-up of the “Christian Right”. Thus, 
although it would be unwise to make sweeping inferences about the whole movement based 
on this single case study, it is suggested here that this thesis’s findings are indeed applicable 
to other instances of successful, Southern Baptist megachurches which relocated in the wake 
of desegregation and which had similar conservative leanings to those of Bellevue. As 
outlined in the Introduction, studies which have attempted to understand the religious 
dimensions of “white flight” have been few and far between, and the final chapter of this 
dissertation in particular attempted to shed more light on the process in the southern 
evangelical context. Meanwhile, it is through the discussion of Bellevue’s congregational 
culture that this thesis makes its second important contribution to the current literature: 
offering an alternative interpretation of conservative evangelicalism’s late-1970s engagement 
with politics, as well as the movement’s unprecedentedly strong electoral and political 
alliance with the Republican Party. Shifting attention away from the historiography’s 
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preoccupation with elite-level mobilisation has revealed that, at a congregational level, the 
primary mechanism through which conservative evangelicals became increasingly engaged 
with politics and affiliated with the GOP was not partisan mobilisation; rather, it was the 
creation of a conservative political culture which was in large part a symptom of demographic 
and urban change, and Bellevue’s strengthening connections with the suburbs.  
 From the beginning of the 1980s there existed at Bellevue a new dimension of the 
church’s congregational culture which mirrored the Christian Right’s blend of religious and 
political conservatism, as well as other features of Republican Party conservatism. If, as this 
thesis contends, this political culture was in large part a product of the church’s connections 
with suburbanisation, then in order to trace the origins of such a phenomenon it has been 
necessary to go back further than the moment when Ronald Reagan appeared at the National 
Affairs Briefing in Dallas in August 1980, or when Jerry Falwell launched the Moral Majority 
in 1979. Instead, it has been necessary to examine our case from the beginning of the 1960s, 
when the civil rights movement was gaining momentum in the South and desegregation 
campaigns were spreading to churches. Bellevue’s response to the kneel-in protestors and the 
prospect of racial integration was to position itself at the ideological centre of existing 
discourses on race. In other words, the church tolerated the presence of African Americans in 
its pews but it never went as far as actively intervening in (or even publically condemning) 
America’s “race problem”. As this thesis showed, one of the main reasons for Bellevue’s 
indifference towards racial inequality and integration was its conservative theology which, 
like countless other conservative SBC congregations, strongly prioritised individual soul 
conversion over social gospel. Meanwhile, like countless other white churches in the country, 
Bellevue’s approach towards integration was informed by the prevailing assumption that 
racial segregation in America’s pews was an inevitability. These factors would have a 
profound effect on the church’s future prospects for racial integration, particularly over the 
course of the next ten years, when white flight in Memphis intensified and Bellevue’s 
Midtown neighbourhood would become home to an increasing number of African 
Americans.  
 The 1970s were transformative years for both Memphis and its largest, most famous 
church. Prior to the arrival of Adrian Rogers in 1972, Bellevue had spent the previous twelve 
years in decline, thanks mainly to the unpopularity of his predecessor Ramsey Pollard. But 
Rogers’ preaching dynamism and entrepreneurial ethos reinvigorated the church at every 
level, with the Floridian pastor ushering in a new era of prolonged growth. Bellevue’s staunch 
theological conservativism, flaunted by Rogers with a fervour which Pollard lacked, was the 
central reason why the church grew at a rate which exceeded that of other evangelical 
churches in the city and the region. Meanwhile, attempts to implement racial integration in 
the public school system led to increased political polarisation and residential segregation in 
Memphis. Assisted by the political economy of the Sunbelt and discriminatory state-
sponsored housing allocation practices, the city’s eastern suburbs burgeoned, as white, 
predominantly middle class residents flocked to such neighbourhoods from inner-city areas 
and elsewhere. Many of Bellevue’s own members participated in white flight, which had been 
increasing in Memphis ever since the Supreme Court’s busing ruling in 1972. (There is no 
record of exactly how many Bellevue congregants left for the suburbs during the 1970s and 
1980s, but one of the justifications for the church’s subsequent relocation was so that it could 
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be closer to seventy percent of its laypeople, suggesting that the majority of its members were 
by that point living in the suburbs).  
By 1980, Bellevue members and thousands of other whites made up around ninety 
percent of the population of areas like Germantown in the east of the city. Meanwhile, one of 
the central features of Rogers’ growth model for Bellevue during the 1970s and beyond was 
to revive the church’s audience by attracting the very same young, upwardly mobile, middle 
class whites who were moving to the suburbs in such high numbers. Even though Bellevue’s 
current location in Midtown was several miles away from East Memphis, attracting people 
who fitted this profile was not difficult because Bellevue’s reputation, combined with 
popularity and allure of Rogers himself, easily compensated for the inconvenience of the 
church’s location. Bellevue’s extraordinary growth during the 1970s therefore strengthened 
the church’s ties with the suburbs, resulting in a congregational composition which was more 
“suburbanised”—in cultural and socioeconomic, and even political terms—than it had been 
prior to the creation of “island suburbs”.582 Thus, by the beginning of the 1980s, despite its 
physical existence in the heart of Midtown, ‘Bellevue was no longer a true “neighbourhood 
church,”’ in the sense that its racial and socioeconomic characteristics did not mirror those of 
its surroundings.583 
 Rogers was so popular with Memphis’s white evangelicals that within eight years of 
his arrival the congregation had grown by fifty percent. In 1972, his first year at Bellevue, the 
church had around eight thousand members, but in 1980 that figure had risen to over twelve 
thousand. By this point it was clear that the church had outgrown its current, twenty-year-old 
sanctuary, itself a product of the success of Rogers’ illustrious predecessor, Dr Robert Lee. 
While the church’s leaders began looking for ways in which to accommodate Bellevue’s 
flourishing congregation, Rogers and layman Ed McAteer became heavily involved with the 
SBC’s Conservative Resurgence and the Christian Right. Between 1979 and 1982, the two 
Bellevue colleagues used their positions of influence to further the accommodationist cause 
via their school prayer initiative, helping to forge an alliance between the SBC, the Christian 
Right and the Republican Party. The effects that this activity had on the congregational culture 
of Bellevue were subtler and more nuanced than what many would assume for a church with 
such close connections with the SBC and the Christian Right. Like his fellow politically active 
Baptist preachers, Rogers was keen to keep his political and denominational activities separate 
from his ministerial duties. Unlike the atmosphere of Republican partisanship during the 1982 
SBC convention meeting, for example, Rogers avoided making overt partisan political 
endorsements from the pulpit, in part because his priority as a pastor had always been 
preaching the Gospel. According to Rogers himself as well as those who knew him, he had 
become a denominational politician out of necessity, because of what he saw as the increasing 
liberalism of the SBC. But his main calling had always been to be a pastor and to evangelise 
as many people as possible. Moreover, preachers like Rogers and Falwell were wary of 
diluting the evangelical message by bringing ostensibly political matters into their churches.  
Nonetheless, at around the same time that conservative evangelicals were launching 
lobby groups like the Moral Majority, there emerged a new form of political culture at 
Bellevue which had not existed ten, or even five years prior to the Conservative Resurgence. 
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This included a greater engagement with the key Christian Right issues such as abortion and 
the Equal Rights Amendment, and manifested itself in the church hosting events about “the 
moral degradation in our nation” and about “woman’s concerns”. (The latter’s euphemistic 
title was a thin disguise for what was evidently an attempt to rally, through a large meeting 
of conservative evangelicals from around the country, resistance to the ERA. A few months 
after the Women’s Concerns Conference at Bellevue, the GOP officially dropped its 
endorsement of the ERA, a move which was largely made in response to pressure from 
conservative evangelicals. Meanwhile, the unwillingness to actually mention the ERA at the 
Conference is further evidence that Bellevue’s leaders wanted, wherever possible, to avoid 
making ostensibly political or partisan statements). Meanwhile, Bellevue’s new political 
culture was also about a strong patriotism and support for the military—features which 
resembled Republican Party conservatism of the period. One of the ways in which this 
dimension was embodied was in Bellevue’s “Celebrate America” events, which had been an 
annual fixture at the church since 1976. According to Randall Balmer in his 1992 profile of the 
church for Christian Century, during such events Bellevue’s worship centre ‘looked for all the 
world like the Republican National Convention’. 584  Today, symbols of Bellevue’s GOP-
inclinations can still be found at various places on the church site, such as the on-campus 
library, which houses numerous books about neoconservative, pro-evangelical figures such 
as George W. Bush. The features of Bellevue’s new political culture, as described in this 
dissertation, help explain how evangelicals’ widespread and unprecedented support for the 
GOP from the 1980 election onwards was created outside the arenas of elite-level mobilisation 
and partisan political endorsements from the pulpit.  
 By the mid-1980s it was becoming increasingly untenable for Bellevue to continue to 
run its ministries in its current venue. Such was the demand to worship at Bellevue, Rogers 
was forced to give two separate Sunday sermons in the three thousand-seater sanctuary in 
Midtown. The Ten Year Plan was launched in September 1982 with the aim of raising $30 
million for a building programme. Initially, Rogers and Bellevue’s deacons were committed 
to expanding the current Midtown campus, but once that possibility was exhausted the 
prospect of relocating to a more spacious site in the suburbs, which was closer to the majority 
of Bellevue’s congregants, was enthusiastically embraced. Unlike other, more liberal 
evangelical congregations—and despite the negative response of some media outlets and 
many locals who were not directly affiliated with the church—there was little resistance to the 
relocation from within the church’s pews. This was due to the lack of connections that 
Bellevue had to its surrounding neighbourhood, and because serving the Midtown locality 
was not considered to be an inherent part of the church’s ministerial identity. Thanks to 
Bellevue’s conservative theology and its relative indifference towards “reaching out” towards 
the increasing numbers of racial minorities in the neighbourhood, Bellevue had, over the 
previous two decades, allowed a broadening gulf to exist between the racial composition of 
the church and that of the neighbourhood itself. Addressing this imbalance could have created 
firmer connections with the inner-city which might have reduced the likelihood of 
suburbanisation, but such a policy would have been incompatible with Bellevue’s growth 
model. Moreover, Bellevue’s conservativism—more ostentatious since the creation of the 
church’s political culture and its connections with the SBC’s Conservative Resurgence—had 
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the side-effect of deterring African Americans, who were far more likely to ascribe to 
politically and theologically liberal beliefs, from joining the church in the first place. Lastly, 
the proposed site in Cordova was seen as the place in which Bellevue’s targets for numerical 
expansion could best be achieved. The congregation’s response to the plans was almost 
unanimously positive, with only a small handful of people dissenting out of a total of four 
thousand voters. The atmosphere of enthusiasm for the relocation enabled Bellevue to go as 
far as referring to the move as a “victory in Jesus” and to consider the new site as the church’s 
very own Promised Land.  
 Shortly after the relocation Bellevue sold the old Midtown site to Mississippi 
Boulevard Christian Church, one of the largest and most prominent African American 
congregations in the city, for $3.5 million, which was considerably below the original asking 
price of $15 million.585 But once the congregation had been successfully transferred to its 
Cordova location, those involved with the church never looked back. From the beginning, 
growth accelerated at an even higher rate than before. Within the first five years of the move, 
9,500 new members had joined the congregation, a growth rate which was around twice as 
high as when the church was in Midtown. In numerical terms, then, the decision to relocate 
has been vindicated by the growth levels achieved. The main priority of the Ten Year Plan 
was to evangelise as many people as possible, and it is clear that for a white congregation with 
a growth model centred on attracting more whites, moving to the suburbs gave the 
congregation the best possibility to do so. By the time of Rogers retirement in September 2005 
(he would die a few months later at the age of seventy-four), Bellevue had established itself 
as one of the largest and most successful megachurches in the denomination, with over thirty 
thousand members and a yearly intake of charitable donations which could be measured in 
the tens of millions of dollars. By overseeing Bellevue’s transformation from a large inner city 
“neighbourhood” church into a suburban, regional congregation, Rogers also achieved 
something for his church which had become increasingly common in evangelicalism ever 
since the 1970s: the creation of a fully-fledged “megachurch” which, as was the norm for other 
examples such as Willow Creek in Illinois, ‘experienced [its] success in the suburbs’.586  
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Bellevue Baptist Church as a Product of the Sunbelt Suburbs 
 
As previous chapters have shown, the creation of Memphis’s “island suburbs” were 
intrinsically linked to the development of the Sunbelt as a socioeconomic, cultural and 
political entity. Since so much of Bellevue’s post-Pollard success was built upon profiting from 
its connections with the suburbs, it is therefore makes sense to consider Bellevue and other 
churches like it to be products of the Sunbelt suburbs. Far from being an anomaly, Bellevue’s 
development as a megachurch has taken place in tandem with trends at denominational and 
trans-denominational levels. In 1972, Rogers’ first year at Bellevue, 145 SBC churches with 
over 2,000 regular attendees existed (with Bellevue being one of them). Thirty years later, the 
number of SBC megachurches had risen to 458.587 Meanwhile, Bellevue’s choice of location in 
Cordova is consistent with nationwide patterns of megachurch spatial distribution. Like the 
majority of other megachurches, Bellevue resides in a suburban area in the Sunbelt with a 
high concentration of relatively wealthy, young and highly-educated residents.588 Numerous 
sociological explanations have been posited for the dramatic post-1970 rise of the megachurch, 
as well as the reasons for their tendency to be located in the suburbs.589 But this thesis has been 
concerned primarily with the effects that this suburban Sunbelt culture had on the 
congregational culture of churches like Bellevue.  
One of the handful of studies which have ‘explored the connection between the 
Sunbelt’s political culture and contemporary evangelicalism’ is Daniel K. Williams’ 
illuminating article on the ministerial and political career of Jerry Falwell.590 According to 
Williams, one of the main reasons why Falwell and other southern leaders of the Christian 
Right (not to mention regular churchgoers) had eventually embraced the Republican Party’s 
‘entire platform’ was because the development of the Sunbelt had encouraged them to become 
‘fully-fledged converts the GOP not only on “moral” issues but also on matters of economics 
and national defence’.591 Falwell came of age at a time when the Cold War defence industry 
was transforming the economic fortunes of his home town of Lynchburg, Virginia. The year 
after a large nuclear energy company and an electrical supplies business built manufacturing 
plants in the city, Falwell founded Thomas Road Baptist Church, which like Bellevue would 
eventually become one of the largest congregations in the country. The formative years of 
Falwell and his congregation were heavily influenced by the political economy of the Sunbelt, 
which brought levels of wealth and high-skilled employment that the city had never 
encountered before. Falwell had always been hostile towards the federal government and the 
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New Deal state (this was initially because of his longstanding defence of racial segregation), 
but the experience of the Sunbelt brought the pastor firmly line with Lynchburg’s fiscally 
conservative, firmly Republican business elites. This unification of fiscal and social 
conservatism via Sunbelt economics was repeated elsewhere in the region, so that by the time 
Falwell formed his Moral Majority lobby-group in 1979 many southern pastors had a 
‘devotion to the politics of corporate interest that equalled that of any conservative 
Republican’.592 The alliance between the GOP and conservative evangelicals was therefore 
forged not just through the former’s embracement of “moral” issues but also thanks to a 
‘shared political ideology that reflected the experiences of a particular region’.593 
 The theme of free market, pro-business ideology has been less relevant to this thesis’s 
analysis than Williams’ case study of Falwell (although learning more about Rogers’ and 
Bellevue laypeople’s economic orientations would be useful, and potentially the subject of 
future research). This is in part due to the distinct social and economic context of Memphis. 
The River City is a much larger than Lynchburg, and despite attracting important private-
sector investment in the 1970s it never experienced the same level industrial development as 
other Sunbelt cities. Thus, Although Memphis’s post-civil rights economic development was 
important, it was not as influential as the cold war defence industries were in Sunbelt towns 
like Lynchburg. The predominant narrative of Memphis’s post-civil rights history was, 
instead, another theme related to the creation of the Sunbelt: increasing racial division and 
polarisation, manifested in extreme levels of residential segregation and white 
suburbanisation. In terms of segregation Memphis was in the same category as the most 
extreme examples, even for a city with such a high ethnic minority presence (according to the 
2010 census African Americans made up almost two thirds of Memphis’s population, 
compared with around one third for Lynchburg). A 1990 study found, for instance, that 
Memphis’s private schools—almost all of which were located in the suburbs—were twice as 
segregated as the second most segregated private school system in the country.594 Meanwhile, the 
side-effects of white flight in Memphis—i.e. a two-tier socioeconomic and racial system in the 
city—were accentuated by the white elites in City Hall (the first African American mayor of 
the city was not elected until 1991) and by discriminatory, state-sponsored housing allocation 
practices. The former were responsible for annexing suburban Shelby County 
neighbourhoods and thereby bolstering the white electoral base of the city’s municipal 
political system, while the latter ensured that stringent limits were imposed on the extent to 
which African Americans had access to superior housing and schooling. Arguably more than 
any other city in the Sunbelt, Memphis had become, in the post-busing era, a city split vividly 
along racial and socioeconomic lines. In the words of Memphis historian Wanda Rushing, by 
the end of the 1970s the city was constituted of two ‘economic and social landscapes, suburban 
sprawl and affluence outside the I-240 [interstate] expressway ring and urban poverty 
within’.595  
 Matthew Lassiter’s metaphor of “island suburbs” in the Sunbelt is therefore 
particularly apt for Memphis, both with regard to the race and class-stratified geographical 
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divisions between inner-city and suburbs, and in relation to the distinctiveness of the two 
environments’ political and cultural dynamics.596 In Memphis and other Sunbelt cities, one of 
the most significant symptoms of this dualistic racial and socioeconomic system was the 
creation of a new form of political and racial conservatism in suburbs like Cordova. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this “colour-blind” discourse of the Silent Majority became a crucial 
Republican Party resource and stimulated the ‘emergence of a centre-right dynamic that has 
dominated American politics since the 1960s’.597 Even though Bellevue spent the majority of 
the 1980s in its historic Midtown location, Memphis’s white suburbs had an effect on the 
congregation long before its actual relocation. Despite the changing demographic situation in 
Midtown, Bellevue never struggled to attract new members during the post-Pollard revival. 
This was part due to the exceptional popularity of Rogers, but it was also because Bellevue 
represented an ideal congregational environment for many white conservatives during the 
post-civil rights era. The church’s theological conservatism, which espoused individualist 
explanations for social and racial inequality, mirrored several of the defining features of 
colour-blind conservatism, which ‘depicted residential segregation as the class-based 
outcome of meritocratic individualism rather than the unconstitutional product of structural 
racism’. 598  Meanwhile, Rogers’ targeting of the same middle class, conservative, “first 
generation suburbanites” who were migrating to East Memphis strengthened the connections 
the church had with the suburbs, thereby exposing the congregation to the political culture of 
the Silent Majority.599 This was reflected to some extent in the creation of Bellevue’s own 
political culture in the 1980s, which as Chapter 4 discussed was expressed in numerous 
different forms and which resulted in a closer cultural and political affinity with the Christian 
Right and the GOP. Sometimes this was even expressed in surprisingly clear, unambiguous 
ways. As one Bellevue member commented in an interview in 1993, ‘voters coming out of 
Bellevue Baptist were conservative and Republican—that is, “if they’re really in tune with 
what’s being taught here”’.600 Indeed, by the time the finishing touches were being put on 
Bellevue’s grand new sanctuary, the congregation was in political-cultural—as well as 
socioeconomic—terms closely aligned with its suburban surroundings.   
 
Contribution 
 
Through the case study of Bellevue Baptist Church this thesis has attempted to demonstrate 
the connections between a handful of important, interrelated dimensions of post-war 
Protestant, urban and political history: namely, the resurgent growth of conservative 
evangelicalism, the rise of the megachurch, the development of the Sunbelt suburbs, and the 
creation of the “Christian Right”. The congregational angle has been a response to the 
historiographical tendency to examine only the elite-level features of contemporary 
evangelicalism, and has enabled this thesis to explore how local, urban forces related to 
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important individual churches like Bellevue. This new perspective has resulted in a fresh 
interpretation of conservative evangelicalism’s post-1960s engagement with politics, and the 
movement’s unprecedentedly-strong electoral and political loyalty to the Republican Party. 
Political scientist Clyde Wilcox defines the Christian Right as ‘a social movement that attempts 
to mobilise evangelical Protestants and other orthodox Christians into political action’. 601 
Figures like Jerry Falwell and Bellevue layman Ed McAteer confirm that direct political 
mobilisation and partisanship was indeed an important part of the story of the Christian 
Right. But this thesis has shown that beneath the surface of the movement’s elite-level partisan 
mobilisation there existed an underlying political culture at churches like Bellevue which has 
hitherto never been investigated. The political-cultural framework helps explain both the new 
willingness, at the beginning of the 1980s, of conservative evangelicals to apply evangelical 
principles to what had been defined as the pertinent “moral” issues of the period, and the 
strong, long-lasting loyalty that the movement has shown towards the GOP. In this sense, it 
is perhaps necessary to amend Wilcox’s conventional definition of the Christian Right so that 
it implies not just a top-down process of mobilisation (or a “social movement”) but also takes 
into account the millions of ordinary laypeople who attended conservative churches like 
Bellevue and who at a collective level made the macro-level political realignments of the 
movement a reality. A point made by Matthew Lassiter in his study of the Silent Majority is 
highly pertinent in this respect: it was ‘suburban homeowners who were neither committed 
activists nor conservative ideologues’ who were the real driving force behind many of the 
political realignments of the post-civil rights age.602  
The alliance between conservative evangelicals and the GOP is often taken for granted 
today, but it is important to remember that before the 1980s it did not even exist. Prior to their 
abandonment of Jimmy Carter and the Democratic Party, conservative evangelicals were 
roughly as likely to vote Democrat as they were to support the GOP. Just under half of white 
evangelicals backed the Baptist presidential nominee in 1976 (with fifty-six percent of white 
Baptists supporting Carter).603 However, ever since the 1980 presidential election conservative 
evangelicals have displayed an unusually steadfast electoral loyalty towards the Republican 
Party. Sixty-seven percent of white evangelicals voted for Reagan in 1980, and in every 
presidential election that has taken place since then conservative evangelicals have turned out 
for Republican candidates at a strongly disproportional rate. This is despite the fluctuating 
fortunes over the last thirty-five years of the Christian Right’s most famous representatives. 
In the 1990s, for instance, Jerry Falwell experienced a severe drop in his political influence, 
and the Virginian pastor discontinued the Moral Majority in 1989 (although it was relaunched 
in 2004 under a different name). Nonetheless, during the twenty-first century white 
evangelicals have supported the GOP with what is arguably an even greater enthusiasm than 
during the height of their relationship with Reagan. In the 2000 and 2004 elections, for 
instance, between eighty and eight-five percent of evangelicals voted for George W. Bush. 
Thus, regardless of the condition of the Christian Right’s elite, there has been a consistent 
evangelical affinity with the GOP at a collective level. The creation of a conservative political 
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culture in evangelical churches, which mirrored key features of the GOP and helped tether 
the movement to the Party, helps explain how this loyalty was possible, even while the 
political influence of figures like Falwell was declining.  
One of the many paradoxes of American evangelicalism is the movement’s fraught 
relationship with politics. It does not take long for any scholar studying the history of 
evangelical politics to stumble across manifestations of this paradox. The research carried out 
for this dissertation has demonstrated to the author that the post-civil rights decades of the 
movement were no exception to this trend. Evangelicals’ confusing and sometimes 
contradictory approaches towards politics has made understanding the nature of their 
engagement a challenge. But this thesis has nonetheless attempted to take these contradictions 
seriously and to confront them directly.604 The most important conundrum discussed in this 
dissertation has been the clear Republicanisation of conservative white evangelicals—what 
Daniel K. Williams refers to as ‘a Republican voting bloc that party strategists could not afford 
to ignore’—and the simultaneous hesitance of evangelical leaders and laypeople at churches 
like Bellevue to bring partisan politics into the pulpit.605 Although some members of Bellevue 
were indeed receptive to the linkages between the church’s religious culture and the GOP, 
many have felt that their faith had nothing to do with politics. To these people, the 
denominational and political activities of Rogers and McAteer felt like an irrelevance to their 
spiritual lives, and they often did not consider themselves to be political at all. It is submitted 
here that the political-cultural framework exhibited in this dissertation allows for these 
contradictory factors to exist simultaneously. This is because the creation of Bellevue’s new 
congregational culture during the 1980s and beyond—which informed the political 
behaviours and attitudes of the church’s members—was more about the influence of indirect 
factors than it was to do with the somewhat restrictive, limited notions of partisan 
pronouncements and direct political mobilisation. The political-cultural framework has taken 
into account how the experiences of demographic and cultural change in the post-civil rights 
Sunbelt suburbs informed the congregational culture of conservative evangelicalism, and in 
turn the political orientations and behaviours of this particularly enigmatic group.  
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